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Corporate governance has been a very topical issue in the public and academic discussion of 
recent years. In particular, since the start of the current financial and economic crisis many 
politicians and the press have blamed flawed corporate governance mechanisms as premier 
cause for the failure of financial and non-financial corporations. As a consequence, most gov-
ernments around the world currently discuss additional regulations of private enterprises. In 
Germany, for example, the government started a legislative initiative to regulate management 
compensation in order to prevent excessive risk taking and to make managers more long-term 
oriented. In this context, the question arises why shareholders and market mechanisms have 
failed to provide managers with the right incentives to maximize firm value and whether the 
causal relationship implied by the current debate indeed exists. The public discussion mostly 
overlooks these issues, which highlights why empirical corporate governance research is im-
portant, to give policy makers unbiased and economically founded advice before regulatory 
steps are taken. 
This dissertation contributes to different areas in empirical corporate governance: composition 
of boards of directors (Chapter II), agency costs of free cash flow and the influence of large 
(institutional) blockholder (Chapter III), managerial preferences and the market for corporate 
control (Chapter IV), and insider trading (Chapter V). Before I briefly outline each of the 
Chapters, I introduce in more detail the subject of corporate governance and its roots in the 
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. I relegate the detailed discus-
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sion of the relevant literature in each of the different areas studied and the empirical issues 
faced to the respective Chapters II to V. 
2 Corporate governance 
The book of Berle and Means (1932) is widely regarded as the starting point of the academic 
discussion about corporate governance (see, for example, Tirole, 2006, p. 15). They were the 
first who documented that the separation of ownership and control is a problem of economic 
and empirical relevance.1 Berle and Means showed that already in 1929 almost half of the 200 
largest U.S. non-financial corporations had no shareholder owning more than 20% of the cor-
poration’s stock. Based on this observation they argue that the dispersion of shareholders cre-
ates substantial discretion of managers over corporate resources, which those are likely to 
abuse. Since then, the understanding of corporate governance has developed tremendously. 
Today it is well accepted that managers do not necessarily act in the best interest of the capital 
providers. On the one hand, the academic literature has documented a large number of prob-
lems connected to managerial moral hazard, including low managerial effort, inefficient in-
vestments, private benefits, self-dealing, and the manipulation of accounting numbers. On the 
other hand, the literature has also identified possibilities to alleviate the problem of moral 
hazard by aligning the interests of managers and providers of capital. These possibilities can 
be grouped in two broad categories (1) tying executive compensation to firm performance and 
(2) monitoring of management activities by current and future investors. Therefore, the domi-
nant view of economics on the subject of corporate governance is that it “deals with the ways 
in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
                                                 
1  Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2005) cite a number of authors, who already discussed the problems associated 
with the separation of ownership and control before Berle and Means (1932). Already Adam Smith (1776, 
p. 741) pointed out that directors of a joint-stock corporation might oversee the firm’s operations with less 
vigilance than partners in a private partnership. 
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One of the most controversial debates in the area of corporate governance centers on the ques-
tion to which extent regulation (by governments, stock exchanges or other authorities) or in-
dividual corporations should determine the level of investor protection from abusive behavior 
of managers. The book of Berle and Means (1932) was probably the first empirical study in-
fluencing government regulation on corporate governance. Shortly after its publication, a se-
ries of laws regulating security markets and corporations were passed (e.g., the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935), which influence U.S. corporate governance until today.2 During the 1950s the opinion 
on the necessity of government intervention in corporate governance changed quite substan-
tially, Alchian (1950), Friedman (1953), and Stigler (1958) argue that product market compe-
tition forces firms to minimize costs and therefore to adopt corporate governance mecha-
nisms, in order to raise capital at lowest cost (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The Alchian-
Friedman-Stigler hypothesis (see Giroud and Mueller, 2009) predicts that in the long run 
competition will take care of corporate governance and therefore government interventions 
are unnecessary. In the 1960s the idea of the market for corporate control was introduced by 
Rostow (1959) and Manne (1964, 1965) as an effective mechanism of disciplining manage-
ment (see Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 2005). In their view, hostile takeovers are a severe threat 
for managers and constitute a countervailing force against managerial discretion if ownership 
and control are separated.3  
The discussion about the separation of ownership and control was revived by the paper of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), where they propose a new theory of the ownership structure of 
the firm. Jensen and Meckling argue that the separation of ownership and control causes 
                                                 
2  It is hard to say with certainty to which extend the New Deal legislation of the Roosevelt administration 
was guided by the book of Berle and Means. The assessment of their contribution varies largely from being 
“the economic Bible of the Roosevelt administration” according to the Time magazine (Hessen, 1983) to 
“the book was at most a most minor influence on the formulation and passage of the securities acts” (Stigler 
and Friedland, 1983). 
3  Grossmann and Hart (1980) show that this mechanism may suffer from free-riding problems because small 
shareholders are better off if they keep their stock until the raider has replaced the inefficient management 
and improved the profitability of the target company. 
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agency costs, which depend on the ownership and capital structure of the firm, the bonding 
costs borne by managers, and the monitoring costs borne by investors. They argue that agency 
costs decline as management ownership increases because as the stake of managers rises they 
pay a larger share of these costs and therefore are less likely to pursue non-value maximizing 
objectives. Debt financing as substitute for outside equity is associated with lower agency 
costs but beyond a certain leverage the marginal agency costs of debt start to dominate the 
marginal costs of outside equity. The reason is that limited liability gives managers an incen-
tive to gamble with creditors’ money if leverage is high. Bonding and monitoring activities 
can reduce perk consumption and gambling by managers, but will generally not eliminate the 
problem of agency costs completely. In the view of Jensen and Meckling, the current form of 
corporations has survived despite its shortcomings, because of its superior attributes com-
pared to potential alternatives. 
The first who empirically examined the influence of the ownership structure on corporate per-
formance were Demsetz and Lehn (1985). They find no significant relationship between own-
ership structure and accounting profits, which supports the view already formulated by Dem-
setz (1983) that the ownership structure of the firm is endogenously determined by a maximi-
zation process not only taking into account the problem of possible shareholder expropriation 
by managers. Demsetz and Lehn’s paper sets the stage not only for a large number of subse-
quent papers investigating the effects of the separation of ownership and control but also on 
the much broader discussion of endogeneity issues in empirical corporate governance. After 
their study, a large number of authors investigated the question, whether management owner-
ship influences firm performance and value. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a), for exam-
ple, argue that there is a non-monotonic relationship between management ownership and 
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firm value.4 They find that Tobin’s Q (their measure of firm value) first increases, then de-
creases and finally increases again as ownership by board members rises. Morck et al. explain 
this finding with two countervailing effects: (1) the incentive effect, which leads to higher 
firm value if management ownership increases and (2) the entrenchment effect, which occurs 
at certain levels of management ownership, where managers are practically insulated from the 
market for corporate control or other monitoring mechanisms but only bear a relatively small 
part of the costs caused by their non-value-maximizing behavior. Already Morck et al. caution 
to interpret their results as evidence of a causal relationship running from management owner-
ship to firm value. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) introduce new methods to the empirical discussion as 
they use panel data and instrumental variable techniques to detect the influence of manage-
ment ownership on firm value (performance).5 They find that managerial ownership is consis-
tently explained by the contracting environment of firms and “cannot conclude (econometri-
cally) that changes in managerial ownership affect firm performance” (Himmelberg et al., 
1999). Their results are therefore consistent with the view of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that 
firms choose management ownership optimally to minimize agency costs in the long run. 
Himmelberg et al. point out that there are two problems for the empirical analysis caused by 
the endogeneity of managerial ownership and firm value. First, it is quite likely that causality 
runs not from ownership to firm value but in opposite direction, which is known as reverse 
causality. The idea is that managers hold larger equity stakes in firms expected to be highly 
profitable in the future because thereby they can maximize their private wealth (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977). Second, it is also possible that both ownership and performance are determined 
by one or more unobserved variables in the firm’s contracting environment, which could lead 
                                                 
4 Other papers finding a significant (non-monotonic) relationship between management ownership and firm 
value are McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and Holderness, Kroszner, and 
Sheehan (1999). 
5 Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) provide an overview of the literature on managerial ownership and firm 
performance since the publication of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) until the paper of Himmelberg, Hubbard, 
and Palia (1999). 
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to spurious correlation. Himmelberg et al. give an example of a firm, which has for some his-
torical reason superior market power compared to its competitors. This firm’s management is 
therefore at least partly insulated from product market competition. As a consequence, the 
optimal contract for managers in this firm might call for more managerial equity ownership to 
better align interests of shareholders and management. The profitability of the firm with more 
market power is likely to be higher compared to its peers and therefore empirically a positive 
correlation between managerial ownership and firm performance would be measured. Besides 
the illustration of spurious correlation, this example also highlights another important issue of 
empirical corporate governance research: firm performance is most likely not only affected by 
managerial ownership but also other governance mechanisms. The example draws on the po-
tentially disciplining effect of product market competition, which was already discussed 
above. Other mechanisms to control agency costs and thereby firm performance are owner-
ship of institutions and large blockholders, composition of the board of directors, debt policy, 
the managerial labor market, and the already mentioned market for corporate control (see 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Since firms make simultaneous choices of individual mecha-
nisms given their current institutional environment, it might not be sufficient to just estimate 
models, only taking into account one (or a few) of these interrelated governance mechanisms 
to derive causal relationships.  
An emerging literature on corporate governance develops indices to evaluate the quality of a 
firm’s governance (see, for example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 
2006). These indices are based on publicly available databases (e.g., IRRC, ISS) of firm-level 
corporate governance practices and usually just add up a large number of provisions, which 
are regarded as good or bad governance. This approach of course does not properly take into 
account any possible interrelation, complementarity or substitutability of governance mecha-
nisms. Arcot and Bruno (2007) criticize this tick box approach as “one size fits all” frame-
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work, which does not take into account that companies are not homogenous entities.6 They 
provide empirical evidence that firms departing from governance best practice are not neces-
sarily badly governed. It is particularly important to keep these results in mind when making 
policy recommendations, because it is not necessarily clear that additional regulation on 
transparency requirements, executive compensation or board composition increases the value 
of firms. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), for example, find that the regulatory response 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act) to the corporate scandals in the U.S. in 2001 and 2002 (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom) were detrimental for many small corporations. 
The problem becomes even more complex, when analyzing the effect of good corporate gov-
ernance across countries, because institutional settings crucially affect individual firm’s 
choices of governance mechanisms. Cross-country studies investigating the effect of govern-
ance practices on firm performance using broad corporate governance indices include Aggar-
wal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), Bruno and Claessens (2007), Chhaochharia and 
Laeven (2009), and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007). 
Giroud and Mueller (2009) illustrate how individual governance mechanisms might influence 
each other by exploiting the exogenous event of the passage of business combination laws in 
different U.S. states to measure the effect of product market competition on firm perform-
ance.7 Business combination laws were enacted to hinder corporate raiders from gaining ac-
cess to the target’s assets and therefore reduce the possibility of hostile takeovers. Giroud and 
Mueller find that this exogenous change in the effectiveness of the market for corporate con-
trol caused a significant decline in performance for firms operating in non-competitive indus-
                                                 
6 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell (2009) criticize broad corporate governance indices, which try to include as 
many provisions as possible as “kitchen sink” approach. They suggest that only a small subset of govern-
ance provisions is of real significance and propose an entrenchment index, which is based on only six of the 
originally 24 provisions used by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). They show that only these six provi-
sions are associated with lower firm value, whereas the other 18 provisions are uncorrelated. 
7 Another example for interrelations between governance mechanisms is presented by Cremers and Nair 
(2005), who suggest that a complementarity between internal (e.g., shareholder activism) and external (e.g., 
market for corporate control) governance mechanisms exists. Only firms that are vulnerable to takeovers or 
have high institutional blockholder ownership exhibit superior performance. 
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tries, while it did not affect firms in competitive industries. They can actually identify a causal 
relationship because they use an augmented difference-in-difference approach, which care-
fully accounts for the endogeneity problem. Their analysis reveals that even if firms converge 
to a contractual optimum in the long run as implied by the results of Himmelberg et al. there 
still might be rather long periods of adjustment, probably caused by some fixed costs to 
change the corporate governance of firms. 
3 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter II analyzes the effects of bankers on supervisory boards of German non-financial 
corporations on firm policies and performance. The study suggests that bankers, while pro-
moting their own business, actually cause a decline in the valuation of non-financial firms. 
Moreover, it provides evidence that the representation of bankers on supervisory boards has 
considerably reduced in recent years. One can interpret this adjustment of board composition 
as support for the hypothesis that firms slowly optimize their corporate governance after a 
formerly (presumably) efficient governance mechanism became inefficient. To address the 
obvious endogeneity problem between board composition and firm performance, the analysis 
takes advantage of the time dimension in the panel data set by using lagged explanatory vari-
ables and including the lagged dependent variable as an additional right-hand-side variable in 
the regressions. The lagged dependent variable filters out most of the effect of unobserved 
variables, because the dependent and the lagged dependent variable are affected in equal 
measure by this problem. This approach identifies causality in the sense of Granger (1969). 
Additionally also fixed effects are used to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Chapter III analyzes, instead of one particular governance mechanism in detail for a large 
number of firms, the complete corporate governance arrangement of one firm. This chapter 
presents a clinical study examining the transformation of Preussag, a diversified German con-
glomerate of “old economy” businesses, into TUI, a company focused entirely on tourism and 
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logistics. By focusing on one firm this analysis allows identifying the causal relationship from 
ineffective corporate governance to poor firm performance. The analysis brings out an impor-
tant point of the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986; 1993). The problem is not limited to 
managerial discretion over high operating cash flows, but extends also to managerial discre-
tion over large amounts of liquid resources. Preussag’s divestitures of “old economy” busi-
nesses created additional liquidity without sufficient incentives for management to use this 
liquidity efficiently. Instead, the CEO of Preussag (later TUI) was able to pursue his pet pro-
ject, to build the largest European tourism company, without interference of any of company’s 
watchdogs even after several billions in shareholder value were destroyed. This case illus-
trates that managers can act against the interest of shareholders for rather long periods, before 
efficiency is restored. The entrenchment of the CEO, stemming from its close personal ties to 
the largest shareholder of Preussag, seems to play the crucial role in explaining how he be-
came the CEO with the longest tenure in a large listed German corporation. In particular, the 
analysis exemplifies that large blockholders, who themselves suffer from agency problems, 
not necessarily help to overcome the problems arising from the separation of ownership and 
control. 
As just highlighted in the discussion of Chapter III, managerial entrenchment can considera-
bly reduce the disciplining effect of governance mechanisms. If entrenchment insulates man-
agers from the pressure to maximize shareholder value, it is important to understand which 
goals managers would pursue. The recent empirical literature on entrenched managers has 
found that managers will pay their workers more (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999; Cron-
qvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos, 2009) and in general prefer to avoid difficult 
decisions and costly efforts (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999; Giroud and Mueller, 2009). 
Therefore, the empirical evidence that average managers seem to enjoy the “quiet life” is in 
contrast to the prior literature on managerial preferences, which had assumed that managers 
prefer to maximize the amount of assets under their control (e.g., Baumol, 1959). Starting 
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from this observation, Chapter IV challenges the conventional view that value-destroying 
acquisitions are primarily undertaken by empire-building managers. This chapter provides 
evidence that quiet-life managers execute acquisitions to secure the independence of their 
firms and thereby private benefits of control. These presumably defensive acquisitions of 
quiet-life managers are associated with significantly negative bidder announcement returns 
and therefore offer a new explanation for the well-established empirical result that many ac-
quisitions lead to the destruction of shareholder value for bidder companies. 
In contrast to the preceding chapters, Chapter V deals with an issue actually caused by an in-
complete separation of ownership and control. Since officers and directors of corporations are 
allowed to trade shares of their corporation, they are offered an opportunity to expropriate 
other shareholders. By virtue of their position, insiders obtain superior information about the 
economic situation of their firm, which they could potentially use to make trading profits at 
the expense of uninformed investors.8 Kyle (1985) presents a model, where informed insiders 
can actually maximize their trading profits by camouflaging their information. The first to test 
this prediction empirically were Barclay and Warner (1993), who find evidence that most of a 
stock’s cumulative price change occurs on medium-sized trades. This observation is consis-
tent with informed traders splitting their trades in smaller transactions to conceal their infor-
mation from outside investors before it is publicly announced. Medium-sized trades seem to 
provide an optimal trade-off between fixed costs of trading, time constraints and the objective 
to hide information. Barclay and Warner call this technique of splitting transactions stealth 
trading. However, their analysis and the subsequent literature based on their methodology 
only provide indirect evidence of stealth trading, because they cannot identify the behavior of 
individual traders.9 The results presented in Chapter V provide direct evidence of stealth trad-
                                                 
8  Due to this obvious problem of asymmetric information between insiders and outside investors, regulators 
in most countries have now outlawed informed insider trading and disclosure requirements were considera-
bly tightened over the last two decades (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). 
9  See, for example, Chakravarty (2001), Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004), and Anand and Chak-
ravarty (2007). 
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ing, by investigating the trading behavior of corporate insiders. However, there is only limited 
support for the hypothesis that insiders try to camouflage private information by using stealth 
trading. It rather seems that insiders just trade larger stakes than other investors and split 
transactions in order to reduce the temporary price impact of their trades, which compensates 
the market maker for providing liquidity. 
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Chapter II 
2 Bankers on the Boards of German 
Firms: What they do, what they are 
worth, and why they are (still) there 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we document how German banks affect non-financial companies through 
board representation during the period from 1994 to 2005.10 Our main result is that banks 
benefit from being present on the boards of non-financial firms: they increase their lending to 
these firms and to other firms in the same industry, and they are more likely to be chosen as 
an advisor if these firms undertake an acquisition. We also present evidence that banks help 
non-financial firms to overcome financing restrictions. By contrast, they do not act in the in-
terest of equity holders – even if they themselves hold an equity stake. Overall, having a 
banker on the board is associated with lower performance, and we argue that the causality is 
likely to run from bank presence to low performance. 
                                                 
10  This chapter is based on joint work with Ingolf Dittmann and Ernst Maug, therefore I retain the personal 
pronoun “we”, used in the original paper, throughout this chapter. An abridged version of this chapter is 
forthcoming in the Review of Finance. All tables are gathered at the end of the chapter. We are grateful to 
Rafel Crespi, Miguel A. García-Cestona, Abe de Jong, Jan Krahnen, Daniel Kreutzmann, Claudio Loderer, 
Ulrike Malmendier, Garen Markarian, Werner Neus, Jörg Rocholl, Günseli Tümer-Alkan, Yishay Yafeh, 
David Yermack, and seminar participants at Humboldt-University Berlin, the Campus for Finance Research 
conference, the University of Cologne, the ECGI Best Paper on Corporate Governance Competition con-
ferences, the European School of Management and Technology, Universidad Autònoma de Barcelona, Hel-
sinki School of Economics, the University of Konstanz, the Conference on Corporate Governance in Co-
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The relationship between banks and non-financial companies in Germany has been the subject 
of continuing debate in the literature. Earlier comparative analyses in the 1980s and before 
have focused more on the advantages of the German bank-based system compared to the An-
glo-Saxon market-based financial system. Banks were credited with providing a long-term 
view on investment, providing expertise to companies as well as improved corporate govern-
ance.11 Many of these commentators inferred that the growth performance of post-war Ger-
many was directly related to the superiority of the German financial system, characterized by 
house banks, representation of banks on companies’ supervisory boards, and the ability of 
banks to vote the shares of their customers. The more recent literature provides a less favor-
able perspective and emphasizes the lower quality of governance in civil law countries like 
Germany (La Porta et al., 1997). 
In the intervening period, the gap between both systems has narrowed through institutional 
changes on both sides of the Atlantic. In Germany, legislators enacted a sequence of laws to 
enhance corporate governance by outlawing insider trading, increasing disclosure standards, 
and introducing a new regulator for financial markets. The most significant institutional chan-
ge for our study was a change in capital gains taxation that became effective in 2002, which 
allowed banks to divest their equity holdings without paying capital gains taxes. This change 
in legislation substantially reduced the costs of selling equity stakes, particularly those stakes 
banks held for a long time and with an accordingly low tax base. Mostly because of this legal 
change, average equity ownership of banks in non-financial companies in Germany declined 
by a factor of 10, from 4.1% in 1994 to 0.4% in 2005. At the same time, the number of board 
seats held by bankers decreases only moderately from 9.6% to 5.6%. The number of boards 
                                                 
11  See, for example, Mayer (1988). A good survey of these opinions as well as an early critique of these views 
is offered by Edwards and Fischer (1994), in particular in their chapter 1. Jensen (1989) argues that LBOs 
and similar going private transactions move the U.S. system towards the successful post-war Japanese sys-
tem of corporate financing, which he also characterizes by close links between banks and non-financial 
companies. 
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where bankers are represented declined from 51% to 33% and seems to stabilize at around 
that value, which is also in line with findings for the U.S. 
The increased disparity between equity ownership and board representation is puzzling and 
provides a backdrop against which we evaluate several hypotheses that explain the presence 
and effect of bankers on the boards of non-financial firms. We investigate three general hy-
potheses that have been developed in the literature to explain the presence of bankers on the 
boards of non-financial companies, in particular: (1) Bankers provide capital markets exper-
tise and act as financial experts; (2) they monitor non-financial companies either because 
these companies are borrowers or because they hold an equity stake; (3) they promote their 
own business, either as commercial bankers (by increasing their lending to these firms or to 
other firms in the same industry) or as investment bankers (by selling more advisory ser-
vices). We develop these hypotheses in more detail in the following section. Finally, we are 
also interested in the relationship between banks’ board representation and firm value. 
A major challenge for our study is to identify the direction of causality, because virtually all 
variables in our analysis are arguably endogenous. The negative relation between bank pres-
ence and performance, for instance, can be explained in three ways: (1) bankers cause low 
performance, (2) firms with low performance appoint bankers to their board, or (3) some ad-
ditional variable (e.g., industry or corporate governance) affects performance and the attrac-
tiveness of board seats for bankers. To address the endogeneity problem, we take advantage 
of the time dimension in our panel data set, lag the explanatory variables in our regressions 
and include the lagged dependent variable as an additional right-hand-side variable. Hence, 
we only analyze the explanatory power of the independent variables beyond the explanatory 
power included in lagged values of the dependent variable itself. This identifies causality in 
the sense of Granger (1969). We also use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogene-
ity.  
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Our analysis is based on a unique, hand-collected panel data set for all firms that were among 
the largest 100 listed companies in Germany for any year in our sample period from 1994 to 
2005. This provides us with a data set for 137 non-financial firms and 11 banks. We also use 
data from Deutsche Bundesbank, which contains the total amount of loans that is provided by 
a given bank to a given firm. We find strong evidence that bankers on the board of German 
non-financial firms promote their own business: Banks lend more to the firms on whose 
boards they are represented, and some evidence that they also lend more to other firms in the 
same industry. We also find compelling evidence that bankers use board seats to promote 
their investment banking business, because the presence of bankers on the board is strongly 
correlated with firms’ subsequent choices of their M&A advisors. We also find substantial 
evidence that bankers are capital market experts who help companies to acquire external fi-
nance more easily or to fund capital expenditures. By contrast, we do not find any evidence 
(and sometimes even contradicting evidence) to support the notion that bankers on the board 
act as monitors. They do not act in their interests as equity-holders, a role that largely disap-
pears during our sample period. Neither do they seem to protect their interests as lenders. 
Finally, we investigate the relation between bank representation and firm value and find that 
this is consistently negative. We establish that performance deteriorates after bankers have 
been appointed to the board, which suggests that bankers cause low performance.12 We con-
clude that the board relationships between banks and non-financial firms are beneficial for the 
banks, while they are potentially harmful for non-financial firms. Our results suggest that 
German universal banks do not behave much differently from U.S. specialist banks: Their role 
as a shareholder in non-financial firms has disappeared and they are mainly interested in pro-
                                                 
12  Alternatively, bankers may assume board seats in those companies where they expect performance to dete-
riorate. We regard it as unlikely that bankers consistently accept board appointments before performance 
deteriorates, but never after performance deteriorates. 
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moting their lending and investment banking business.13 As a result, the German financial 
system has lost some of its formerly distinctive features. 
The argument proceeds as follows. We provide a literature review and develop our hypothe-
ses in Section 2. Section 3 describes the main features of the relevant institutional framework, 
the construction of our data set, and the methods we use. Section 4 discusses the factors that 
influence the presence of bankers on the supervisory boards of non-financial firms. Section 5 
asks what role bankers actually perform on the boards, and Section 6 addresses the question 
whether firms benefit from having a banker on their board. Section 7 integrates our findings 
and relates them to the hypotheses developed in Section 2. Section 8 concludes. 
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Several mutually non-exclusive hypotheses regarding bank representation have been ad-
vanced in the literature (see Kroszner and Strahan (2001), and Byrd and Mizruchi (2005)). 
We develop these hypotheses here in detail. In all cases, we distinguish between three ques-
tions. First, we want to understand the motivations of banks to seek board representation in 
non-financial companies. Second, once bankers are represented on the board we want to un-
derstand the impact they have on financing and investment decisions. These two questions are 
clearly linked, but bankers may or may not pursue the agenda they were meant to pursue 
when they were elected to the board. Finally, we are interested in the link between bank rep-
resentation on the board and firm value. 
2.1 Bankers provide capital markets expertise 
The capital markets expertise hypothesis emphasizes the demand side and therefore the 
characteristics of companies that actively seek bank representation on their boards. According 
to this hypothesis, bankers are appointed to the boards of non-financial companies as financial 
                                                 
13  Similar results have been found for the U.S. by Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) and Güner, Malmendier and Tate 
(2008). In contrast, Jagannathan and Krishnamurthy (2004) show that investment bankers on the board 
have a positive effect on firm value in the U.S. 
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experts who help the company to obtain funding. Bankers on the board overcome adverse 
selection and credit rationing problems so that companies that have a banker on their board 
should use more bank lending and increase their leverage.14 The company should then be fi-
nancially less constrained and investment decisions of firms with a banker on the board 
should be responsive only to their own investment opportunities. If bankers are experts at 
pricing debt, then companies that rely more on debt financing should also include more bank-
ers on the board (Booth and Deli, 1999). In terms of consequences for financial policy, in-
creases in leverage should then be accompanied by higher capital expenditure and capital ex-
penditure should be higher for firms with a banker after controlling for investment opportuni-
ties. The effect on firm value of a relaxation of financing constraints is unclear, however. The 
effect is positive if the reduced constraints allow the firm to invest in positive net present 
value projects, which it would not have been able to finance otherwise. On the other hand, 
relaxed financing constraints might also allow managers to overinvest or to waste resources. 
2.2 Bankers monitor non-financial firms 
Our remaining hypotheses emphasize the supply side and the motivations of bankers to seek 
representation on the boards of certain companies. There are two general motivations: moni-
toring of the bank’s investments, and the promotion of the bank’s own business. Depending 
on the type of investment, there are two variants of the monitoring hypothesis. First, accord-
ing to the equity monitoring hypothesis, bankers on boards simply represent their interests as 
shareholders, just as any other block owner may do. If this is correct, then we should see that 
bank representation is closely associated with bank ownership of shares, and that they engage 
more in underperforming companies with lower valuations, as these companies seem to indi-
cate a stronger need for intervention by the owners. Hence, we should see a negative associa-
                                                 
14  Ramirez (1995), Byrd and Mizruchi (2005), and Ciamarra (2006) provide evidence for the capital markets 
expertise hypothesis for U.S. firms. Morck and Nakamura (1999) provide supporting evidence for Japan. 
Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) list a number of sources that develop the capital markets expertise hypothesis 
(pp. 229-30). 
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tion between the appointment of a banker and Tobin’s Q.15 Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) 
argue that entrenched managers tend to have less leverage and that a better representation of 
the interest of owners should therefore increase leverage. According to this view, bankers 
should increase leverage and if they increase leverage primarily in pursuit of their equity in-
terests, then this increase in leverage should be spread across different sources of borrowing. 
Similarly, banks as equity investors should press for higher payouts of free cash flows to 
shareholders, just as much as any other blockholder would. As a consequence, we should ob-
serve improving performance and higher valuations for firms with bank representation on the 
board. 
The second variant of the monitoring hypothesis, the debt monitoring hypothesis holds that 
bankers wish to safeguard their existing loans and want to get involved in those companies 
where their loans have a significant probability to be distressed in the future.16 Then bank 
representation on the board allows bankers to influence financial and investment policies to 
protect the interests of the firm’s existing creditors and becomes a substitute for loan cove-
nants. In this scenario, we should see more bankers on the boards of companies that are riskier 
and have a higher likelihood of entering financial distress, fewer collateralizable assets, and 
higher leverage, in particular through loans from the bank represented on the board. If bankers 
represent the interests of lenders, we should expect a lower payout ratio and a decline in the 
firm’s risk. The implications for the value of the firm are ambiguous. Debt monitoring may 
reduce adverse selection costs and therefore the costs of capital, which increases the value of 
the firm. However, steering the investment policy of the firm towards lower risk investments 
and lower payouts may reduce firm value. 
                                                 
15  Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue for the case of Japan that poor stock 
performance increases the likelihood of bankers being appointed to the boards of non-financial companies. 
16  See Fama (1985) and James (1987). Morck and Nakamura (1999) show that bankers on the boards of Japa-
nese firms primarily act in the interest of creditors. 
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2.3 Bankers promote their own business 
The German proxy voting rules allow banks to vote the shares of their depositors. Since large 
fractions of the shares of German companies are deposited with the large banks, this permits 
banks to elect their own managers to corporate boards independently of their own equity 
stakes. As a result, banks may use board representation in order to promote their own busi-
ness. We distinguish between three sub-hypotheses. First, bankers might seek board seats in 
order to sell debt to the firm (debt selling hypothesis).17 In particular, they may wish to better 
screen loan applications and to obtain inside information on the financial status of (potential) 
borrowers. We would then expect that bankers seek representation on the boards of firms with 
large, unutilized debt capacity, i.e., firms with a large proportion of tangible assets, low vola-
tility, and low existing leverage. In contrast to the equity monitoring hypothesis, this argu-
ment does not imply that bankers on the board cause higher overall leverage. It only implies 
more lending from the bank represented on the board. Borrowing across all sources of funding 
may even be reduced if borrowing from the bank represented on the board displaces borrow-
ing from other sources.18 If bankers on the board represent the interests of their employer in 
this way then the firm will most likely borrow too much and at less advantageous terms, 
which should lead to a reduction in firm value. 
A closely related argument, the industry expertise hypothesis states that bankers may derive 
industry knowledge from their board seats, which then allows them to condition their lending 
decisions to firms in that industry more accurately. For example, banks may be willing to ad-
vance credit lines to companies only if they learn sufficiently quickly if lending conditions in 
the industry deteriorate, so that they can make timely decisions to call back these credit lines. 
                                                 
17  Booth and Deli (1999) find that the presence of commercial bankers on the boards of U.S. companies is 
associated with higher aggregate debt levels. 
18  Daniševská, de Jong, and Verbeek (2004) argue that banks use their influence to increase lending but re-
duce overall leverage to maximize the value of their own loans. Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) show that U.S. 
commercial bankers who are also lenders to the firm have a negative effect on the debt ratio. In contrast, 
Booth and Deli (1999) find that the presence of commercial bankers on the boards of U.S. companies is as-
sociated with higher aggregate debt levels. 
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This hypothesis implies that a bank’s representation on the boards within an industry is posi-
tively related to future lending of this bank to firms in this industry. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this hypothesis has not been formulated or tested in the literature before. 19 
Finally, banks may also sell other services to their clients and we label this hypothesis selling 
M&A advisory services (e.g., Güner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008). The firms in our sample 
are large and undertake mergers and acquisitions on a regular basis to complement their op-
erations. Some of the banks represented on the boards of these firms also own investment-
banking divisions, which typically contribute significantly to the overall profitability of uni-
versal banks in Germany. We therefore expect that bankers on boards channel the high margin 
M&A advisory business towards their own employer. We do not expect this to have a major 
implication for valuation, unless mergers and acquisitions account for a large fraction of a 
company’s economic activity. 
2.4 Evidence from other studies 
The literature has also discussed the conflicts of interest hypothesis, which says that bankers 
are more likely to seek representation on boards where they do not jeopardize their position as 
lenders (e.g., Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). In our view, this hypothesis depends on the valid-
ity of the doctrine of “lender liability” and is therefore specific to institutional contexts such 
as those of the United States, where banks with board representation may be held accountable 
and lose the priority of their debt claims in case of bankruptcy. German law has no such pro-
visions, so this hypothesis does not apply.20 
                                                 
19  Mintz and Schwartz (1985) observe that banks in the U.S. seek board seats on other firms much more than 
non-financial companies and argue that the main function of these board representations is to provide the 
banks with sufficient intelligence about the lending conditions in the economy. However, they do not ana-
lyze any industry relationships and the later literature has not picked up their suggestion. Kroszner and 
Strahan (2001) argue that banks learn through their lending relationships and then use this knowledge in the 
companies where they sit on the board. 
20  Banks may be held liable for interventions in a company if they obtain the right to do so after a breach of 
covenants by a creditor, but this is different from our context where banks represent their interests on the 
board of directors. 
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Numerous studies have analyzed aspects of the relationship between German banks and Ger-
man non-financial companies. In particular Cable (1985), Gorton and Schmid (2000), Ed-
wards and Nibler (2000), and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) reach more benign conclusions 
regarding the role of banks in German corporate governance than our study. To the best of our 
knowledge, Cable (1985) is the earliest paper in this literature. He studies a 1970 sample of 48 
German firms and finds that bank control enhances profitability. He does not analyze causal-
ity, relies on a small and much earlier sample, and uses a somewhat idiosyncratic measure of 
profitability. Gorton and Schmid (2000) study the effects of bank equity control on German 
firms for two cross-sections and find that bank equity ownership is beneficial and that banks 
appear to be special compared to other shareholders in that they positively affect firm per-
formance. However, unlike our study they do not analyze a panel and do not include the in-
fluence through board membership in their study. Also, as their study finds a significant struc-
tural break between their 1975 and their 1986 cross-section, it is plausible to presume that 
some of the relationships they describe have changed until 1994, when our sample starts. 
Lehmann and Weigand (2000) reach a similar conclusion to Gorton and Schmid, but they use 
a very different research design. Their sample covers the early 1990s and therefore overlaps 
with our sample, but is restricted to mining and manufacturing industries and includes smaller 
and also unlisted firms. Their results are therefore not directly comparable to ours. Edwards 
and Nibler (2000) investigate a cross-section of 156 of the largest non-financial German firms 
and find a positive impact of the equity ownership of the top three banks, but they undertake 
neither causality analysis nor control for unobserved heterogeneity and several other effects 
we include in our model. Boehmer (2000) studies a sample of acquisitions and finds that 
banks only provide benefits to bidding companies when their power is offset by non-bank 
blockholders, which is closer to our findings in a different context. Franks and Mayer’s 
(1998) clinical study of all three hostile takeover attempts in post-war Germany also finds 
evidence that banks do not always act in the interests of shareholders. Elston and Goldberg 
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(2003) show that bank influence reduces the level of compensation for German executives. 
Agarwal and Elston (2001) also strike a cautious note on the beneficial impact of German 
banks and find that bank influence does not seem to enhance either firms’ profitability or 
growth, which is also corroborated by a later study by Chirinko and Elston (2006). 
3 Institutional framework, data and methods 
3.1 Institutional framework 
The German board system has some distinct characteristics that differentiate it from the sys-
tems of most other countries, notably the Anglo-Saxon model.21 German companies have a 
two-tier board, where the management board (Vorstand) is responsible for the day-to-day op-
erations and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) appoints and supervises the members of the 
management board on behalf of shareholders and the public interest. This structure has been 
mandatory since 1870. Most aspects of the board structure are tightly regulated by the Ger-
man stock corporation act (Aktiengesetz) and other laws, which leave little discretion to the 
company and its charter. In particular, the two boards are personally separated, and nobody 
can be a member of both boards of the same company at the same time. Also, direct board 
interlocks are prohibited so that a member of the management board of company A cannot sit 
on the supervisory board of company B if a management board member of company B is sit-
ting on the supervisory board of company A at the same time. Nobody is allowed to accumu-
late more than ten seats on the supervisory boards of different corporations, where a chair-
manship counts as two board seats for the benefits of this regulation.22  
Under applicable German law, in particular the co-determination act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) 
the supervisory board has a minimum and a maximum size, which depends on the number of 
                                                 
21  More detailed accounts of the German board system can be found in Charkham (1994), Edwards and 
Fischer (1994), Hopt (1998), and Prigge (1998). 
22  Management board members of holding companies and parent corporations often represent the interests of 
the parent by holding supervisory board seats on the boards of their subsidiaries. Up to five seats in sub-
sidiaries are not counted towards the seat limit. Chairmanships have counted as two seats towards the limit 
of 10 seats on the supervisory board only since May 1998. 
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employees of the firm, so board size is largely determined by law. We therefore do not use 
this variable in our empirical analysis. The codetermination act also requires that half of all 
board members are worker representatives.23 Still, the shareholders of the company retain 
control of the supervisory board because the chairman of the supervisory board, who has the 
casting vote in case of a tie, is appointed by shareholders. The worker representatives are 
elected by the company’s workers, and some of them must be union representatives. The 
shareholders’ representatives on the supervisory board are elected by the shareholders’ annual 
general meeting. The supervisory board cannot assume managerial responsibilities, but the 
company’s charter can require that some executive decisions be subject to the supervisory 
board’s approval. 
In January 2002, a capital gains tax reform became effective that was first proposed by the 
federal government in December 1999 and that was formally (and rather unexpectedly) final-
ized by a vote of the upper house (Bundesrat) in July 2000. Realized capital gains from the 
sales of shares in companies were taxable before January 2002 and have been tax-free since 
then. Hence, the reform provided incentives to realize book losses before January 2002 and to 
delay the realization of gains until after January 1, 2002. The taxation of capital gains was 
widely perceived as an obstacle to the unraveling of cross shareholdings between German 
companies. 
Another important development during our sample period is the internationalization of the 
German stock market. More and more German companies switched their financial reporting 
from German GAAP to IFRS or U.S. GAAP. While in 1994 all firms in our data set reported 
according to German GAAP, this number falls to 2% in 2005. As German GAAP is more 
conservative than IFRS or U.S. GAAP (see Harris, Lang, and Möller, 1994), we include a 
German GAAP dummy variable in all regressions where the dependent variable is likely to be 
                                                 
23  The co-determination act does not apply to smaller companies with less than 2,000 employees, where the 
required proportion of worker representatives is only one third. For 72% of our non-bank firm-year obser-
vations, the number of employees exceeds 2,000. 
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affected by the accounting standard. In addition, we repeat all regressions that include ac-
counting variables (as dependent or independent variables) for the smaller sample of all firm-
year observations with German GAAP reporting. In order to conserve space, we do not show 
these robustness checks in the tables, but we report whenever they yield qualitatively different 
results. 
3.2 Construction of the data set 
We identify all companies that were included in the DAX 100, the index of the top 100 listed 
German companies, at any point in time during the 12-year period from 1994 to 2005. These 
are 167 firms, which we divide into two subsamples. The first subsample comprises 11 banks 
(SIC code 6021) and the second subsample comprises 137 non-banks. Financial services 
companies (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) other than banks are excluded from both 
samples. For all these companies we obtain the following data from Worldscope, SDC Plati-
num, Datastream, Deutsche Bundesbank and Hoppenstedt company profiles for the years 
1994-2005.24 Hoppenstedt company profiles (a periodical similar to Moody’s manuals) gives 
us the names of all members of the management board and the supervisory board. From Hop-
penstedt company profiles, we also obtain information about blockholders, and the total pay-
ments to members of the management board. In those cases where Hoppenstedt does not pro-
vide certain data, we compiled it from other sources, usually from company reports, which 
was successful in most cases. We obtain accounting data from Worldscope and market data 
from Datastream. From SDC Platinum we obtain data on mergers and acquisitions of our 
sample firms and the identity of the acquiring firm’s advisor. Deutsche Bundesbank provided 
us with data for individual bank-firm credit relationships, which they collect according to Sec-
tion 14 of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz).25 Our final sample consists of 1,388 
                                                 
24  See http://www.hoppenstedt.de/ for further information on the Hoppenstedt group and their company pro-
files (Firmen-Profile). 
25  According to Section 14 of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz), German banks have to report on 
a quarterly basis all creditors whose total borrowing volume from the bank exceeds €1.5m. The total credit 
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firm-year observations on non-financial firms and a further 110 firm-year observations for 
banks. 
Insert Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 here. 
Table 2.1 provides the definitions of all our variables at the firm-year level and reports their 
respective sources. Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the sample of non-financial 
firms. 
3.3 Ties between banks and non-financial firms 
In order to measure bank influence we need to define a “banker,” which poses some difficul-
ties.26 It is common practice in Germany that former bank managers become members of their 
company’s supervisory board immediately after their retirement, when a younger colleague 
takes over the top management post. In our view, these retired supervisory board members 
still represent the interests of their former employers. We therefore define that a person is a 
“banker” for all years after he or she joined the management board of a bank. She stays a 
“banker” except if she is appointed to a non-bank’s management board during the sample-
period. Then we define her status as a “non-banker” from that point onwards. 
We measure bank influence on a company by two variables. The first is defined as Bank-
Dummy and assumes a value of one if at least one member of the supervisory board is a 
banker, and zero otherwise. In 643 firm-years, or 46% of our sample, at least one member of 
the supervisory board was a banker. The second variable to measure the influence of banks is 
                                                                                                                                                        
volume also includes bonds issued by the creditor and held by the bank. The aim of this regulation is to 
track the financial liabilities of a firm, so a bank loan for which two firms are liable (e.g., because it is 
given to a joint venture of the two firms) appears twice in the database. While this double counting is a se-
rious limitation of this database in general, it is less important in our case, because we are explicitly inter-
ested in all borrowing relationships a firm has to one of our sample banks. Also, the restriction of the data-
base to borrowing in excess of €1.5m should not result in a substantial bias as we consider only large firms. 
We match the Bundesbank and Worldscope data manually based on the names of the firms and banks. 
26  Note that unlike the U.S. literature on the influence of bankers on boards we do not distinguish between 
commercial bankers and investment bankers. Such a distinction is impossible in the German context as in-
vestment banking services and commercial banking services are offered by the same universal banks. See 
Booth and Deli (1999), Kroszner and Strahan (2001), Jagannathan and Krishnamurthy (2004), and Güner, 
Malmendier, and Tate (2008). 
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PercentBankers defined as the ratio of bankers to the total number of shareholder representa-
tives on the supervisory board. We focus only on shareholder representatives on the supervi-
sory board and disregard worker representatives for our purposes. On average, bankers oc-
cupy 8.8% of all shareholder appointed supervisory board seats, and the median supervisory 
board in our sample has six shareholder representatives (the mean is 7.1). 
The average equity ownership of German banks, BankEquity, is only 3.3% during this period, 
again much reduced compared to the 7.3% reported for the earlier sample by Edwards and 
Fischer (1994).27 The distribution of equity stakes is highly skewed: For only 18% of all our 
firm-year observations, BankEquity is positive and then it is 18.3% on average with a median 
of 13.2%. So, banks hold substantial stakes in a few companies rather than small stakes in all 
of them. 
Insert Table 2.3 here. 
The aggregate figures above suggest a substantial loosening of the ties between banks and 
non-banks between the 1970s and the 1990s. We investigate this further in Table 2.3, which 
reports the means of some of the major variables from our data set by year for the subset of 
companies where we have continuous data from 1994 to 2005. This allows us to assess the 
impact of the institutional changes during this period, in particular the reform of corporate 
taxes that became effective at the beginning of 2002. Table 2.3 shows that the equity owner-
ship of banks in non-financial firms (BankEquity) is stable around 4% from 1994 to 2001 and 
then drops to 0.4% by 2005, which reflects a substantial reduction in the number of firms 
where banks hold equity as well as in the average size of the remaining equity stakes.28 This 
suggests that banks held shares during the earlier sample period mainly in order to defer taxes 
                                                 
27  Gorton and Schmid (2000) use a similar sample to Edwards and Fischer (1994) of 82 firms and report eq-
uity ownership to be 8%. They also collect data for another 56 firms for 1986 and report equity ownership 
to be 13% there. 
28  The numbers in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 are not directly comparable because Table 2.3 is based on a sub-
sample of 75 firms for which we have continuous data from 1994-2005. Of these firms, 16 have bank eq-
uity investments in 1994, of which three remain in 2005. The average size of a stake declines from 19.4% 
to 9.3% during this period. 
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and not for other economic reasons. We therefore expect that theories trying to explain bank 
shareholdings in non-financial companies will find little support during this period. Owner-
ship of other blockholders (NonBankEquity) also declines from 55.4% in 1994 to 47.7%, but 
the decline is more gradual here and relatively moderate compared to the decline of bank eq-
uity ownership. This is also reflected in the increase of the free float from 40.5% to 51.9%, 
which suggests that the attempts to improve financial market regulation where met with some 
success, at least in terms of the attractiveness of German capital markets for small sharehold-
ers. 
The representation of bankers on boards has declined dramatically over the 1994 to 2005 pe-
riod according to both measures, BankDummy and PercentBankers. At the beginning of this 
period, 50.7% of all supervisory boards included a banker compared to only 33.3% twelve 
years later, and the percentage of bankers on boards fell from 9.6% to 5.6% over this period. 
These figures are substantially below the 75% of the top 100 German firms who had a banker 
on their supervisory board in 1974, when bankers held 22.4% of the shareholder seats in a 
comparable sample of companies (Edwards and Fisher, 1994, p. 201). By comparison, in the 
U.S. only about 31.6% of large firms had representatives of banks (commercial or investment 
banks) on their boards.29 We interpret this development as part of the continuing unraveling of 
what used to be the distinctly German pattern of corporate governance and bank-firm relation-
ships and as support of the notion that the German model converges to the Anglo-Saxon 
model. However, the decline in bank representation on boards is not nearly as stark as the 
decline in banks’ equity ownership. Most of the change in board representation happened be-
tween 2002 and 2004. Board representation stabilized at 31% in 2004 and 2005 in the full 
sample (not shown in the table), which suggests that the weaker decline in board representa-
tion is not due to a mere time lag. In addition, Table 2.2 shows that bankers on the board 
                                                 
29  See Kroszner and Strahan (2001), referring to the Forbes 500 firms in 1992. Similar numbers have been 
reported by Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) and Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008). 
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without equity stakes outnumber bankers who represent an equity stake by three to one (com-
pare the means of PercentBankersWithEquity and PercentBankersWithoutEquity). Hence, 
board representation and equity ownership are not closely related. 
We do not have data on the proxy voting rights of banks. These voting rights are a specific 
part of German corporate governance that allows banks to vote the shares of their customers 
at shareholder meetings. Data on these voting rights are very expensive to collect because the 
only source are the minutes of the shareholder meetings, which must be filed with the local 
district court where the company is registered. Previous studies have therefore always col-
lected only small samples of proxy voting data, and no study has ever compiled a panel.30 The 
figures in these studies are not directly comparable, but they agree on the fact that banks’ vot-
ing power derives to a large extent from their proxy voting rights, and only a small proportion 
of voting rights derives from direct equity ownership. 
3.4 Performance measures and additional variables 
Our measure of company valuation is Tobin’s Q, which we define as the market value of the 
firm divided by the book value of total assets.31 The market value of the firm is calculated as 
the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. 
Clearly, this is only an approximation to Tobin’s Q. We have sufficient balance sheet data for 
1,282 firm-years or 92% of our sample and the average Q is 1.54 (the median is 1.24, see 
Table 2.2). Other variables we use to describe companies’ performance are the return on as-
sets (defined as EBIT divided by total assets) and sales growth. The median company has 
sales of almost €1.9bn, which shows that our sample consists of large companies. 
                                                 
30  Edwards and Fischer (1994) report that banks vote 49.45% of the shares of companies in their sample by 
proxy. Gorton and Schmid (2000) have 21% for their 1975 sample and 23% for their 1986 sample. Elsas 
and Krahnen (2004) report an average of 29.5% for a 1990 sample of 65 large firms. 
31  Tobin’s Q has been widely used as a performance measure in the corporate governance literature. Research 
that focuses on boards and uses Tobin’s Q or the market to book ratio includes Pfannschmidt (1995), Yer-
mack (1996), Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004), Gorton and Schmid (2000), de Jong (2002), Loderer and 
Peyer (2002), and Fich and Shivdasani (2006). 
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Data on executive compensation are notoriously scant in Germany and we have no data on 
these variables before 1997. Executive compensation has to be disclosed individually for 
members of the management board only since 2006. Therefore, we can only compute the av-
erage compensation per board member for our sample period. Table 2.3 shows that manage-
ment compensation increases steadily and more than doubles during the nine years for which 
we have data. However, compensation divided by firm value declines by 5% from 1997 to 
2005.  
In our analysis, we also look at – and control for – firms’ funding decisions as proxied by 
capital expenditure (scaled by total assets) and the payout ratio, which is the percentage of net 
income paid out to shareholders. In addition to market leverage and book leverage, we use a 
third measure of leverage: LeverageBanks is the ratio of BankDebt to the sum of total debt 
and market capitalization and measures the part of market leverage that is provided by the 
banks in our sample. Due to the double counting problem discussed in Footnote 25, BankDebt 
can be overstated and in a few cases it can be even higher than total debt.32 This is the reason 
why the maximum of LeverageBanks is bigger than the maximum of LeverageMarket in 
Table 2.2. Apart from this, the numbers are very reasonable: average book leverage is 38%, 
average market leverage is 27%, and average bank leverage is 15%. Finally, we also include 
three variables that proxy for the debt capacity of the firm: interest cover, defined as the ratio 
of EBIT to interest expense, the amount of intangible assets scaled by total assets, and the 
firm’s stock price volatility. 
We use dummy variables for calendar years and for industries. Our industry definition uses 
the definition of prime sectors of the German stock exchange, and we aggregate some sectors 
with a small number of firm-years in our sample to obtain 15 different industries.33 
                                                 
32  This bias is likely to affect only the level of LeverageBanks, but not the covariation of LeverageBanks with 
bank representation, which is the focus of our study. 
33  We consolidate media, telecommunications, and transport with consumer, and software with technology. 
This leaves us with 12 non-financial industries (automobiles, basic resources, chemicals, construction, con-
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3.5 Methods 
Endogeneity is a major problem in our analysis, because firm value, bank involvement, and 
firm policies are likely to be jointly determined. Some of our hypotheses imply that firm value 
increases (or decreases) if banks get involved, while other hypotheses state that low-value 
firms actively solicit bank involvement. Similarly, some hypotheses predict that certain firm 
policies (like leverage or capital expenditure) should affect the board representation of bank-
ers while other hypotheses imply the opposite direction of causality. We address the endoge-
neity problem in three ways but are aware of the fact that they can only alleviate but not com-
pletely solve the problem. 
First, all our explanatory variables are lagged by one year in order to remove the contempora-
neous effect if the explanatory variable is endogenous. Many variables in our analysis (includ-
ing banks’ board representation) are highly correlated over time, so that this method is only of 
limited use here. Second, we include fixed effects that filter out year, industry, or firm effects 
and thereby any unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time. 
Third, we also include specifications with the lagged dependent variable as an additional right 
hand side variable: 
 1 1α β γ ε− −= + + +∑ kit it k it it
k
y y x . (2-1) 
This specification is a generalization of differencing the dependent variable, because β is not 
restricted to be equal to one. Formally, specification (2-1) is a Granger (1969) causality re-
gression, which asks whether the lagged independent variables xk have explanatory power for 
the dependent variable y beyond the explanatory power included in lagged values of y itself. 
The lagged dependent variable filters out most of the effect of missing variables, which will 
affect yt and yt-1 in equal measure. The main advantage of this approach is that we can include 
                                                                                                                                                        
sumer, food, healthcare, industrial, machinery, retail, technology, utilities) and three financial industries 
(banks, finance, insurance). We need to consolidate industries in order to reduce the potential bias that is 
caused by the use of fixed (industry) effects in Tobit or Granger causality regressions. 
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the lags of endogenous variables because they are predetermined and need not distinguish 
them from exogenous variables. 
Granger causality regressions are a very conservative method, because they remove much of 
the cross-sectional variation whenever the dependent variable changes only slowly over time. 
We therefore always also report OLS regressions with firm fixed effects and OLS or Tobit 
regressions with industry effects. While these fixed effects regressions do not help much to 
identify the direction of causality, they provide a more complete picture about the association 
between the dependent and the explanatory variables. 
Granger causality has a few drawbacks. Jacobs, Leamer, and Ward (1979) show that Granger 
causality is not able to detect the absence of causality, but that it can be used to prove the ex-
istence of causality – given that the model is correctly specified. We check for correct specifi-
cation in our analysis in two ways. First, we re-run all Granger causality regressions (2-1) 
with three lags yit-1, …, yit-3; we do not show the results in the tables but report all qualitative 
changes relative to the tables shown. Typically, we observe an increase in the standard errors 
because we lose an additional 20% of our observations by including more lags. Second, we 
perform a unit-root test for all our dependent variables and find that we can reject the hy-
pothesis of a unit-root for all of them (not shown in the tables; see He and Maekawa (2001) 
for a discussion of spurious Granger causality for integrated processes). Another problem oc-
curs if one of the variables involves forward-looking behavior. Suppose that higher Percent-
Bankers reduces firm value. As Tobin’s Q involves market expectations, this variable will 
react immediately to any changes in PercentBankers, and the reaction will possibly even pre-
cede the cause if such a change is anticipated. Then it is possible that the test picks up a 
Granger causality from Tobin’s Q to PercentBankers even though the true causality runs in 
the opposite direction. We therefore need to be cautious when interpreting the Granger causal-
ity regressions. 
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Other methods that are often used to tackle endogeneity in the literature do not work in our 
setting. The most obvious choice is instrumental variables regressions, but these regressions 
are only as good as the instruments used and all the variables in our analysis can be easily 
argued to be endogenous. We experimented with firm age and the distance of a firm’s head-
quarters to Frankfurt, where most banks are based, but age seems to proxy for many unob-
served factors and distance turns out to be a weak instrument. We also tried to take advantage 
of the tax law change in a differences-in-differences approach, but this change has a direct 
effect only on banks’ equity holdings but not on their representation on the supervisory board.  
An obvious way to measure the impact of bankers on firm value is an event study of the effect 
of adding a banker to the board. We also followed this approach, but it did not yield any ro-
bust results because the appointment of a new banker is not a major news event. In most 
cases, the proposed new appointments are listed in the proxy statement, which usually in-
cludes a lot of further contaminating news. If a director must be replaced between two annual 
general meetings, the firm proposes a new director to the local court, and the court then 
checks a number of formal criteria. In the few cases where there are press announcements, 
these are dated from after the court’s decision, and it appears unreasonable to assume that the 
market did not learn about the pending appointment earlier. 
In order to conserve space, we concentrate on PercentBankers as a measure of bank board 
activity in our analysis below. As a robustness check, we repeat the whole analysis with 
BankDummy and find very similar results. We therefore only report them in the few cases 
when they are qualitatively different from the results for PercentBankers. 
4 When do banks get involved? 
We first address the question when banks are represented on the supervisory boards of non-
financial German firms, so our dependent variable in Table 2.4 is the percentage of bankers 
on the firm’s supervisory board. In Panel A, we consider the full sample from 1994 to 2005. 
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Here we run a Tobit regression with year and industry dummies (models (1) and (2)) and an 
OLS regression with year and firm dummies (models (3) and (4)). Using a Tobit model here 
is appropriate because about half of the observations are censored at zero. However, Tobit 
models with firm fixed effects are biased and inconsistent when the time dimension is small, 
so we use OLS in the specifications with firm fixed effects. The table also shows two Tobit 
regressions with the lagged dependent variable as additional explanatory variable (models (5) 
and (6)). Panel B contains the results of the three regressions with LeverageBanks for the two 
subsamples 1994-1999 and 2000-2005. 
Insert Table 2.4 here. 
Our analysis in Table 2.4 (Panel A) yields some evidence for the capital markets expertise 
hypothesis. This hypothesis implies that companies that rely more on debt and that have 
higher funding requirements try to attract more bankers to their boards. If we assume that 
faster growing companies are also those with larger funding needs, then the positive and sig-
nificant coefficient on SalesGrowth in specifications (3) to (6) can be explained by fast grow-
ing companies attempting to recruit directors to their boards who help them to reduce the 
costs of external financing.34 Predictions for Tobin’s Q are ambiguous. Higher values for 
Tobin’s Q may reflect that firms have more growth options and therefore more need for ex-
ternal capital, so that we would expect a positive coefficient on Tobin’s Q under the capital 
markets expertise hypothesis. However, low values for Tobin’s Q may also identify low per-
formance firms that are more in need of external expertise, which would suggest a negative 
coefficient. Our coefficient estimates are not consistent across specifications and can therefore 
not lend support to either interpretation. To the extent that funding requirements are related to 
(past) capital expenditure, we should also see a positive relationship between CapEx and Per-
centBankers, but we find significant results here only for specifications (3) and (4) with firm 
                                                 
34  In our robustness checks (not reported in the tables), LogSales is insignificant in the Granger causality 
regressions (5) and (6) if BankDummy is used instead of PercentBankers. 
 41
fixed effects. If the expertise on negotiating and pricing debt contracts is important, then we 
should see more bankers on the boards of more highly levered firms, but the coefficient on 
LeverageMarket is never significant.35 Overall, we find limited evidence that is consistent 
with the capital markets expertise hypothesis. 
We also find some evidence for the debt selling hypothesis, which implies that bankers seek 
representation on the boards of companies that have large underutilized debt capacity. Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, bank representation should be higher for large, low-risk companies 
that have a large proportion of tangible assets. We find that size as measured by sales has a 
highly significant positive impact on bank representation on the board in all specifications. 
Also, the negative relationships between Volatility and PercentBankers, which is significant 
in the two firm fixed effects regressions, is consistent with the debt selling hypothesis. The 
proportion of intangible assets is insignificant in all specifications. The significant positive 
effect of LeverageBanks on PercentBankers in two of the three specifications in Table 2.4A is 
not conclusive because it is not clear whether bankers can leave after they have successfully 
sold their loans or if they must stay in order to make sure that their bank maintains its position 
if the debt matures and must be rolled over.36 Hence, some predictions of the debt selling hy-
pothesis are borne out by our findings. 
Table 2.4A contains very little (and mixed) evidence for the debt monitoring hypothesis. If 
bankers seek representation on the board in order to monitor existing loans, then we should 
see more bankers on the boards of those companies that use more bank loans, that have a 
higher likelihood to enter financial distress, and where recovery in case of financial distress 
would be more difficult. Bank lending as measured by LeverageBanks is indeed significantly 
positively related to the percentage of bankers on the board in two out of three specifications 
                                                 
35  In our robustness checks (not reported in the tables), we find significantly positive signs on LeverageMar-
ket if we use BankDummy instead of PercentBankers (in specification (3)), or if we restrict the sample to all 
firm-year observations with German GAAP reporting (in all specifications). 
36  Anecdotal evidence suggests that many bank loans take the form of short-term credit lines, which would 
suggest that bank lending is frequently rolled over, but we have no evidence on this. 
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in Table 2.4A. The likelihood of financial distress should increase with volatility and decrease 
with interest cover. We find that the coefficients on Volatility are significantly negative in the 
two firm fixed effects regressions, which contradicts the debt monitoring hypothesis. The co-
efficients on InterestCover are statistically insignificant. Finally, the possibility to recover 
assets in case of financial distress should be associated with the tangibility of the assets, 
which we measure by the proportion of the assets that are intangible, but Intangibles is insig-
nificant in all specifications.37 
Finally, we find mixed evidence for the equity monitoring hypothesis, which predicts that 
bankers should be represented on those boards where their banks also hold significant equity 
stakes. Table 2.4A shows that the coefficients on BankEquity are significantly positive in the 
two Tobit specifications (1) and (2), although the relation is insignificant in the remaining 
four specifications.38 If bankers act in the interest of equity holders, other blockholders should 
be happy to have a banker on the board, but the highly significant negative coefficient on 
NonBankEquity in specifications (1) to (4) suggests that this is not the case. This can be inter-
preted as indirect evidence against the equity monitoring hypothesis. If banks are concerned 
about their equity investments, then they should seek representation on those boards where 
firm valuation is lower. In our regressions, we measure this by the cross effect of TobinsQ and 
BankEquity which is significantly positive in specifications (1), (2), and (4). This implies that 
banks get involved in those firms they have invested in that have high Tobin’s Q and this di-
rectly contradicts the equity monitoring hypothesis. Alternatively, poor performance may be 
related to past stock returns and we ran all our regressions again with last year’s stock return 
instead of Tobin’s Q (results not tabulated). The coefficient on stock returns is consistently 
negative in all specifications, but significant only once at the 10% level. More importantly, 
                                                 
37  In our robustness checks (not reported in the tables), Intangibles is significantly negatively related to Per-
centBankers in the Granger causality regressions if we restrict the sample to all firm-year observations with 
German GAAP reporting. 
38  In our robustness checks (not reported in the tables), BankEquity is significantly negatively related to Per-
centBankers in the fixed-effects OLS regressions if we consider firm-years with German-GAAP reporting 
only. 
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the cross effect of past stock return with BankEquity is always positive and significantly so in 
the specifications that correspond to (4), (5), and (6) in Table 2.4A, which again contradicts 
the equity monitoring hypothesis. 
When we split the sample into the two periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2005 in Table 2.4 (Panel 
B), we find some noteworthy differences between the two periods regarding the equity moni-
toring hypothesis. For the first period (1994-1999, specifications (7) to (9)), we find results 
similar to those for the combined sample. In the latter period (2000-2005), however, 
BankEquity is significantly positively related to PercentBankers not only in the Tobit regres-
sion (10), but also in the Granger causality regression (12). Many banks sold their equity 
stakes in non-financial firms after the capital gains tax reform in 2001 (see Table 2.3) and 
then often also withdrew their representatives from the board. Note, however, that the coeffi-
cient on the cross effect between BankEquity and LogTobinsQ remains significantly positive 
in the 2000-2005 subperiod (specifications (10) and (11)), which contradicts the equity moni-
toring hypothesis. Altogether, we find little evidence for and substantial evidence against the 
equity monitoring hypothesis. 
5 What do bankers on the board do? 
5.1 Bankers on boards as capital markets experts? 
Several studies in the literature argue that if bankers are appointed to the boards of non-
financial companies as capital market experts, then they should help firms to obtain the nec-
essary financing more easily. We first investigate whether bankers on the board help firms to 
obtain better access to debt in general or bank debt in particular. Table 2.5 shows OLS regres-
sions of LeverageMarket and LeverageBanks on PercentBankers and seven additional control 
variables. The regressions without lagged dependent variables show that there is a significant 
positive correlation between bank representation and both measures of leverage. In the 
Granger causality regressions, however, the coefficient on PercentBankers is only significant 
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at the 10% level for LeverageMarket and insignificant for LeverageBanks. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 
therefore show that firms that rely more on debt and in particular on bank debt are more likely 
to have bankers on their boards. However, we cannot make any statement regarding the direc-
tion of causality. 
Insert Table 2.5 here. 
Access to (bank) debt financing will be most valuable in years in which firms experience fi-
nancial difficulties.39 We therefore also include InterestCover as a measure of financial 
strength in the regressions in Table 2.5, and the cross effect of InterestCover with Percent-
Bankers. If bankers facilitate debt financing in difficult times, the coefficient on this cross 
effect should be negative and this is indeed the case in the regressions without a lagged de-
pendent variable. While this finding is consistent with the capital markets expertise hypothe-
sis, we again cannot show causality.40 In Table 2.7 further below, we also look at the debt 
obtained from the same bank that is represented on the board and obtain similar results. We 
can conclude that distressed firms receive more loans from the banks that are represented on 
their boards, but we cannot show that these banks were already represented on the board be-
fore the additional debt financing had been obtained. The evidence is also consistent with the 
alternative explanation that the bank receives a board seat when the firm receives a loan, pos-
sibly as a condition. 
A limitation of our analysis of leverage measures in Table 2.5 is that lower leverage is not 
necessarily a sign of being financially constrained. We therefore now turn to regressions of 
capital expenditure on cash flows and ask whether bankers on the board reduce the sensitivity 
of investment to cash flows. The argument relies on the assumption that if companies are fi-
                                                 
39  Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) show that firms in Japanese keiretsus benefit from funding through 
the main bank during financial distress. 
40  In unreported results, we repeat the analysis once with PayoutRatio and once with ROA instead of Interest-
Cover as measure of financial strength. We obtain the same results with ROA, but with PayoutRatio all re-
sults, including the coefficients on PercentBankers are insignificant in all specifications. A potential reason 
might be that we lose an additional 15% of the observations for which we cannot calculate the payout ratio. 
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nancially constrained, then their capital expenditure should be responsive to their own cash 
flows (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988, and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991). 
By contrast, if they are unconstrained, then cash flows and investment levels should be uncor-
related.41 
This is a broader test of capital markets expertise as it is not limited to debt financing. 
Insert Table 2.6 here. 
Table 2.6 performs standard tests of the investment-cash flow sensitivity, where we regress 
investment levels on cash flows, a number of controls, and an interactive coefficient of Cash-
Flow with PercentBankers. This interactive coefficient should be negative for financially con-
strained firms, so that more bankers on the board reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flows. We follow the literature and argue that firms are more financially constrained if they 
have smaller dividend payouts.42 We therefore partition the sample into those firms whose 
payout ratio is above the median and those whose payout ratio is below the median of the 
sample. We repeat this analysis for the two subperiods 1994-1999 and 2000-2005, and Table 
2.6 shows our results.  
For the full sample period 1994-2005, we do not find any significant results: all the interactive 
coefficients are insignificant, and they do not differ significantly between the two subsamples. 
There is also no evidence that bank representation has a direct effect on capital expenditures. 
When we look at the two subperiods, however, we find a significant difference in the cross 
effect CashFlow*PercentBankers between constrained and unconstrained firms for both sub-
periods. For the 1994-1999 subsample, bankers on the board facilitate financing and invest-
                                                 
41  This argument is not uncontroversial. Alti (2003) shows that even in a standard neoclassical investment 
model without financial constraints there can be a correlation between investment levels and cash flows be-
cause cash flows reveal information about the productivity of future investments, so that companies with 
higher cash flows tend to invest more. 
42  In unreported results, we split our sample according to size (total assets). We do not obtain any significant 
results in this case, which perhaps is not so surprising given that all companies in our sample are by some 
definition large. Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) argue that payout policy and size may be poor proxies 
for financial constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) develop an index of financial constraints for the U.S., 
but no similar index is available for Germany. 
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ment for financially constrained firms. For the 2000-2005 sample however, we obtain the op-
posite signs, which implies that bankers increase their lending to financially unconstrained 
firms rather than to constrained firms. Under one interpretation, German firms had many 
growth options in the earlier period, which they could not finance internally, so that they were 
constrained. By comparison, they had only few growth options in the latter period, where they 
were unconstrained. Under another interpretation, this result is consistent with the debt-selling 
hypothesis. Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find the same signs in their U.S. sample as 
we do in our 2000-2005 subsample, so Table 2.6 can be seen as another indication that the 
German system of corporate governance has converged to the Anglo-Saxon model. Alto-
gether, we cannot infer any consistent evidence from Table 2.6 that would support the capital 
markets expertise hypothesis. 
5.2 Bankers on boards as sales agents? 
We investigate three aspects of the notion that bankers may act as sales agents for their bank. 
We first investigate if bankers persuade the companies on whose boards they are represented 
to take on more debt and, more specifically, debt from the bank they are representing. We 
then look at the debt provided by a bank to an industry and ask whether board representation 
in an industry helps to acquire industry expertise and to sell more debt to other firms in the 
industry. Finally, we investigate if bankers sell M&A advisory services to companies through 
their board representation. 
Insert Table 2.7 here. 
In Table 2.7, we consider individual bank-firm relations in more detail and turn to regressions 
of bank-firm-year observations in order to investigate the debt selling hypothesis. The table 
displays results of five Tobit regressions of FirmBankDebti,j,t, the debt provided by bank j to 
firm i in year t. The independent variables are the lagged dependent variable,  
FirmBankDebti,j,t-1, the dummy ThisBankOnBoardi,j,t-1, which equals one if bank j has a 
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banker on the board of firm i in year t–1, the dummy AnotherBankOnBoard i,j,t-1, which indi-
cates whether a bank other than j has a banker on the board of firm i, and a number of controls 
that describe firm i in more detail. As the controls do not vary across the ten banks within one 
firm-year section, we report robust standard errors with firm-year clusters for the Tobit speci-
fications in Table 2.7.43 
All specifications in Table 2.7 indicate that a given bank sells more debt to firms where it is 
represented on the board and less to firms where another bank is represented on the board. 
This effect is highly significant except in the Granger causality regression (5) with year, in-
dustry, and bank fixed effects, where ThisBankOnBoard becomes insignificant. This last re-
gression sets the highest hurdle for finding significant results, so it is not surprising that we 
lose significance here. The fixed effects regressions (1) and (2) show that there is a positive 
relation between bank representation and lending of the same bank (even if we control for the 
identity of firm and bank), while regression (3) and (4) show that (Granger) causality runs 
from bank representation to lending. Note that the negative effect of AnotherBankOnBoard 
remains significant in all specifications. We therefore conclude that there is compelling evi-
dence that banks on the board of non-financial firms increase lending to these firms and to 
some extend replace other banks as lenders. 
Having bankers on the board who try to sell their own bank’s debt need not be detrimental to 
the firm as the terms of these loans might be preferential. We do not have any data about the 
terms of the loans provided, but Table 2.7 contains some indirect evidence: NonBankEquity 
has a significant negative effect on FirmBankDebt in all specifications. This finding might 
simply be due to the fact that firms with non-bank blockholders generally have lower leverage 
(see Table 2.5), possibly because these firms have better access to equity financing. Alterna-
tively, it can be interpreted as an indication that debt sold through bankers on the board is not 
in the interest of the firm and is restricted if non-bank blockholders are present. 
                                                 
43  We have only 10 banks left here because of the merger that created HypoVereinsbank. 
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Table 2.7 also contains some evidence for the capital markets expertise hypothesis. In specifi-
cation (1), the cross effect of InterestCover and ThisBankOnBoard has a highly significant 
effect on FirmBankDebt, but this effect is insignificant in the remaining regressions. We ob-
tain the same result if we use PayoutRatio or ROA as an indicator of financial difficulty in-
stead of InterestCover. So in bad times firms that have bankers on their boards also hold more 
debt from the banks represented on the board, but our results are silent regarding the direction 
of causality. 
It could also be that banks seek appointments to supervisory boards to gain industry exper-
tise and lending possibilities that are industry-specific, for example, because lending pros-
pects are sensitive to industry cycles. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formu-
late and investigate this hypothesis. We therefore repeat our analysis from Table 2.7 on the 
bank-industry level and average FirmBankDebt across those firms within each industry-year 
where the bank considered is not represented on the board of directors. This yields our new 
variable IndustryBankDebtk,j,t, which is the average bank debt (scaled by total assets) that bank 
j provides to those firms in industry k in year t, where bank j has no representative on the 
board. Table 2.8 shows the results of four Tobit regressions of IndustryBankDebt on Percent-
BankersThisBankk,j,t, the average proportion of board seats held by bank j in industry k and 
year t. The regressions include six additional, firm-specific variables that are all averaged 
across firms in each industry-year, and regressions (2) to (4) also include the lagged depend-
ent variable. 
Insert Table 2.8 here. 
The coefficient on PercentBankersThisBank is always positive and statistically highly signifi-
cant in two of the four specifications in Table 2.8. In the specifications that involve bank 
dummies, however, the effect is insignificant. In contrast to Table 2.7, results also become 
insignificant in the bank fixed effects regression (1) without a lagged dependent variable. In 
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our robustness checks (not shown in the tables), we obtain somewhat stronger results: If we 
consider only firm-year observations with German GAAP reporting, specification (1) be-
comes significant, and if we use BankDummy instead of PercentBankers as an indicator of 
bank involvement, all specifications are significant at least at the 10% level. Altogether, we 
find some evidence for the industry expertise hypothesis. 
Finally, we turn to the hypothesis that bankers sell M&A advisory services to the firms on 
whose boards they are represented. In contrast to the United States, banks in Germany have 
always been universal banks that include investment banking divisions. From SDC Platinum, 
we collect data on 4,097 acquisitions undertaken by 115 of the non-financial firms in our 
sample. For only 67 acquisitions undertaken by 28 sample firms is the advisor also one of the 
sample banks; most acquisitions are small and therefore done without an advisor. We delete 
all firm-year observations without any acquisition and construct the variable PercentAcqAdvi-
sori,j,t as the number of acquisitions of firm i in year t, where bank j was hired as the advisor, 
scaled by the total number of acquisitions for this firm-year. In Table 2.9, we regress Percen-
tAcqAdvisor on ThisBankOnBoard and four other firm-specific control variables. Specifica-
tion (1) does this for all banks in our sample. In specifications (2) and (3), we separately con-
sider those two banks that have a large investment banking business, i.e. Dresdner Bank and 
Deutsche Bank. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year level to compute sig-
nificance levels for specification (1). 
Insert Table 2.9 here. 
In all specifications, we observe a significant and positive relationship between bank repre-
sentation and PercentAcqAdvisor, even though the number of uncensored observations is 
small in each case (15 for Dresdner Bank, 32 for Deutsche Bank). We can safely conclude 
that bankers on the boards of large, non-financial firms successfully promote the M&A advi-
sory services of their employer. 
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5.3 Bankers on boards as monitors? 
We have discussed the potential role of bankers on the boards as monitors of their equity in-
terests or of their interests as creditors in Section 4 and found no evidence that either version 
of the monitoring hypothesis might explain why bankers join the boards of non-financial 
companies. However, they may still act as monitors once they are appointed to these boards. 
We therefore investigate how bankers affect the investment behavior and financial policies of 
firms. 
Insert Table 2.10 here. 
Table 2.10 shows regressions that address the influence of bank representation on the payout 
ratio and on volatility. The equity monitoring hypothesis postulates that bankers on the 
board pursue the interests of their banks as equity-holders. In order to investigate this hy-
pothesis more directly, we split PercentBankers into those bankers that represent equity inter-
ests on the board (PercentBankersWithEquity) and those bankers on the board whose bank 
does not have an equity interest in the company at the same time (PercentBankersWithoutE-
quity). We should then see that banks that also own equity use their influence to increase the 
payout ratio and to shift risk and thereby increase volatility. There is virtually no evidence for 
this in Table 2.10. The coefficient on PercentBankersWithEquity is always insignificant, and 
BankEquity becomes significant only once (specification (1)) and then with the opposite sign 
compared to what we would expect.44 A potential reason for the insignificant results for Vola-
tility is that the leverage of our sample companies is not high enough (the median of Lever-
ageMarket is 24.8% from Table 2.2) to generate significant risk shifting incentives for equity 
holders. 
                                                 
44  In our robustness checks (not shown in the tables), BankEquity also has a significant negative effect on the 
payout ratio in the Granger causality regression (3) when we use BankDummy instead of PercentBankers or 
when we restrict the sample to those firm-year observations with German GAAP reporting only. 
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The implications of the debt monitoring hypothesis for the relationship between Percent-
Bankers and, respectively, PayoutRatio and Volatility, are the opposite of those suggested by 
the equity monitoring hypothesis, but most coefficients are insignificant. The only exception 
is the effect of PercentBankersWithoutEquity on Volatility in specification (5), which is sig-
nificant at the 5% level but has the opposite sign than expected under the debt monitoring 
hypothesis. Hence, we cannot find any support for the debt monitoring hypothesis based on 
these results. 
Insert Table 2.11 here. 
In Table 2.11, we investigate the relationship between equity ownership and management 
compensation. Disclosure on compensation in Germany is poor by U.S. or U.K. standards and 
before 2006, publicly listed companies had to disclose only the aggregate compensation of the 
management board and the supervisory board, without providing a breakdown by person or 
by compensation components (fixed pay, bonus payments, stock options, etc.). We therefore 
cannot evaluate pay for performance sensitivities. Instead, we resort to LogAvgManComp, 
which is the logarithm of the average total compensation per member of the management 
board. These data are available only from 1997 onwards, so the number of observations for 
our regressions is somewhat reduced. 
Table 2.11 shows that the impact of bankers on average management compensation is nega-
tive if these bankers represent equity interests on the board, but this effect is significant at the 
10% level only in specification (2). All other bankers, whose supervisory board seats are not 
associated with equity ownership, have an insignificant impact on average management com-
pensation. The difference between the coefficients on PercentBankersWithEquity and Per-
centBankersWithoutEquity is statistically significant at the 10% level in the Granger causality 
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regression (3) (the p-values are reported at the bottom of Table 2.11).45 This implies that 
managerial pay decreases in firms where bankers with equity interests are on the board com-
pared to firms where bankers without equity interests are on the board. Note that Non-
BankEquity has a highly significant negative effect on average compensation in all specifica-
tions. This suggests that lower compensation does not reflect lower managerial skills but 
rather lower managerial rents. Altogether, the equity monitoring hypothesis has some ex-
planatory power here, but only for the minority of bankers who actually represent equity in-
terests. 
6 The value of having a banker on the board 
Our final question addresses the relationship between bank representation on the board and 
firm performance, where we use Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) as performance meas-
ures.46 Table 2.12 regresses LogTobinsQ on PercentBankers, ownership variables, and a range 
of controls. Here it is conventional to also control for some value drivers (productivity, sales 
growth, R&D), although we are not convinced by this approach for our purpose. Ultimately, if 
bank representation on the board affects valuation, then it has to affect some value driver 
(such as profitability or growth), and for our question the precise transmission channel is of 
secondary importance. Therefore, if we control for value drivers, then we control to some 
extent for the effect we are trying to measure. Our preferred specifications are therefore mod-
els (1), (3), and (5) in Table 2.12, but we include the regressions with more controls (2), (4), 
and (6) for better comparison with the literature. As R&D expenditures need not be reported 
according to German GAAP, we set this item equal to zero if it is missing. In Table 2.13, we 
repeat this analysis with ROA instead of LogTobinsQ as the dependent variable. 
Insert Table 2.12 and 2.13 here. 
                                                 
45  If we use BankDummy instead of PercentBankers, this difference is significant at the 2% level. However, if 
we include three lags of the dependent variable, this difference becomes insignificant. These results are not 
shown in the tables. 
46  For Switzerland, another universal banking country, Tobin’s Q is not significantly correlated with the pres-
ence of bankers on the board (Loderer and Peyer, 2002). 
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Specifications (1) and (2) in both tables show that there is a significant negative relation be-
tween bankers on the board and firm performance. This result is reflected in specifications (1) 
and (2) in Table 2.4, where we regress PercentBankers on LogTobinsQ. In the firm fixed re-
gressions (3) and (4) in Table 2.12 and 2.13, however, PercentBankers is insignificant, which 
implies that the negative relationship only holds between firms but not necessarily within 
firms.47 In the Granger causality regression (5) in Table 2.13, PercentBankers has a negative 
effect on ROA that is significant at the 10% level. With the additional controls in regression 
(6), this effect becomes insignificant. Here, the additional control LeverageBook becomes 
significant, and from Table 2.5 we know that bankers have a positive effect on leverage.48 
Hence, Table 2.13 provides weak evidence that bank representation Granger causes lower 
firm performance. 
The result of the Granger causality regressions for Tobin’s Q in Table 2.12 is puzzling. This 
result persists in all our robustness checks with the only exception that it becomes insignifi-
cant in the 2000-2005 subsample. At face value, it implies that PercentBankers has a signifi-
cant negative effect on LogTobinsQ. However, note that Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking 
measure. So, with efficient markets Tobin’s Q should adjust immediately if there is causality 
from bank representation to Tobin’s Q, so that PercentBankerst-1 should have no impact on 
LogTobinsQt if we control for the lagged value LogTobinsQt-1. There are two possible ways to 
interpret the negative effect of PercentBankers on LogTobinsQ in Table 2.12 (specifications 
(5) and (6)) and the insignificant effect of LogTobinsQ on PercentBankers in Table 2.4 (speci-
fications (5) and (6)). First, if the market does not immediately and fully incorporate the in-
                                                 
47  If we split the sample in two periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2005, the relation between PercentBankers and 
Tobin’s Q becomes significantly positive at the 10% level in the fixed-effects regressions in the 1994-1999 
period. This finding is in line with the positive sign on LogTobinsQ in specifications (3), (4), (8) and (11) in 
Table 2.4. It implies that bankers are generally represented in low-performance firms, but within these 
firms, they are more likely to be on the board during (relatively) high-performance years. 
48  These results are robust if we include three lags of the dependent variable or if we consider observations 
with German GAAP reporting only. However, if we use BankDummy instead of PercentBankers or if we 
consider the two periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2005 separately, the impact of bank presence on ROA be-
comes insignificant in the Granger causality regressions (5) and (6), although it remains significant in the 
OLS regressions (1) and (2).  
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formation of a new board appointment, the evidence suggests that bank representation indeed 
causes lower Tobin’s Q. Alternatively, the appointment of bankers could be forward looking, 
so that firms that expect lower Tobin’s Q appoint bankers (presumably to improve perform-
ance) or bankers choose firms with lower expected Tobin’s Q. This second interpretation also 
presupposes that the market does not correctly infer the information contained in the appoint-
ment of a banker. The evidence is not consistent, however, with the hypothesis that perform-
ance first deteriorates and bankers are then appointed to the board. So while we cannot distin-
guish the direction of causality econometrically, we consider the possibility that bankers are 
generally appointed when low performance is anticipated but not when low performance oc-
curs as rather remote. We therefore interpret Tables 2.12 and 2.13 as weak evidence that 
bankers on the boards of non-financial firms have a negative effect on performance as meas-
ured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. The size of this effect is substantial: For a board with average 
size of seven, the decrease in ROA caused by an additional banker ranges from 0.4 to 1.1 per-
centage points while Tobin’s Q decreases by 1.9% to 8%. 
7 Assessment of the hypotheses: Putting it all together 
In this section, we summarize our results with respect to the hypotheses developed in Section 
2. Our evidence is strongest for the hypothesis that bankers seek board seats in non-financial 
firms in order to promote their own business. We investigate three aspects of this hypothesis 
and find evidence for all of them. First, the debt selling hypothesis suggests that bankers 
seek seats on the boards of companies with underutilized debt capacities in order to sell new 
loans. Our discussion of Table 2.4 finds some evidence for this, as smaller, more volatile 
firms have fewer bankers on their boards. We then investigate this hypothesis using more de-
tailed data and find strong evidence that bankers increase borrowing from their own bank and 
to some extend also reduce borrowing from other banks (Table 2.7). Second, we find strong 
support for the hypothesis that bankers on the board sell M&A advisory services of their 
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own investment banking divisions. Some large companies in our sample regularly acquire 
smaller companies, and the M&A-advisory work is significantly more often done by the bank 
that is represented on the board than by another bank in our sample (see Table 2.9). However, 
this concerns only a minority of the companies in our sample. Finally, the industry expertise 
hypothesis holds that bankers seek board appointments in order to gain insider knowledge of 
industry cycles and to better adjust their lending policies. We find that higher board represen-
tation in companies of a certain industry is followed by a significantly higher lending volume 
to that industry, even if we exclude the firms where the bank is represented on the board 
(Table 2.8), although this result is not robust to the inclusion of bank fixed effects. 
We also find substantial evidence for the capital markets expertise hypothesis. Financial 
experts are more likely to be appointed to the board if firms enjoy fast growth (Table 2.4), and 
they help distressed firms to obtain additional loans from banks (Tables 2.5 and 2.7). On the 
other hand, our tests of the investment-cash flow sensitivity (Table 2.6) lend support to this 
hypothesis only for the earlier part of our sample. 
On the other hand, we can rule out the hypothesis that bankers are on the board of non-
financial firms in order to monitor the firm and to represent the bank’s debt or equity interests. 
None of the implications of the debt monitoring hypothesis that we test in Tables 2.4 and 
2.10 are borne out by the data with the exception of the prediction that board representation is 
positively related to bank debt, which in itself is only very indirect evidence for this hypothe-
sis. Our findings from Table 2.4 that volatility and board representation are negatively related 
in some specifications directly contradict this hypothesis. These findings can be explained 
much better with the debt selling hypothesis. We also find little evidence for and substantial 
evidence against the equity monitoring hypothesis. We find weak evidence that bankers are 
more likely to withdraw from boards if their banks sell their equity stakes in the respective 
companies (Table 2.4) and that bankers on the board are associated with lower managerial pay 
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(Table 2.11). On the other hand, our analysis yields several results that contradict the equity 
monitoring hypothesis: When banks hold an equity stake in non-financial firms, they are more 
likely to have a representative on the board if performance (as measured by Tobin’s Q) is high 
(Table 2.4). Also, equity stakes held by non-banks have a negative impact on bank representa-
tion (Table 2.4), and bankers on the board potentially have a negative impact on firm per-
formance (Tables 2.12 and 2.13). 
8 Conclusions 
This chapter analyses the network of cross shareholdings and board representations between 
banks and non-banks in Germany between 1994 and 2005. We find that shareholdings by 
banks in non-financial firms declined by about 90% after a capital gains tax reform became 
effective in January 2002. However, indicators of board representation fell by only 30-40% 
during the same period. Even the values of the measures of bank ownership and board repre-
sentation at the beginning of our sample period are much lower than those reported in earlier 
studies of the 1970s and the 1980s, and we therefore conclude that the German model of cor-
porate financing and corporate governance witnessed a slow and steady decline and has by 
now largely adjusted to international standards. 
These developments caused an increased variation in bank influence on non-financial firms. 
We take advantage of this increased variation and analyze the effect of bank influence on the 
financial policies and the performance non-financial firms. We cannot find much evidence for 
the hypothesis that bankers are on the boards of other firms as monitors, neither as lenders nor 
as equity holders. In fact, by the end of our sample period, banks are not owners of any sig-
nificant equity interests anymore. In contrast, we find some evidence that bankers are on the 
boards of non-financial firms as capital market experts and that they help these firms to over-
come financial constraints. Our strongest results, however, suggest that bankers on the board 
successfully promote their employer’s business: 
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• Banks sell more debt to firms where they are represented on the board, and somewhat 
less debt to firms where other banks are represented on the board. Hence, bankers in-
crease lending to the firms where they occupy board seats and replace other banks as 
lenders to some extent. 
• Banks also sell more debt to firms in industries where they hold more board seats, 
even to firms where they are not represented on the board. This implies that bankers 
gain important information through their board memberships and that they use this in-
dustry expertise to increase their lending to the whole industry. 
• Banks that are represented on the board are more likely to be chosen as M&A advisor 
if the firm undertakes an acquisition. 
Consistent with these findings, we find evidence that suggests a negative causal effect of the 
presence of a banker on the firm’s board on firm performance. Our results make us critical of 
the ability of German banks to use the power of their proxy voting rights to have their own 
managers elected to the boards of non-financial companies. This arrangement gives banks the 
power to influence non-financial firms without having any equity incentives themselves. Mi-
nority shareholders can evidently not overcome their collective action problem, while bankers 
use their board seats to promote their own business. 
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9 Tables 
Table 2.1: Definitions of variables used in this chapter 
This table defines all variables at the firm-year level used in this chapter. Board data are taken from Hoppenstedt 
company profiles, accounting data from Worldscope and market data from Datastream. The numbers in brackets 
refer to Worldscope items, taken from the Worldscope Data Definition Guide. Bank debt data was provided by 




AvgManComp. Total management board compensation divided by the number of managers (in 
thousand €) (Hoppenstedt) 
BankDebt Total volume of credit relations between the respective firm and all sample banks 
that exceed €1.5m (Deutsche Bundesbank) 
BankDummy = 1 if one or more members of the company’s supervisory board are classified as 
Bankers (Hoppenstedt). A director is classified as a “banker” if she currently is 
or previously was a member of the management board of one of the banks in our 
sample. A former banker is not classified as a banker any longer if she becomes 
member of the management board of a non-bank in our sample. 
BankEquity Sum of all voting blocks held by banks (Hoppenstedt) 
BoardSize Number of supervisory board members appointed by shareholders (Hoppenstedt) 
CapEx = Capital expenditure [04601] / total assets [02999] 
CashFlow = (Earnings before extraordinary items [01751] + depreciation [01151]) / total 
assets [02999] 
FreeFloat = 1 – BankEquity – NonBankEquity 
Intangibles = Intangible assets [02649] / total assets [02999] 
InterestCover = EBIT [18191] / interest expense on debt [01251] 
LeverageBanks = BankDebt / (total debt [03255]+ market capitalization [08001]) 
LeverageBook = Total debt [03255] / (total debt + common equity [03501]) 
LeverageMarket = Total debt [03255] / (total debt + market capitalization [08001]) 
MarketCap = Market capitalization [08001] 
NonBankEquity Sum of all voting blocks held by non-banks (Hoppenstedt) 
PayoutRatio = Common dividends (cash) / Net Income after preferred [08256] 
PercentBankers Number of Bankers on the supervisory board divided by BoardSize (Hop-
penstedt). See BankDummy for a definition of a banker. 
PercentBankers 
WithEquity 
Number of Bankers on the supervisory board that come from banks which do 
hold voting blocks, divided by BoardSize (Hoppenstedt) 
PercentBankers 
WithoutEquity 
Number of Bankers on the supervisory board that come from banks which hold 
no voting blocks, divided by BoardSize (Hoppenstedt) 
Productivity = Net sales or revenues [01001] / number of employees [07011] 
R&D = Research and Development expenditure [01201] / total assets [02999] 
ROA Return on Assets: EBITt [18191] / {(total assetst [02999] + total assetst-1)/2} 
Sales = Net sales or revenues [01001] 
SalesGrowth = (net salest [01001] – net salest-1) / net sales t-1 
TobinsQ = (market capitalization [08001] + total assets [02999] – common equity 
[03501]) / total assets 
TotalAssets = total assets [02999] 
Volatility Standard deviation of daily excess returns (from market model) over the preced-
ing calendar year (own computations; data from Datastream) 
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics 
This table displays descriptive statistics for 27 variables used in our analysis. Board data are taken from Hop-
penstedt company profiles, accounting data from Worldscope, and market data from Datastream. Bank debt data 
was provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, it includes all individual (sample) bank-firm credit relations that 
exceed €1.5 million. Only non-financial firm year observations are used. 
Variable N Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
AvgMan.Comp. ('000 €) 1051 833.6 636.0 645.0 5.0 5,676.6 
BankDebt (in million €) 1367 377.5 79.5 767.1 0 8,395.2 
BankDummy 1388 0.46 0.00 0.50 0 1 
BankEquity 1388 3.3% 0.0% 9.3% 0.0% 91.0% 
BankEquity if BankEquity>0 251 18.3% 13.2% 14.3% 0.5% 91.0% 
BoardSize 1388 7.06 6 2.13 2 15 
CapEx 1328 0.071 0.056 0.064 0 0.680 
CashFlow 1338 0.090 0.090 0.070 -0.291 0.950 
Intangibles 1332 0.091 0.042 0.116 0 0.754 
InterestCover 1336 15.365 3.961 59.434 0 858.672 
LeverageBanks 1279 0.146 0.067 0.251 0 3.042 
LeverageBook 1324 0.379 0.379 0.239 0 0.996 
LeverageMarket 1296 0.274 0.248 0.211 0 0.980 
MarketCap (in million €) 1296 4,850 780 12,293 4 213,794 
NonBankEquity 1388 53.8% 56.0% 32.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
PayoutRatio 1139 31.8% 29.9% 25.7% 0.0% 99.9% 
PercentBankers 1388 8.8% 0.0% 10.9% 0.0% 50.0% 
PercentBankersWithEquity 1388 2.0% 0.0% 7.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
PercentBankersWithoutEquity 1388 6.0% 0.0% 9.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
Productivity ('000 €/employee) 1333 237 177 332 32 7,988 
R&D 1338 0.020 0.000 0.036 0 0.231 
ROA 1321 7.9% 6.8% 8.2% -44.9% 67.1% 
Sales (in million €) 1338 8,219 1,910 17,987 13 162,384 
SalesGrowth 1322 9.7% 5.4% 81.5% -94.8% 2,840.4% 
TobinsQ 1282 1.54 1.24 1.03 0.67 12.53 
TotalAssets (in million €) 1338 9,664 1,405 25,427 24 206,985 
Volatility 1308 0.337 0.312 0.165 0.047 2.372 
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Table 2.3: Trends for bankers on the board, ownership structure, Tobin's Q, and compensation 
This table displays annual means of nine variables that describe bank’s board representation, ownership structure, Tobin's Q, and compensation. For each column, the means 
are calculated only from those firms for which the corresponding variable was available for all years shown in the table. The corresponding number of firms is shown in the 
last row. See Table 2.1 for a definition of the variables. Compensation data is generally not available before 1997. 
AvgManComp 








Equity Free Float TobinsQ '000 € scaled by firm value 
1994 6.92 0.507 0.096 0.041 0.554 0.405 1.52   
1995 6.93 0.533 0.101 0.036 0.559 0.405 1.50   
1996 6.93 0.493 0.093 0.054 0.550 0.397 1.48   
1997 6.96 0.507 0.093 0.043 0.541 0.415 1.62 616.4 0.0690% 
1998 6.92 0.533 0.103 0.037 0.543 0.420 1.64 676.2 0.0773% 
1999 7.08 0.533 0.103 0.036 0.520 0.444 1.52 715.6 0.0799% 
2000 7.08 0.547 0.106 0.031 0.528 0.441 1.53 856.0 0.0947% 
2001 7.05 0.520 0.100 0.041 0.518 0.440 1.49 899.5 0.0847% 
2002 7.05 0.507 0.099 0.025 0.519 0.456 1.26 953.2 0.0882% 
2003 6.97 0.400 0.073 0.028 0.529 0.443 1.40 1,142.6 0.0786% 
2004 6.93 0.360 0.064 0.014 0.475 0.511 1.43 1,258.5 0.0809% 
2005 6.93 0.333 0.056 0.004 0.477 0.519 1.48 1,377.0 0.0656% 
# Firms 75 75 75 75 75 75 59 58 58 
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Table 2.4: Determinants of the percentage of bankers on the board 
The table presents results for Tobit and OLS regressions with PercentBankers as dependent variable. All ex-
planatory variables are lagged by one year. See Table 2.1 for a definition of all variables. For each explanatory 
variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero 
slope. Panel A displays our results for the full sample 1994-2005 and Panel B shows the results for the two sub-
samples 1994-1999 and 2000-2005. 
Panel A: Full sample results: 1994-2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Method Tobit OLS Tobit 
Lagged PercentBankers     1.1595 1.1570 
     (39.98) (39.74) 
BankEquity 0.2401 0.2077 -0.0016 -0.0192 0.0500 0.0502 
 (2.85) (2.45) (-0.04) (-0.46) (1.23) (1.23) 
NonBankEquity -0.0823 -0.0778 -0.0553 -0.0534 -0.0057 -0.0059 
 (-3.88) (-3.68) (-4.58) (-4.49) (-0.55) (-0.57) 
LogSales 0.0444 0.0438 0.0286 0.0285 0.0131 0.0130 
 (9.60) (9.54) (5.28) (5.36) (5.80) (5.80) 
CapEx 0.1021 0.1383 0.0899 0.0864 0.0619 0.0679 
 (1.06) (1.44) (1.98) (1.92) (1.31) (1.43) 
Intangibles 0.0320 0.0731 -0.0310 -0.0143 -0.0315 -0.0229 
 (0.50) (1.14) (-0.87) (-0.41) (-1.01) (-0.73) 
Volatility -0.0303 -0.0380 -0.0378 -0.0408 -0.0292 -0.0263 
 (-0.70) (-0.89) (-2.53) (-2.67) (-1.39) (-1.26) 
LeverageMarket 0.0233  0.0215  0.0186  
 (0.64)  (1.29)  (1.04)  
LeverageBanks  0.0684  0.0888  0.0055 
  (2.79)  (5.79)  (0.48) 
InterestCover -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-1.50) (-1.40) (-0.81) (-0.66) (-1.20) (-1.21) 
SalesGrowth 0.0063 0.0065 0.0038 0.0039 0.0087 0.0086 
 (1.13) (1.18) (1.93) (2.01) (3.48) (3.43) 
LogTobinsQ -0.0640 -0.0603 0.0147 0.0192 0.0052 0.0003 
 (-2.56) (-2.73) (1.43) (2.00) (0.41) (0.03) 
BankEquity*LogTobinsQ 0.9657 1.0543 0.2237 0.2762 -0.0327 -0.0463 
 (2.62) (2.87) (1.51) (1.90) (-0.19) (-0.26) 
Fixed Effects Year, Industry Year, Firm Year, Industry 
Observations 1,133 1,122 1,133 1,122 1,133 1,122 
Uncensored observations 533 533   533 533 
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Panel B: Subsample results: 1994-1999 and 2000-2005 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Period 1994-1999 2000-2005 
Method Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit OLS Tobit 
Lagged PercentBankers   1.0833   1.2671 
   (27.72)   (28.11) 
BankEquity 0.1585 0.0334 -0.0395 0.2522 -0.0305 0.1313 
 (1.25) (0.31) (-0.64) (2.10) (-0.68) (2.50) 
NonBankEquity -0.0886 -0.0612 -0.0160 -0.0723 -0.0123 -0.0025 
 (-3.02) (-2.66) (-1.06) (-2.32) (-0.75) (-0.17) 
LogSales 0.0300 0.0245 0.0123 0.0548 0.0276 0.0119 
 (4.71) (2.51) (3.81) (8.05) (2.67) (3.71) 
CapEx 0.1040 -0.0120 0.0783 0.1765 0.1093 0.0672 
 (0.76) (-0.15) (1.11) (1.29) (2.00) (1.06) 
Intangibles 0.0727 -0.0829 -0.0044 0.1132 -0.0583 -0.0179 
 (0.70) (-1.06) (-0.08) (1.30) (-1.22) (-0.47) 
Volatility -0.0365 -0.0611 -0.0348 0.0058 -0.0249 0.0062 
 (-0.65) (-1.50) (-1.25) (0.09) (-1.22) (0.19) 
LeverageBanks 0.0812 0.0858 0.0282 0.0683 0.0892 -0.0107 
 (2.35) (3.48) (1.65) (1.92) (4.74) (-0.68) 
InterestCover -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004 
 (-1.26) (0.06) (-1.01) (-0.84) (0.48) (-1.05) 
SalesGrowth 0.0066 0.0035 0.0079 0.0025 -0.0001 0.0078 
 (1.22) (1.63) (3.00) (0.08) (-0.01) (0.52) 
LogTobinsQ -0.0589 0.0338 0.0062 -0.0475 0.0127 -0.0021 
 (-1.87) (1.73) (0.36) (-1.43) (1.13) (-0.12) 
BankEquity*LogTobinsQ 0.8597 0.1432 0.0777 1.5542 0.5187 0.1222 
 (1.67) (0.49) (0.30) (2.65) (2.57) (0.50) 











Observations 495 495 495 627 627 627 
Uncensored observations 285  285 248  248 
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Table 2.5: The effect of bank representation on leverage 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with market leverage and (sample) bank leverage as dependent 
variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions also contain a German GAAP 
dummy variable (not shown) that indicates whether the financial statements adhered to the local German ac-
counting standard. See Table 2.1 for a definition of all variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays 
the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope based on robust hetero-
scedasticity consistent standard errors, which also allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable LeverageMarket LeverageBanks 
Lagged dependent variable   0.8667   0.8595 
   (47.72)   (15.04) 
PercentBankers 0.2813 0.2510 0.0664 0.3323 0.2686 -0.0310 
 (3.54) (2.64) (1.82) (1.99) (2.24) (-0.65) 
BankEquity -0.0167 -0.2112 -0.0652 0.0837 0.0046 -0.0374 
 (-0.18) (-2.29) (-1.26) (0.57) (0.06) (-0.53) 
NonBankEquity -0.0635 -0.0944 -0.0213 -0.1137 -0.0159 -0.0234 
 (-2.17) (-2.79) (-1.79) (-4.44) (-0.61) (-1.93) 
LogSales 0.0224 0.0409 -0.0004 0.0122 0.0242 0.0019 
 (3.69) (2.99) (-0.14) (1.90) (2.23) (0.72) 
CapEx 0.1835 -0.3591 0.1117 -0.4484 -0.1119 -0.0374 
 (1.46) (-3.30) (1.83) (-3.80) (-1.24) (-0.95) 
Intangibles 0.1982 0.3933 0.0288 -0.4512 0.0324 -0.0418 
 (2.70) (5.08) (0.89) (-6.52) (0.74) (-1.52) 
Volatility 0.1730 -0.0025 -0.0089 0.2206 -0.0433 0.0067 
 (2.30) (-0.08) (-0.41) (2.63) (-1.55) (0.34) 
InterestCover -0.00068 -0.00002 -0.00008 -0.00050 -0.00006 -0.00010 
 (-4.98) (-0.52) (-3.10) (-7.77) (-1.67) (-3.18) 
InterestCover*PercentBankers -0.0209 -0.0095 -0.0015 -0.0164 -0.0051 -0.0004 
 (-6.60) (-3.25) (-1.43) (-4.65) (-2.78) (-0.37) 











Observations 1129 1129 1126 1118 1118 1112 
 65
Table 2.6: The effect of bank representation on capital expenditures 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with capital expenditure as the dependent variable. Results are 
shown for the full sample and for two sample split-ups. “PayoutRatio=low” is the subsample for which the pay-
out ratio is smaller or equal to the sample median, while “PayoutRatio = high” is the subsample for which the 
payout ratio is larger than the sample median. Specifications (1) to (3) show the results for the full sample period 
1994-2005, while specifications (4) to (7) look at the two subperiods 1994-1999 and 2000-2005. All regressions 
also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not shown) that indicates whether the financial statements ad-
hered to the local German accounting standard. See Table 2.1 for a definition of all variables. For each explana-
tory variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero 
slope based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, which also allow for autocorrelation of one 
lag (Newey-West). The table also reports the p-value of the standard t-test that the coefficients of the cross effect 
“CashFlow*PercentBankers” is identical between the two corresponding subsamples. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Period 1994-2005 1994-1999 2000-2005 
PayoutRatio PayoutRatio PayoutRatio 
Subsample Full Sample low high low high low high 
CashFlow 0.3076 0.3014 0.5786 0.4825 0.4039 0.1027 0.7172 
 (3.14) (2.34) (4.44) (3.32) (2.54) (1.38) (2.68) 
PercentBankers 0.0232 0.0218 -0.0075 0.1182 -0.1383 -0.0256 0.2068 
 (0.57) (0.42) (-0.11) (1.90) (-1.66) (-0.67) (1.93) 
CashFlow*PercentBankers -0.0696 -0.5090 0.4555 -1.2832 2.0453 0.2605 -1.9795 
 (-0.14) (-0.86) (0.61) (-1.77) (2.17) (0.67) (-1.74) 
LogTotalAssets -0.0019 0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0004 -0.0034 0.0009 -0.0009 
 (-1.25) (0.92) (-1.37) (-0.13) (-1.21) (0.32) (-0.41) 
TobinsQ -0.0014 0.0025 -0.0172 -0.0007 -0.0213 0.0035 -0.0142 
 (-0.51) (0.85) (-3.06) (-0.30) (-2.24) (0.87) (-1.71) 













Test of equality of cross-
effect (p-value)  30.97% 0.42% 5.56% 
Observations 1267 546 547 272 273 274 274 
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Table 2.7: The effect of bank representation on bank debt 
For each of the 1,118 firm-years in our sample and for each of the 10 banks in our sample, we calculate Firm-
BankDebt, i.e. the debt (scaled by total assets) provided by this bank to this firm. The table presents results for 
Tobit regressions of FirmBankDebt on the dummy variable ThisBankOnBoard, which equals one if the bank for 
which FirmBankDebt has been calculated is represented on the board. The regression also contains the dummy 
variable AnotherBankOnBoard, which equals one if another bank is represented on the board, as well as seven 
additional variables that are described in Table 2.1. All dependent variables are lagged by one year. All regres-
sions also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not shown) that indicates whether the financial statements 
adhered to the local German accounting standard. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope esti-
mate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope. The t-statistics are based on robust 
standard errors with firm-year clusters. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FirmBankDebt   0.9084 0.9060 0.7269 
   (5.01) (4.98) (4.55) 
ThisBankOnBoard 0.0146 0.0139 0.0186 0.0185 0.0037 
 (8.45) (7.90) (3.43) (3.41) (1.34) 
AnotherBankOnBoard -0.0081 -0.0059 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0035 
 (-5.93) (-3.81) (-2.68) (-2.94) (-2.51) 
BankEquity 0.0130 -0.0152 0.0025 0.0020 0.0053 
 (1.64) (-1.59) (0.49) (0.43) (0.94) 
NonBankEquity -0.0208 -0.0102 -0.0067 -0.0069 -0.0106 
 (-7.57) (-3.09) (-2.73) (-2.63) (-3.52) 
LogSales 0.0028 0.0069 0.0028 0.0030 0.0033 
 (4.05) (3.68) (4.33) (4.70) (4.43) 
CapEx -0.0318 0.0152 -0.0173 -0.0120 -0.0146 
 (-2.05) (1.15) (-2.06) (-1.33) (-1.34) 
Intangibles -0.0454 0.0138 -0.0163 -0.0145 -0.0209 
 (-5.66) (2.01) (-3.06) (-2.53) (-3.03) 
Volatility 0.0098 -0.0032 -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0014 
 (1.89) (-1.06) (-0.32) (-0.30) (0.40) 
InterestCover -0.00011 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00006 
 (-6.65) (-3.45) (-3.37) (-3.52) (-3.87) 
InterestCover*ThisBankOnBoard -0.00057 -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00014 












Observations 11180 11180 11140 11140 11140 
Uncensored observations 4501 4501 4490 4490 4490 
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Table 2.8: The effect of a bank’s board representation 
on their lending activity to the same industry 
For each of the 132 industry-years in our sample and for each of the 10 banks in our sample, we calculate Indus-
tryBankDebt, i.e. industry-year average of the debt (scaled by total assets) provided by this bank to a firm in this 
industry-year. We only average across those firms where this bank is not represented on the board. The table 
presents results for four Tobit regressions of IndustryBankDebt on PercentBankersThisBank, which is the indus-
try-year average of the percentage of supervisory board seats occupied by this bank. The regressions also contain 
the lagged values of six additional variables that are averaged across each industry-year and are identical for 
each bank. See Table 2.1 for a definition of these variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays the 
slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope. The t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors with industry-year clusters. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged IndustryBankDebt  0.9130 0.9055 0.6845 
  (21.38) (21.04) (13.69) 
PercentBankersThisBank 0.0334 0.0735 0.0788 0.0255 
 (1.17) (6.07) (6.29) (1.53) 
BankEquity 0.0196 -0.0103 -0.0035 0.0046 
 (1.55) (-1.47) (-0.35) (0.44) 
NonBankEquity -0.0026 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0006 
 (-0.92) (-0.07) (0.15) (-0.26) 
LogSales 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0021 0.0021 
 (1.62) (-0.60) (2.01) (2.09) 
CapEx 0.0263 0.0035 0.0096 0.0152 
 (1.84) (0.54) (0.88) (1.32) 
Intangibles 0.0014 -0.0033 0.0044 0.0028 
 (0.16) (-1.04) (0.64) (0.38) 
Volatility -0.0074 0.0033 0.0041 0.0008 









Observations 1316 1315 1315 1315 
Uncensored observations 885 884 884 884 
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Table 2.9: The effect of bank representation 
on mergers and acquisitions advisory 
For each of the 700 firm-years in our sample in which a firm did at least one acquisition and for each of the 10 
banks in our sample, we calculate PercentAcqAdvisor, i.e. the percentage of the acquisitions for which this bank 
was hired as an advisor. This table presents results for three Tobit regressions of PercentAcqAdvisor on the 
dummy variable ThisBankOnBoard, which equals one if the bank for which PercentAcqAdvisor has been calcu-
lated is represented on the board. The regressions include four additional independent variables that are de-
scribed in Table 2.1. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-
statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope. For model (1), the t-statistics are based on robust standard errors 
with firm-year clusters. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All banks Deutsche Bank Dresdner Bank 
ThisBankOnBoard 0.6992 0.3194 0.3812 
 (5.15) (2.49) (2.45) 
LogSales 0.1209 0.1308 0.1073 
 (3.48) (2.87) (1.87) 
CapEx 0.0003 0.4693 -2.3788 
 (0.00) (0.40) (-1.03) 
Intangibles 1.0261 1.1282 0.4332 
 (2.46) (2.49) (0.85) 
Volatility -1.0814 -1.2718 4.1932 
 (-0.36) (-0.19) (0.64) 
Fixed Effects Year, Industry None None 
Observations 7,000 700 700 
Uncensored observations 52 32 15 
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Table 2.10: The effect of bank representation 
on payout ratio and volatility 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with payout ratio and volatility as dependent variables. All ex-
planatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not 
shown) that indicates whether the financial statements adhered to the local German accounting standard. See 
Table 2.1 for a definition of all variables. For each explanatory variable, the table displays the slope estimate 
and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope, based on robust heteroscedasticity consis-
tent standard errors, which also allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). Additionally, the p-value of 
the F-test for the equality of the coefficients on PercentBankersWithoutEquity and PercentBankersWithEquity is 
displayed.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Payout Ratio Volatility 
Lagged dependent variable   0.5710   0.0217 
   (16.96)   (4.14) 
PercentBankersWithoutEquity -0.0873 -0.1828 -0.0547 0.0042 0.0094 0.0003 
 (-0.89) (-1.19) (-0.76) (1.05) (1.97) (0.15) 
PercentBankersWithEquity 0.0065 0.0741 0.0122 -0.0159 -0.0131 -0.0117 
 (0.04) (0.47) (0.10) (-1.65) (-1.16) (-1.46) 
BankEquity -0.2362 -0.0453 -0.1573 0.0143 0.0059 0.0068 
 (-2.14) (-0.31) (-1.62) (1.61) (0.63) (0.94) 
NonBankEquity 0.0545 -0.0672 0.0335 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0017 
 (1.55) (-1.30) (1.32) (-0.03) (0.28) (-2.20) 
LogSales 0.0126 0.0445 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0012 
 (1.57) (2.04) (-0.30) (-8.78) (-3.16) (-4.89) 
CapEx 0.4717 0.4255 -0.0029 -0.0049 -0.0169 -0.0053 
 (3.32) (2.30) (-0.03) (-0.86) (-3.04) (-1.17) 
Intangibles 0.0819 0.2303 0.0874 0.0039 -0.0028 -0.0004 
 (0.87) (1.36) (1.29) (0.88) (-0.65) (-0.17) 
Volatility -0.3624 -0.0946 -0.2609    
 (-3.17) (-1.63) (-4.08)    











Test of equality of PercentBankers 
with and without equity (p-value) 62.07% 19.39% 62.51% 6.13% 9.26% 15.93% 
Observations 968 968 848 1159 1159 1130 
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Table 2.11: The effect of bank representation 
on management compensation 
The table presents results for OLS regressions of LogAvgManComp, the logarithm of average management com-
pensation as the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. See Table 2.1 for a defini-
tion of all variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-
statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope, based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, which 
also allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). Additionally, the p-value of the F-test for the equality of 
the coefficients on PercentBankersWithoutEquity and PercentBankersWithEquity is displayed. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged LogAvgManComp   0.5082 
   (7.96) 
PercentBankersWithoutEquity 0.2392 -0.3396 0.1370 
 (1.15) (-1.19) (0.87) 
PercentBankersWithEquity -0.2653 -0.9008 -0.5419 
 (-0.78) (-1.86) (-1.59) 
BankEquity 0.1186 0.0664 0.2887 
 (0.50) (0.31) (1.29) 
NonBankEquity -0.3473 -0.4021 -0.2036 
 (-4.53) (-3.58) (-3.88) 
LogSales 0.2411 0.4024 0.1197 
 (15.00) (3.43) (6.96) 
TobinsQ 0.1161 0.1090 0.0566 
 (4.31) (3.06) (2.92) 
Intangibles -0.0906 0.5237 -0.0559 
 (-0.49) (1.91) (-0.40) 
Volatility 0.1260 0.1130 0.0341 
 (1.00) (1.28) (0.42) 





Test of equality of Percent-
Bankers with and without eq-
uity (p-value) 
19.84% 24.65% 6.10% 
Observations 954 954 851 
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Table 2.12: The effect of bank representation on Tobin’s Q 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with the logarithm of Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not 
shown) that indicates whether the financial statements adhered to the local German accounting standard. See 
Table 2.1 for a definition of all variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, 
in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope, based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors, which also allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged LogTobinsQ     0.8017 0.7945 
     (31.14) (30.91) 
PercentBankers -0.5019 -0.5601 0.0497 0.1035 -0.1338 -0.1409 
 (-4.31) (-5.35) (0.58) (1.19) (-2.49) (-2.68) 
BankEquity -0.0967 0.0077 0.0073 0.0183 0.0138 0.0287 
 (-0.97) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.34) (0.68) 
NonBankEquity 0.0184 0.0258 0.1114 0.1208 0.0116 0.0202 
 (0.46) (0.66) (2.50) (2.73) (0.60) (1.04) 
LogTotalAssets -0.0264 -0.0080 -0.1092 -0.1088 0.0008 0.0032 
 (-2.41) (-0.81) (-3.91) (-3.76) (0.17) (0.74) 
CapEx 0.4094 0.3879 0.6703 0.5331 0.0264 0.0099 
 (2.02) (1.90) (3.18) (2.99) (0.18) (0.08) 
Intangibles -0.1678 0.1818 -0.2575 -0.2054 -0.0395 -0.0157 
 (-1.23) (1.20) (-1.70) (-1.35) (-0.61) (-0.23) 
Volatility -0.0661 0.0037 0.0143 0.0138 -0.0936 -0.1000 
 (-0.66) (0.04) (0.27) (0.25) (-2.17) (-2.19) 
LeverageBook  -0.4539  0.0075  -0.0583 
  (-6.72)  (0.13)  (-2.05) 
Productivity  0.0001  0.0005  0.0000 
  (2.09)  (6.75)  (-0.61) 
SalesGrowth  -0.0006  -0.0055  -0.0025 
  (-0.05)  (-1.89)  (-1.25) 
R&D  1.8339  0.8161  0.4862 
   (3.75)  (1.25)  (2.02) 











Observations 1115 1102 1115 1102 1104 1101 
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Table 2.13: The effect of bank representation on ROA 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with ROA as the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are 
lagged by one year. All regressions also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not shown) that indicates 
whether the financial statements adhered to the local German accounting standard. See Table 2.1 for a definition 
of all variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-
statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope, based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, which 
also allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged LogTobinsQ     0.5224 0.5765 
     (6.46) (9.75) 
PercentBankers -0.0720 -0.0771 -0.0312 -0.0393 -0.0379 -0.0297 
 (-2.73) (-3.03) (-0.76) (-1.12) (-1.93) (-1.57) 
BankEquity 0.0045 -0.0215 0.1265 0.0646 0.0185 -0.0324 
 (0.11) (-0.57) (1.51) (1.01) (0.46) (-0.84) 
NonBankEquity 0.0035 -0.0020 0.0069 0.0005 0.0030 0.0010 
 (0.38) (-0.22) (0.43) (0.03) (0.43) (0.16) 
LogTotalAssets -0.0058 -0.0010 -0.0173 -0.0129 -0.0020 -0.0002 
 (-2.44) (-0.47) (-1.51) (-1.00) (-1.17) (-0.11) 
CapEx 0.1172 0.1395 0.1349 0.1444 0.0128 0.0315 
 (2.72) (3.32) (2.76) (3.07) (0.40) (1.01) 
Intangibles -0.0575 -0.0010 -0.0278 0.0094 -0.0414 -0.0173 
 (-1.99) (-0.03) (-0.66) (0.22) (-1.95) (-0.78) 
Volatility -0.0308 -0.0194 0.0195 0.0146 -0.0137 -0.0203 
 (-1.22) (-0.84) (1.00) (0.75) (-0.71) (-1.02) 
LeverageBook  -0.0990  -0.0379  -0.0342 
  (-6.60)  (-1.69)  (-2.79) 
Productivity  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
  (3.07)  (3.98)  (1.22) 
SalesGrowth  0.0019  0.0005  0.0006 
  (0.55)  (0.33)  (0.37) 
R&D  0.0258  -0.0509  -0.0142 
  (0.21)  (-0.30)  (-0.17) 











Observations 1124 1106 1124 1106 1119 1106 
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Chapter III 
3 How Preussag Became TUI: 
A Clinical Study of Institutional Block-
holders and Restructuring in Europe 
Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story 
in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beauti-
ful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profit-
ability of the target company. We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, 
many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses 
even after their corporate backyards are knee deep in unresponsive toads. 
Warren Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report 1981 
 
1 Introduction 
At the beginning of fiscal year 1993/94, Preussag’s sales were 4% in logistics, 4% in informa-
tion technology, and 92% in “old economy” lines of business, including metal trading, steel, 
mining, shipbuilding, and plant construction.49 At the end of 2004, tourism accounted for 
73%, logistics for 19%, and nine of the ten “old economy” segments as well as information 
technology were gone. Moreover, the company had now relabeled itself “TUI AG,” and only 
the identities of its CEO, its chairman of the supervisory board, its largest shareholder, and the 
registration code of its stock preserved continuity. From 1994 to 2004, the stock gained 9% 
while the market index rose by 71% and an industry-weighted portfolio by 115%. We track 
Preussag’s history and the fate of its stock and analyze its 47 acquisitions and 46 divestitures 
                                                 
49  This chapter is based on joint work with Ingolf Dittmann and Ernst Maug, therefore I retain the personal 
pronoun “we”, used in the original paper, throughout this chapter. An abridged version of this chapter was 
published in Financial Management 37:3, pp. 571-598. All tables and figures are gathered at the end of the 
chapter. This is an academic study and was written only to make a contribution to the scientific debate on 
corporate governance. The authors did not conduct the study on behalf of a third party and none of the au-
thors received any funds from any party mentioned in this paper. We also did not receive any information 
or communications from Preussag’s management. We are grateful to Michel Habib, Martin Wallmeier, an 
anonymous referee, and the jury members of the JFE ECGI Clinical Paper Competition, especially Steve 
Kaplan and Claudio Loderer, for their comments. Christoph Schneider acknowledges the support of a 
DekaBank scholarship. 
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as well as other transactions and news events. We find that Preussag’s divestiture program 
was a success and added significant shareholder value. However, the investment of divestiture 
proceeds into tourism was misguided: Preussag lost value by investing in an industry it did 
not understand and, ultimately, by overpaying for assets to which it could not add any value. 
Or, extending Warren Buffet’s famous parable, as Preussag kissed too many toads that failed 
to turn into princes, it ultimately became a rather unattractive toad itself. 
This chapter asks what went wrong in the process that turned Preussag, a traditional diversi-
fied conglomerate, into TUI, a modern and focused services company. In the process, we sug-
gest some general conclusions about corporate governance, acquisition programs, incentives 
for voluntary liquidations, and the potentially ill-fated role of institutional shareholders. 
We analyze three phases of Preussag’s development: 
Phase 1: From January 1, 1994 to June 10, 1997, Preussag’s strategy was to restructure its 
core lines of business, expand the profitable segments and divest everything that 
was not profitable. This strategy looked promising initially but then delivered less 
than expected, and the stock lost 25.0% relative to the market index. 
Phase 2: On June 11, 1997, Preussag bought Hapag-Lloyd, a company in container ship-
ment, luxury cruises, airlines, and travel agencies. From then on until September 
11, 2001, Preussag undertook altogether 16 acquisitions in tourism and divested 
most of its former lines of business. During this period, Preussag outperformed the 
market index by 29.6%. 
Phase 3: Beginning with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, tourism went through a 
number of crises that marked a structural shift in the industry. Preussag slowed 
down its acquisitions and consolidated its tourism and logistics operations. Most re-
structuring was internal during this period, and the stock underperformed the mar-
ket by 38.4% until December 31, 2004. 
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Our main focus is on the second phase where Preussag entered tourism, as it presents the key 
to understanding the turnaround in the company’s strategy. We group transactions into several 
categories, including “tourism acquisitions,” “other acquisitions,” and “sell-offs.” We also 
analyze “tourism news” and “other news,” mostly financial disclosures. We then conduct an 
analysis of variance of Preussag’s stock return in order to distinguish the impact of different 
categories of news and announcements on the stock price. We also adapt event study methods 
to our problem. Our main findings are: 
• The positive performance in Phase 2 is explained entirely by Preussag’s divestiture 
program. Divestitures themselves explain an outperformance relative to the stock mar-
ket of 48%.50 
• The positive impact of divestitures hides the value destruction through tourism acqui-
sitions. These reduced the stock price by 35% relative to the index. 
• The crises affecting tourism in Phase 3 cannot explain the underperformance of Preus-
sag during this time. 
We then calculate the value Preussag would have had if it had divested all its traditional busi-
nesses but not acquired any tourism companies. Had Preussag invested the proceeds from its 
sell-offs into a tourism and logistics index, rather than into tourism and logistics companies, 
then its shareholders would have almost tripled their wealth to more than €11 billion rather 
than seeing it reduced to €3.3 billion. 
Preussag followed a strategy of “business migration” that only few other firms have followed 
before.51 The remarkable feature of Preussag remains the speed of their transformation, which 
                                                 
50  This and the following number measure performance relative to an index in logarithmic returns and refer to 
the calculations in Section 4. 
51  Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (2000) cite the example of American Can, a maker of tin cans and metal 
containers, that became Primerica, a financial services company that acquired the U.S. business of Barclays 
Bank and Smith Barney. Others include U.S. Steel that became USX when it added oil to its steel business 
(without divesting steel), and International Harvester, a farm equipment manufacturer in the 1930s and 
1940s, that became the truck manufacturer Navistar today (see Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley, 2000, pp. 
200-201). 
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mostly happened, between 1997 and 2001. Our analysis shows that this strategy consistently 
destroyed large amounts of shareholder value and raises the question why such a strategy 
could be followed over an extended period of time without any interference by shareholders. 
We study Preussag’s corporate governance and find that compensation was practically unre-
lated to performance and did not provide incentives for a voluntary liquidation of the com-
pany. Rather, compensation increased substantially as Preussag was transformed into 
Europe’s largest tourism company. We also document that this strategy created significant 
private benefits in the form of increased status for Preussag’s CEO as he accumulated seats on 
other companies’ boards. At the first glance, a better alignment of management’s and share-
holder’s interests could have been expected as Preussag had an independent supervisory board 
and a large controlling shareholder. However, it turns out, however, that the large shareholder 
was an intermediary – a state-owned bank – whose management had little incentive to prevent 
the destruction of shareholder value. This bank commanded almost complete control over 
Preussag through its voting power and interlocking directorates. 
Our discussion of corporate governance and the causes of value destruction brings out four 
general points: (1) Managerial discretion is not limited to free operating cash flows, but also 
includes the (potentially much larger) proceeds from divestitures; (2) Large shareholders are a 
mixed blessing if they are institutions that suffer from agency problems themselves; (3) Com-
pensation is critical to induce value-enhancing, voluntary liquidations; (4) Independent super-
visory boards lose their bite in networks of cross-holdings and board interlocks. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the history of Preussag 
and background information on the major players. Section 3 introduces our data and the 
method of analysis. Section 4 contains the main results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 is 
devoted to an analysis of what went wrong at Preussag and puts the case into a larger context. 
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Section 6 summarizes the reaction of Preussag’s management to our results, and Section 7 
concludes. 
2 Background and stock price history 
2.1 History of Preussag 
Preussag’s history dates back to 1924, when the “Preussische Bergwerks- und Hütten-
Aktiengesellschaft” took over state-owned amber operations in Königsberg, turning Prussian 
civil servants into entrepreneurs.52 The first step towards privatization was taken with the 
1959 IPO and the name changed to Preussag AG in 1964. Acquisitions in the 1960s created a 
diversified conglomerate with engagements in logistics, mining, oil exploration, metal pro-
duction, and trading. In 1989, Preussag took over Salzgitter AG, a state-owned company in 
steel, shipbuilding, and engineering, creating a corporation with more than 70.000 employees. 
Insert Table 3.1 here 
Table 3.1 provides data on Preussag’s sales by segment and shows that in fiscal year 1992/93, 
their largest segment by revenues was trading (trading in steel and non-ferrous metals), which 
together with the related logistics operations accounted for 40% of sales.53 Plant construction 
with altogether 13 different activities (including nuclear power plants, civil engineering, un-
derground engineering) prospered at this time because of the construction boom after German 
unification. Steel production was the third largest segment with 10.4% of sales. The Herfin-
dahl index that measures the degree of diversification is 0.18 for this fiscal year, describing a 
moderately diversified conglomerate. 
2.2 Preussag’s main shareholder: WestLB 
The major shareholder of Preussag during the entire period under consideration here is the 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (WestLB), who owned 29.1% directly and another 
                                                 
52  The name can be translated as “Prussian Mining and Steel, Inc.”; Königsberg is now Kaliningrad, Russia. 
53  We do not have earnings figures by segment. German GAAP requires segment reporting for sales only. 
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approximately 3.5% indirectly through their 33.3% stake in Niedersachsen Holding. WestLB 
was important for Preussag not only as its major shareholder but also through its portfolio of 
industrial holdings, especially in tourism. This becomes apparent from Figure 3.1A, which 
describes the major blockholdings in the Preussag-WestLB-network in 1994 that remained 
almost unchanged until June 1997. 
Insert Figure 3.1 here 
WestLB is the fourth largest German bank by assets and also the largest state-owned bank in 
the country with its main regional focus in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia.54 The original 
purpose of WestLB was to assist small local savings banks to coordinate their liquidity. These 
savings banks are community owned and were founded to provide affordable banking ser-
vices to small and medium size businesses and less well-off households. In addition, WestLB 
is a major lender to the state and to the communities of North Rhine-Westphalia. The owners 
of WestLB, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and a number of communities, guarantee for 
all liabilities of the bank. In the 1960s, WestLB began to extend its scope and started to as-
semble a portfolio of stakes in German companies. Over subsequent decades, these included 
Preussag, Babcock and a number of major tourism companies (see Figure 3.1A). In the 1980s 
and 1990s, WestLB expanded into investment banking and leasing and built up a worldwide 
network of branches. WestLB made headlines in 2003 when its London branch lost about 
€500 million in a deal with the U.K. based TV rental company Boxclever. 
2.3 Phase 1: Consolidate core businesses (1994-1997) 
On January 1, 1994 Michael Frenzel, already a member of the management board for six 
years, became CEO of Preussag. During the first three years of his leadership, Preussag fol-
lowed a strategy described as “value-oriented development.” Its key focus was to “extend 
Preussag’s core competencies in plant engineering and construction and technological ser-
                                                 
54  Handelsblatt, December 3, 2001, p. 21. We rely on Handelsblatt for most of our company information. It is 
a German business daily newspaper with detailed company reports. 
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vices.” (Preussag, Annual Report 1993/94, p. 9). This strategy comprised the following parts: 
(1) Identify three segments for growth, (2) retain “core segments” with more limited growth 
prospects but sufficient profitability, (3) divest segments that have no potential for growth and 
are not profitable, and (4) accelerate internationalization by expansion into the Asian-Pacific 
region as margins in Western Europe stagnate. Following this strategy, Preussag sold the 
Hagenuk group, a manufacturer of mobile phones that suffered severe losses, and exited from 
railcar manufacturing. Apart from these segments, the relative weights of the other segments 
within the company did not change much until fiscal year 1996/97. Preussag undertook 11 
acquisitions and 14 sell-offs from January 1994 to June 1997. 
Insert Figure 3.2 here 
Figure 3.2A displays Preussag’s stock price for this period. The figure shows the performance 
indices of Preussag’s stock and of the CDAX, so dividends are always reinvested. The CDAX 
represents a value-weighted portfolio of all German corporations traded on the Frankfurt 
stock exchange. During most of the first phase, where Preussag’s management tried to re-
structure their old economy businesses, the stock price tracked the development of the index 
closely, with some divergence becoming apparent in the second half of 1996. As of 1997, the 
German stock market index started a strong ascent, in line with other markets worldwide, 
which Preussag’s stock followed only partially. Over the first phase until June 10, 1997, 
Preussag’s stock increased by 27.6%, which is 25% less than the CDAX performance over the 
same time period. Our analysis needs to address the question why Preussag underperformed 
the index in this phase. 
2.4 Phase 2: Enter tourism (1997-2001) 
On June 11, 1997, Preussag bid for Hapag-Lloyd AG and opened a new chapter in the com-
pany’s history. Hapag-Lloyd celebrated its 150th anniversary in the same year, which they 
dated to the foundation of the “Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft” 
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(short “Hapag”) in 1847, which had opened its North Atlantic service (Hamburg-America-
Line) in 1848. Its main focus is in global container shipping, airlines, travel agencies, and 
luxury cruises, four areas entirely unrelated to Preussag’s traditional lines of business. Hapag-
Lloyd was publicly listed but its free float was less than 1% of its shares. Hapag-Lloyd also 
owned a 30% stake in TUI, which was a tour operator independent of Preussag (see Figure 
3.1A). 
With this takeover, Preussag entered the German tourism market that consisted of three main 
segments: tour operators, travel agencies and charter airlines. An integrated European tourism 
industry did not exist at that time. The tour operator market had a volume of about €15.6 bil-
lion in 1997 and had grown at an annual rate of almost 9% since 1990. This market was 
highly concentrated at the time with the three major players being TUI (market share: 26%), 
C&N (22%) and LTU (12%). The German travel agency market grew by an annual 7.3% be-
tween 1990 and 1998 and reached a sales volume of about €22.5 billion in 1997. During the 
previous decade, the concentration in this segment had increased dramatically but was still 
only moderate. As a consequence of the aggressively expanding travel agency chains and the 
entry of new competitors, average industry return on sales decreased significantly from 10.1% 
in 1993 to 3.3% in 1996. The three major players in this market are Hapag-Lloyd, First and 
C&N with a combined market share of about 20%. Finally, the charter flight market was also 
a fast growing segment during the 90’s because of the increasing popularity of overseas holi-
days. Like the tour operator segment, this market is an oligopoly where the three major air-
lines are Condor/C&N (24%), LTU (24%) and Hapag-Lloyd (16%). Clearly, the features of 
tourism as a growing market and the perceived general shift of the economy from manufactur-
ing towards services made it look attractive compared to the stagnating, cyclical, and often 
loss-making traditional businesses Preussag operated before. 
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During this period, Preussag undertook 26 acquisitions (16 of which were in tourism) and 15 
divestitures, mostly of its traditional lines of business. As a result, Preussag became more fo-
cused, and its degree of diversification fell significantly over this period. The Herfindahl in-
dex based on sales reached 0.38 in 2001, almost double the average value during 1994-1997. 
At the same time, WestLB disengaged from tourism, selling most of it to Preussag. Figure 
3.1B depicts the ownership and cross-shareholdings at the end of 1999. The comparison to 
Figure 3.1C shows how acquisitions and divestitures disentangled this network in subsequent 
years. 
Insert Figure 3.3 here 
Figure 3.2B shows that Preussag’s stock appreciated by 44.8% over this period (until Sep-
tember 10, 2001), whereas the market as a whole rose by only 15%. A potential explanation 
for this superior performance is that Preussag is just a high-beta stock that profited from the 
general rise in markets. Figure 3.3A disproves this conjecture. The chart shows the develop-
ment of Preussag’s beta from 1994 to 2004 measured over a moving 500 trading day window. 
This beta is highest at the beginning and at the end of the period (close to 1.0), but low in the 
middle phase between 1997 and 2001, where it falls into the 0.6-0.8 range. Hence, Preussag 
outperformed the market while moving its field of operations from “old economy” towards 
tourism. We therefore have to address the question why Preussag outperformed the market 
and whether this can be interpreted as an endorsement of its business model by the stock mar-
ket. 
2.5 Phase 3: Consolidate tourism (2001-2004) 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, tourism suffered a general setback. Subse-
quent events like the war in Iraq and the SARS epidemic in Asia reinforced these problems 
for many tourism companies. We therefore separate this third phase from the previous phase. 
After September 11, 2001, Preussag scaled back its acquisition program and undertook only 
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10 smaller acquisitions (nine in tourism) and continued to exit from its previous lines of busi-
ness with a total of 17 divestitures. Their efforts were focused on consolidating and restructur-
ing their tourism business. At the end of 2004, almost three-fourths of their sales came from 
tourism and another 19% from logistics, raising the Herfindahl index for diversification to 
0.58.55 
Figure 3.2C shows that Preussag’s stock price fell by 11% by the close of trading on Septem-
ber 11 in Frankfurt. While the CDAX fell in line with other stock markets, the decline for 
Preussag was sharper, underperforming the index by more than 20% within the first ten days 
of the attacks. However, the CDAX subsequently started a sustained recovery, finishing 2004 
at 97% of its value on September 10, 2001, whereas Preussag ended 2004 at less than 60% of 
its value on that day. Preussag’s beta increased after 2000 to values around 1.0, so this cannot 
explain why Preussag declined more than the market. Preussag’s low stock price nearly led to 
its exclusion from Germany’s major stock index, the DAX in 2004. It also led to takeover 
speculations when Morgan Stanley raised its stake in Preussag to 10% in July 2004, and 
WestLB repeatedly expressed its interest to sell its 31.4% stake in Preussag. In December 
2004, WestLB sold a 10% stake to a Spanish investor who is reportedly a close friend of 
Preussag’s CEO Michael Frenzel. The remaining WestLB shares were placed with other 
Spanish investors and with European institutional investors. In Section 4.3 we investigate 
what caused the spectacular collapse of Preussag’s stock price over Phase 3. Was it just bad 
luck from an unforeseeable negative shock that was entirely outside management’s control as 
managers claimed?56 Or did the market – belatedly – recognize the problems of Preussag’s 
concept of an integrated tourism company? 
                                                 
55  Preussag changed its name to TUI, its former tourism subsidiary, on June 26, 2002, towards the end of the 
period under consideration here. Throughout the text, we still refer to the company as Preussag and ignore 
the change of name in order to avoid confusion. 
56  Preussag, Annual Report 2003, p. 107. We refer to annual reports by fiscal year, not by publication date. 
For example, Preussag’s annual report for the fiscal year 1994/95 was published in 1996. 
 83
3 Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
In order to collect a complete set of transaction announcements and news we searched for 
“Preussag,” “TUI,” and “Hapag-Lloyd” in five different databases. (1) The Genios Business 
database, which includes several major German newspapers and business periodicals;57 (2) 
DGAP, a service that collects disclosures to regulators;58 (3) The press release database of 
TUI AG available from their website; (4) For the years 2003 and 2004 we also had access to 
Lexis-Nexis and searched this database for “TUI”.59 Whenever we identified a transaction in 
any of these databases, we verified the names of acquirer and target with the Genios Business 
database. We also downloaded all transactions from Thomson Financial SDC where these 
companies appear either as target or as acquirer, but we found this database to be particularly 
unreliable.60 We therefore deleted all events from Thomson Financial that could not be con-
firmed from one of the other sources. These were only small and probably insignificant trans-
actions, so we feel confident that this decision does not bias our results but that it significantly 
enhances the accuracy of our data. 
As a general rule, we assume that disclosures to the market happened one trading day before 
the publication date of the newspaper. For electronic disclosures we use the same day. In 
those cases where there is clear evidence (time stamp) that the news did not reach the market 
before the close of trading, we assign the event day to the subsequent trading day. We cannot 
exclude the possibility that we miss the correct event date by one trading day in some in-
                                                 
57  These include the Wall Street Journal Europe, Handelsblatt, the M&A Review, Tagesspiegel, Wirtschafts-
woche, VDI Nachrichten, Der Spiegel, and Die Zeit. 
58  DGAP is “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc Publizität mbH” and collects the disclosures to BAFIN (Bun-
deaufsichtsamt für das Wertpapierwesen), the German financial regulator (equivalent to the SEC in the 
U.S. or the FSA in the U.K.). 
59  Lexis-Nexis includes the Financial Times, Financial Times Deutschland, Börsen-Zeitung, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Frankfurter Rundschau. 
60  In many cases, the announcement date was confused with the effective date. In several other cases, the 
announcement date was the publication date of the newspaper article even though exact time and date 
stamps for disclosures or company press releases existed. In more than 35% of the cases, we had to correct 
the announcement date because it was evidently incorrect. This database was also highly incomplete. 
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stances. We also searched the Genios Business database for news articles and press releases 
on industry news relevant to Preussag’s businesses. In total, we can identify 125 transaction 
announcements and 292 news items that we retain in our data set, a total of 417 events. 
We classify all announcements into the following five groups: tourism acquisitions, other ac-
quisitions, sell-offs, tourism news, and other news. Whenever some ownership is transferred, 
we classify an announcement as an acquisition or a sell-off – irrespective of the percentage of 
ownership transferred in the transaction. Joint ventures to which Preussag mainly contributed 
cash and Preussag’s partners contributed assets are classified as acquisitions. On the other 
hand, we regard the announcements of strategic alliances and joint ventures where Preussag 
does not contribute cash as a news item. Announcements of internal restructurings are also 
considered news items. Note that some transactions generate multiple announcements if they 
are executed in stages or if different pieces of news reach the market on different days. In 
total, we identify 62 announcements of 46 sell-offs and 63 announcements of 47 acquisitions, 
of which 25 were in tourism. Of the 292 news items, 44 regard tourism. Most of the others are 
disclosures of financial statements of Preussag and its subsidiaries. 
We obtain stock market data from Thomson Financial Datastream. We choose the CDAX as 
the relevant market index. The CDAX represents a value-weighted portfolio of all German 
corporations traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. All time series were adjusted for Ger-
man holidays without stock market trading in order to avoid an underestimation of the excess 
returns’ variance. Stock returns were calculated from the return index, which includes rein-
vested dividends. 
3.2 Methods 
In order to test our hypotheses and to address our questions, we analyze Preussag’s stock 
price reaction in two different ways: (1) with a regression of Preussag’s returns on dummy 
variables, and (2) with an adaptation of standard event study methods. For our analysis, we 
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use log returns, because log returns are additive over time and facilitate the attribution of re-
turns to classes of events. 
3.3 Choice of benchmarks 
For both methods, a benchmark for the normal or expected performance must be chosen first. 
For Preussag, this turns out to be a major methodological problem, because the correlation of 
Preussag’s shares with the market index varies markedly over time as Figure 3.3A demon-
strates. Even within each of the three subperiods we defined above, Preussag’s CAPM beta is 
not constant. On the other hand, 417 events in 11 years render it impossible to find enough 
‘clean’ estimation windows for estimating the model separately for each event. We therefore 
work with the market-adjusted model and simply deduct the market return (CDAX) from 
Preussag’s return in order to arrive at Preussag’s abnormal return. Brown and Warner (1985) 
show in a simulation study that the size and power of tests based on the market-adjusted 
model are only marginally worse than tests based on the market model. 
We also employ an industry-adjusted model, where we subtract the return on an appropriately 
weighted industry index from Preussag’s returns when calculating Preussag’s abnormal re-
turns. This industry-adjusted model helps us distinguishing between industry effects and firm-
specific effects, because industry effects do not ‘wash out’ as in standard event studies based 
on firms from many industries. Since Preussag’s activities moved more and more from steel 
and engineering towards tourism and logistics, we construct two industry indices: The steel 
and engineering index is an equally weighted portfolio of the FTSE Europe steel and other 
metals index and the FTSE Europe engineering and machinery index. The tourism and logis-
tics index is an equally weighted portfolio of the FTSE Europe leisure and hotels index and 
the FTSE Europe transport index. Figure 3.3B displays the coefficients of a regression of 
Preussag’s daily returns on the corresponding returns of these two indices and an intercept 
where the regression is performed over a moving 500 trading day window. Both series start in 
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January 1995, because the FTSE Europe indices are not available before January 1994. The 
plot demonstrates that the correlation between Preussag’s returns and the returns on the tour-
ism and logistics index steadily and markedly increases over the period considered while the 
correlation with the steel and engineering index decreases. The plot therefore reflects the 
transformation of Preussag from a steel and engineering conglomerate to an integrated tour-
ism and logistics service provider. 
As Preussag gradually moves from one industry to another, we construct a weighted industry 
index for use in the industry-adjusted model. A similar approach has been used by Parrino 
(1997). We weight the ‘steel and engineering’-index and the ‘tourism and logistics’-index 
with the total assets of each segment according to the most recent balance sheet.61 The weight 
on ‘tourism and logistics’ rises steadily from 3.1% in 1994 to 97.6% in 2004. 
3.4 Regression approach 
For each of the three time periods, we regress the daily abnormal returns ARt on an intercept 
and on up to six dummy variables Di,t that are set equal to one for every day t within the event 
window for an event of type i. So if type 1 represents sell-offs, the event window is (-1, 0), 
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AR D  (3-1) 
Here αˆ  and the βˆ ’s are estimates of the regression coefficients and tεˆ  the OLS residuals. 
This regression approach has been widely used in the literature. (See Binder, 1985, for a com-
parison with the standard event study method.) In the context of a clinical study, the regres-
sion approach has been used by Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000). By summing equation (3-1) 
over all observations t, we obtain: 
                                                 
61  We could not obtain total assets for segments prior to September 30, 1998, so we use sales as a weight 
before that date. We use sales numbers excluding intra-company sales for computing these weights. These 
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where n is the number of observations used in the regression and ni is the number of observa-
tions for which the dummy variable Di equals one, i.e. ,=∑i i tn D . Note that the sum of the 
residuals εˆ t  is zero as these are OLS residuals. In Tables 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6, we report the cu-
mulative effects βˆi in  rather than the average effects βˆi , because we want to quantify the total 
impact of the different components of Preussag’s strategy. 
3.5 Event study approach 
Our second approach is based on standard event study methods. We calculate cumulative ab-
normal returns (CARs) for a small event window around each event individually and then add 
the CARs of events of the same type (sell-offs, tourism acquisitions, etc.) in order to test more 
general hypotheses. We use the same classes as in the regression analysis. 
As we consider 417 announcements during a total of 2,775 trading days, we naturally encoun-
ter overlapping event windows and even multiple events per day. When we add up cumulative 
abnormal returns across events within one class, such overlaps become a serious methodo-
logical problem. We address this problem by introducing “multiple events” and “no events” 
as additional classes. After putting the event windows around the individual events, we assign 
each trading day to exactly one class. Each day that belongs to two or more event windows of 
different classes is assigned to the class “multiple events.” All other days that fall into one of 
the event windows are assigned to the class of the respective event. Finally, each day that 
does not belong to any event window is classified as “no events.” From the days in the “no 
events” class, we calculate the standard deviation of abnormal returns used for significance 
tests. In order to conserve space, we report our event study results only for Phase 2, which is 
the key time period in our analysis. The results of the event study approach and the regression 
approach are very similar. 
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4 Analysis and evaluation 
4.1 Phase 1: Consolidate core businesses (1994-1997) 
The first three and a half years of Michael Frenzel’s tenure at the helm of Preussag are 
marked by his attempt to turn the company around through a restructuring program described 
as “value-oriented development.” 
Insert Table 3.2 here 
Table 3.2 contains the regression results from equations (3-1) and (3-2) for this period. The 
table displays the part of the total abnormal return that can be explained by three event 
groups: acquisitions, sell-offs, and news. Results are presented for four different event win-
dows and two choices of the benchmark index. The main findings from Table 3.2 are robust 
to the different test specifications. Abnormal returns in all transaction categories are small and 
statistically and mostly also economically insignificant. Only the 67 news announcements – 
with one exception all disclosures of financial statements about Preussag and its subsidiaries – 
are highly significant and negative. Altogether, it seems that the decisions of Preussag’s man-
agement during the period 1994-1997 held little surprise for the stock market. However, fi-
nancial disclosures were mostly negative and resulted in a cumulative underperformance of 
22% to 43% over the whole period.62 Hence, Preussag consistently surprised the market with 
less than expected financial performance. 
As Preussag outperformed the market for the whole of 1994 by 12.0% (actual return), we 
conclude that the stock market initially subscribed to Preussag’s concept of a “value oriented” 
restructuring, and the transactions of the company were clearly geared towards this goal. Then 
the market slowly and steadily absorbed the less than promised impact of this strategy as it 
became reflected in Preussag’s financial performance and completely lost heart in 1996: dur-
ing that year, Preussag underperformed the CDAX by 58.4% (actual return). From this per-
                                                 
62  All returns given in Sections 4.1 through 4.3 are log returns if not stated differently. 
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spective, it is not surprising that Preussag’s management began to rethink its strategy at the 
beginning of 1997. 
4.2 Phase 2: Enter tourism, exit core businesses (1997-2001) 
The second phase begins on June 11, 1997, when Preussag confirmed previous rumors that it 
bid for Hapag-Lloyd. This event marked a turning point, as tourism now became a major part 
of the company’s activities, accounting for 28% of sales in fiscal year 1997/98, and for 57% 
in fiscal year 2001 (see Table 3.1). 
Insert Table 3.3 here 
Table 3.3 lists abnormal returns and short descriptions for the main events during phase 2 of 
our analysis. The first rumors regarding Preussag’s intention to buy Hapag-Lloyd circulated 
already on May 27 without moving the stock price. The announcement of the takeover itself 
on June 11 led to a statistically insignificant increase of Preussag’s share price. The final price 
of €532 per share – a 14% premium on the pre-announcement price – was announced only 
after negotiations concluded and became public on September 2, which led to a significant 
decline in Preussag’s stock. It is therefore difficult to discern from this an unambiguous reac-
tion of the stock market to Preussag’s change of strategy, and the negative reaction to the last 
announcement may well imply that Preussag simply overpaid. It is certainly not clear how 
Preussag could justify a 14% premium for the purchase. As recently as 1996 Preussag had 
argued that its core competencies were in logistics, steel, and oil (Annual Report 1994/95, p. 
9). Now they announced the transformation of the company into a “modern services com-
pany” (press statement dated September 3, 1997). 
Hapag-Lloyd also owned 30% of the tour operator TUI (Touristik Union International) and 
Preussag’s CEO was quoted in the press on June 12, a day after announcing the bid for Ha-
pag-Lloyd, that they were also interested in acquiring another 30% stake from WestLB in 
order to obtain majority control. Clearly, the Hapag-Lloyd takeover set the stage for a 
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stronger engagement in tourism and services. Industry observers, including the federal cartel 
office, Germany’s antitrust regulator, perceived the emergence of a duopoly for the German 
holiday market with Preussag, Hapag-Lloyd and LTU on one side, and C&N with its holdings 
Condor and NUR as their only main competitor on the other side. The later purchases of the 
other TUI stakes from Deutsche Bahn, the state-owned German railway operator, and the 
Schickedanz group (see Table 3.3) was probably anticipated by the market and did not cause 
significant movements of Preussag’s stock price.  
With the acquisition of Thomas Cook, a large British tour operator, travel agency chain and 
financial service provider, Preussag’s expansion into tourism reached an international dimen-
sion. On October 9, 1998, the press reported rumors about Preussag’s ambitions to buy Tho-
mas Cook for the first time. At that time, Thomas Cook planned to merge its activities with 
the British interests of U.S.-based Carlson Companies, Inc. The decision became official only 
in December, but evidently the stock market took this announcement seriously and reacted 
enthusiastically with the CAR measured over the (0, 2) event window reaching 9%. The 
staged acquisition of Thomas Cook from WestLB (a 24.9% stake in December 1998, fol-
lowed by another 25.2% in September 1999) itself did not cause the stock price to move. So 
evidently in this case, the purchase price was more in line with the market’s expectations in 
this case. The reaction to the first announcement suggests either that the market endorsed 
Preussag’s move into tourism at this time, or that WestLB sold Thomas Cook to Preussag for 
too low a value. WestLB is not listed, so we can only look at the return to this investment for 
Preussag as they sold Thomas Cook at a premium in December 2000. The internal rate of re-
turn from their investment is 74% when the stock market gained only 23% over the same pe-
riod.63 This favors the hypothesis that WestLB sold Thomas Cook to Preussag at a discount. 
                                                 
63  Preussag paid €146 million for the first stake on December 23, 1998 (M&A Review, 2/1999, p. 101) and 
€147 million for the second stake by exercising their purchase option on September 30, 1999. They sold all 
their holdings on December 5, 2000 for €461 million (Handelsblatt, December 8, 2000, p. 22). 
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In 2000, Preussag increased their engagement in the U.K. and consolidated their investment in 
tourism by purchasing Thomson Travel Group plc, the largest U.K. tourism group. Before 
Preussag became interested, Thomson Travel had been engaged in negotiations with C&N 
about a merger during April 2000. C&N had bid first 130 pence and then 145 pence per share 
for Thomson Travel, which put a price tag of €2.42 billion on Thomson Travel. On April 12, 
2000, Frenzel discussed this development at Preussag’s annual general meeting and described 
this price as “extremely high.” He expressed “no interest” at the time and said Preussag’s atti-
tude to this regrouping of their competitors as “extremely relaxed.” Exactly one month later, 
on May 15, 2000, C&N had increased its bid to 160 pence per share (€2.67 billion) when 
Preussag announced that it would top the C&N-offer with a spectacular 180 pence per Thom-
son Travel share (€2.8 billion), about twice its valuation before takeover rumors first reached 
the market.64 Frenzel now argued that Thomson is “a British TUI” that would offer Preussag 
“the chance for a quantum leap for the expansion of its tourism operations” and a “unique 
opportunity.” Industry commentators were less impressed, pointing out the lack of synergies, 
Thomson’s meager sales margin (3% compared to an industry average of 4%), the fact that 
Thomson had lost almost half of its 170 pence per share value after its IPO in May 1998, and 
the fact that EU competition authorities would require Preussag to divest Thomas Cook again 
in order not to obtain too strong a position on the British market.65 The stock market clearly 
took a negative view. All CARs reported in Table 3.3 for the date first rumors became known 
(Friday, May 12) and on the subsequent official announcement (Monday, May 15) are signifi-
cantly negative at the 1% level. As these event windows overlap, the most informative statis-
tic is the cumulative abnormal return from May 11 to May 17, which is –15.3% representing a 
loss of €1.19 billion of Preussag’s market capitalization. This is approximately equal to the 
                                                 
64  The precise measurement depends on the reference date, which is difficult to determine, as there was a run-
up as early as March and April 2000. This run-up was possibly caused by rumors in the market, but a part 
of it may be attributed to fundamental information about Thomson. The stock price on the date before 
C&N’s first offer was 95.25 pence. Preussag’s bid premium was 89% relative to this price. 
65  Handelsblatt, May 16, 2000, p. 2, and Wall Street Journal Europe, May 16, 2000, p. 4 
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premium of €1.23 billion Preussag paid for Thomson Travel on the pre-takeover price, so 
none of the synergies and economies of scale emphasized by management seemed to justify 
such a premium from the market’s point of view and this sum simply represented a transfer of 
wealth from Preussag’s shareholders to Thomson Travel’s shareholders. On May 15, Preussag 
also published interim semi-annual financial reports, but these were wholly favorable, above 
the previous year’s results and in line with the market’s expectations, so we classify May 15, 
2000 as a tourism acquisition and disregard the financial statements as a potentially disturbing 
event. 
Insert Tables 3.4 and 3.5 here 
Table 3.4 reports the regression results for the period from the Hapag-Lloyd announcement up 
to and including September 10, 2001. Of the 29 tourism acquisition announcements, 16 are 
also listed in detail in Table 3.3. We distinguish purchases from WestLB (6 announcements) 
from all other tourism acquisitions (23 announcements) and find that purchases from WestLB 
generate a cumulative positive 9% to 16%, whereas all other tourism acquisitions lead to a 
cumulative abnormal returns of –17% to –52%. Table 3.5 displays the corresponding event 
study results that are similar in magnitude but generally show somewhat higher levels of sig-
nificance than the regression results in Table 3.4. Table 3.5 also demonstrates that all tourism 
acquisitions together result in a cumulated loss of value between 10% and 35%, although this 
is often statistically insignificant.66 Results become significant, however, once we distinguish 
between purchases from WestLB and other purchases. Hence, purchases negotiated under 
market conditions generated highly significant negative returns, whereas the “friendly” pur-
chases from WestLB (in particular the acquisition of Thomas Cook) where favorable for 
Preussag. This finding is consistent with the general observation that tender offers and bid-
                                                 
66  An advantage of the event study method is that the two classes “Tourism acquisitions from WestLB” and 
“Other tourism acquisitions” can be merged without changing the results for the other classes of events. For 
Phases 1 and 3, the event study method and the regression method yield quantitatively very similar results. 
Generally, the event study results turn out to be slightly more significant than the regression results. We 
therefore do not present the event study results for Phases 1 and 3. 
 93
ding competition generally create lower and mostly negative bidder returns compared to 
prices established through bilateral negotiations. For example, in a study of bidders that make 
multiple acquisitions, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that returns to the acquisi-
tion of public targets are significantly lower than those to the acquisition of privately held 
firms or subsidiaries (controlling for the identity of the bidder). Altogether, we therefore con-
clude that entering tourism destroyed shareholder value. In total, Preussag’s shareholders paid 
a price of €0.402 - €1.343 billion for this change of strategy.67 
As the stock price of Preussag increased relative to the market index during the 1997-2001 
phase, we now need to understand where the increase in wealth came from if not from a suc-
cessful engagement in tourism. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that there was another part of 
Preussag’s strategy in this period that seemed to be uniquely successful: the divestiture of its 
former core businesses in steel, non-ferrous metals, plant construction, and building engineer-
ing. 25 sell-off announcements fall into this period, seven of which are listed in Table 3.3. 
The cumulated return to these sell-offs is positive and large overall and often highly signifi-
cant. The reason for these sell-offs was to obtain money for further investments in tourism 
and logistics as it appears that Preussag paid cash in all its acquisitions.68 Other news also had 
a significant impact on Preussag’s stock price as Table 3.3 shows. Since the market reaction is 
sometimes positive and sometimes negative, the aggregated effect of ‘other news’ shown in 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 is not significant. 
Our main conclusion is therefore that Preussag’s management generated considerable value 
for its shareholders during the period from 1997 to 2001 by divesting their former lines of 
business. Unfortunately, they did not pay out the proceeds to their shareholders but reinvested 
them in the acquisition of tourism companies instead. The market did not grant Preussag’s 
                                                 
67  For this comparison, we use the numbers from Table 3.5 (Panel A) and multiply the CARs with the market 
capitalization on June 10, 1997 of €3.892 billion. 
68  There is no source to confirm this but none of the news sources we studied ever mentions stock or other 
securities as acquisition currency. The same holds true for all sell-offs except their shipbuilding and plant 
construction to Babcock, where they accepted Babcock shares in return. 
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management any specialized skills in this area and seemed to subtract the takeover premiums 
they paid – notably in the disastrous acquisition of Thomson Travel – one for one from their 
market value. At the end of this phase, Preussag was mainly a focused tourism and logistics 
group. At that point, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought the period where 
tourism was a growing, profitable industry to an immediate halt. 
4.3 Phase 3: Consolidate tourism (2001-2004) 
In the period between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2004, Preussag underperformed 
the CDAX by 49.8%. Was the poor performance of Preussag’s stock just bad luck? We ap-
proach this question in the same way as before. 
Insert Table 3.6 here 
Table 3.6 displays our regression results for this period. Clearly, no category of events ac-
counts for significant stock price changes in one direction or another. Interestingly, “tourism 
news” as a group is insignificant over this period. Preussag’s stock lost 33.1% (actual return) 
within the first 10 days after September 11, an underperformance of the index of 20.6% (ac-
tual return). However, this and subsequent events like the Iraq war were later compensated by 
positive news and reassessments by the market. This picture is confirmed by looking at the 
industry-weighted index, which controls – at least partially – for tourism-specific events. 
Table 3.6 shows that the magnitude of “tourism news” is always smaller for the weighted in-
dustry benchmark than for the CDAX. In fact, Preussag’s cumulative abnormal return relative 
to this index was -81%, indicating that more must be at work here than just a bet on tourism 
that went wrong ex post. Most of the underperformance during this period falls into the cate-
gory “unexplained returns,” i. e. those days where no particular event or news item can be 
found from any of our sources of information.69 Note that during this period, the German 
                                                 
69  We were skeptical that this could be true and went back to search for news on dates of large stock price 
movements. We found one announcement in Phase 2 related to speculations about a reweighing of the 
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stock market underperforms the European stock market. The industry-weighted index (in 
Phase 3 largely tourism) is a European index with a stronger performance than the German 
market but weaker than the European market at large. Preussag underperformed all of them. 
During this period, Preussag’s management reacted with standard retrenchment measures. 
They tried to cut costs in its tourism operations, and to experiment with new products and 
distribution channels. During 2002, these efforts neither showed any visible success nor did 
they show which direction management intended to take. For example, on June 19, 2002 they 
announced a new brand to sell last minute holidays, imitating a strategy of their competitor 
C&N. On October 10 of the same year, they announced an expansion of their luxury segment, 
arguing that it had higher margins. Neither announcement impressed the stock market. 
In 2003, Preussag (now renamed TUI) announced a new brand “Discount Travel” to expand 
its franchise in the budget travel market, and was rewarded with an 8.8% increase of its stock 
price on the same day. However, a few days later Frenzel announced a “restructuring” (effec-
tively shrinking) of the management board that also included the dismissal of both tourism 
specialists on the board without replacement. Analysts were mostly outraged by the prospect 
of having Europe’s largest tourism company led by a management without any tourism exper-
tise and downgraded the stock. Preussag lost almost 12% of its market value as a conse-
quence. 
Overall, Preussag’s management struggled with the impact of an increasingly hostile envi-
ronment after September 11, 2001 – as did most tourism companies. They tried to cut costs, 
strengthened the luxury segment and later the low cost segment of their operations, fired man-
agers and reorganized internally. Still, the stock market turned its back on the company more 
than it did on its competitors. Ultimately, the business model of Preussag did not convince the 
market. 
                                                                                                                                                        
DAX. On other dates, all of them in Phase 3, market commentators talked about “revaluations” without be-
ing able to point out significant new information. We discuss press and analysts’ coverage in Section 5.2. 
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4.4 Overall assessment 
Preussag’s decision to shift gears in 1997 and to give up on their original restructuring plan 
was well motivated given that previous efforts did not have the desired impact on their per-
formance. However, choices other than simply continuing to struggle with their traditional 
lines of business or entering tourism were clearly available. In this section we investigate one 
particular alternative more closely that is suggested by our analysis of Phase 2: simply liqui-
date the company and pay out the funds to shareholders. Naturally, as mature industries stag-
nate and shrink, some companies need to exit these markets, and if their managers do not have 
skills to add value in another industry, then the company should simply liquidate itself. We 
analyze the following strategies:70 
1) Execute Preussag’s divestiture program precisely as they did during the period 1997-2004. 
On September 30, 1997, use all cash available at that time to pay off debt and invest the 
remaining cash in our tourism and transport index.71 Use all subsequent proceeds from 
sales of businesses and invest them in the same index on the date of the sale. Similarly, 
whenever any of the traditional businesses generate free operating cash flows, invest those 
in the same way. We attribute these cash flows to the last day of the fiscal year. This strat-
egy assumes the position of an investor who wants to invest in tourism and logistics rather 
than in metal trading, shipbuilding and Preussag’s other businesses. However, this inves-
tor would put her money into a broad portfolio of logistics and tourism companies rather 
than those chosen by Preussag. Table 3.7 shows that this would have generated a balance 
of €11,372 billion on December 31, 2004. 
2) Proceed as under 1), but now reinvest cash, free operating cash flows, and sales proceeds 
from sell-offs in the CDAX. This assumes the position of an investor who simply wanted 
                                                 
70  In order to estimate exact values for the different strategies we did not use log returns, but actual returns for 
calculating the index returns. This ensures comparability with the actual history of Preussag’s stock until 
December 31, 2004.  
71  It would be preferable to start this analysis on June 10, 1997 but we are limited to balance sheet data avail-
able for the end of the fiscal year 1996/97 and cannot base this analysis on events before that. 
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to exit from Preussag’s businesses and put the money into a broad stock market portfolio. 
This strategy would have generated a balance of €9,206 billion. 
3) Assume the company could have been sold to another investor on June 10, 1997, who 
would then have proceeded as he wished. Assume the sale price would have been the 
market value on that date, which was €3.892 billion, then reinvest these proceeds in the 
stock market. In this scenario, an investment in the tourism and transport index would 
have generated €5.794 billion by the end of 2004. 
4) Proceed as in 3), but now reinvest in the CDAX. Then the resulting value at the end of 
2004 would have been €4.495 billion. 
Insert Table 3.7 here 
Preussag’s value (including reinvested dividends) was in fact only €3.333 billion at the end of 
2004. The following table compares the results from the four alternatives described above to 
the actual result: 
Strategy Description Value (billion €) on December 31, 2004 
Change to 
status quo 
0 Actual history (status quo) 3.333  -  
1 Liquidate as in history, reinvest 
proceeds in tourism and trans-
port portfolio 11.372  8.039  
2 As (1), reinvest in CDAX 9.206  5.873  
3 Invest the market value of 
Preussag in tourism and trans-
port portfolio 5.794  2.461  
4 Invest the market value of 
Preussag in CDAX 4.495  1.162  
 
The high values for strategies 1 and 2 compared to strategies 3 and 4 reflect the value created 
through the redeployment of assets. It shows that Preussag’s exit strategy was successful. 
With hindsight, they were even correct in betting on tourism and logistics, as the portfolio 
reflected in our tourism and transport index outperformed the CDAX by 33% over the period 
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from June 10, 1997 to December 31, 2004. However, Preussag’s management should never 
have undertaken these investments themselves, as their actual strategy destroyed more than 
€1.1 billion relative to a passive investment in the stock market, and more than €8 billion rela-
tive to the optimal strategy of liquidating the company and leaving it to shareholders to use 
the proceeds to invest in tourism and logistics companies. Ultimately, this is the range of val-
ues lost by Preussag’s shareholders, and, in the final conclusion, by the German taxpayer who 
participated in this enterprise by virtue of WestLB’s shareholdings. WestLB sold its stake in 
Preussag in December 2004 for €950 million. Therefore, given our four alternative strategies 
above, €0.4 billion to €2.6 billion of German taxpayer’s money was wasted by the disastrous 
strategy of Preussag’s management. Interestingly this enormous destruction of taxpayer’s 
wealth was never discussed in the press. The issue was also never raised in the state parlia-
ment, presumably because the extent of the value destruction was not apparent. Some news-
papers even reported that WestLB was able to realize a book profit (see e.g., Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, December 2, 2004, p. 15). 
5 Why things went wrong – the larger context 
In this section we wish to understand why the story of Preussag could develop as it did. We 
therefore analyze decision-making and corporate governance at Preussag. We also put the 
case of Preussag into a larger context and draw more general conclusions. 
5.1 The agenda of Preussag’s management 
When Preussag’s management shifted the company’s strategy to tourism in 1997, they ex-
plained this move in a letter to the shareholders as part of a “comprehensive modernization of 
Preussag” and they motivated the focus on tourism as “an industry with sustainable growth 
prospects.” (Preussag, Annual Report 1997/98, pp. 7-8). However, efficient markets would 
discount the higher growth prospects of tourism companies into their prices and we therefore 
need to ask how Preussag could justify any acquisition premiums. Preussag’s move towards 
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focusing is in general agreement with the notion that diversification destroys value, but Preus-
sag was focusing on something unrelated to its former business.72 
Preussag developed the concept of a vertically “integrated tourism company” that would con-
trol all stages of the value chain from travel agencies to airlines and hotels.73 Their argument 
was that travel agencies would help to divert tourists to company-owned hotels and airlines 
and thereby increase capacity utilization. Standard arguments in industrial organization sug-
gest that vertical integration may be helpful in overcoming hold-up problems or inefficiencies 
from double marginalization, but none of these advantages seems to be present here as all 
segments of the tourism market – with the exception of airlines – feature either a large num-
ber of suppliers, or low costs of entry and unspecialized assets (see Section 4.2). When market 
relationships dominate, standard textbook analysis emphasizes the costs of integration, as in-
tegration increases the scope for agency costs and influence activities and prevents the full 
exploitation of scale and learning economies. These arguments are never reflected in Preus-
sag’s press releases or annual reports. 
The bid for Thomson Travel was inconsistent with Preussag’s proclaimed strategy. At the 
time, Preussag already had a significant stake in the British market with Thomas Cook. How-
ever, Thomson Travel was significantly larger and would otherwise have been acquired by 
C&N, Preussag’s smaller German competitor. Frenzel was possibly frank about his true ambi-
tion when he commented that this acquisition “(…) secures our position as the biggest player 
in Europe” (Wall Street Journal Europe, May 16, 2000, p. 4). Exactly why size would matter 
for a tourism company and how size could be translated into value creation was never ex-
plained. The large number of small tourism companies suggests that economies of scale are 
limited, and academic studies show that the benefits from mergers and acquisitions do not 
                                                 
72  See Martin and Sayrak (2003) for a survey of the literature on diversification and its consequences. Some 
authors argue that the diversification discount is not caused by diversification (see Graham, Lemmon, and 
Wolf, 2002, and Villalonga, 2004). Moreover, results for Germany indicate a lower diversification discount 
than for the U.S. (Lins and Servaes, 1999).  
73  Annual Report 1996/97 p. 8, Annual Report 1997/98 p. 8 and pp. 23, 38, 89. 
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derive from building market power (see Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987, Mueller, 1985, and 
Eckbo, 1992). 
Our analysis suggests that Preussag’s migration from steel and mining to tourism was not the 
outcome of a well-formulated strategic concept but the result of the ambitions of its manage-
ment, for which shareholders ultimately had to pay the price. At this stage it appears that 
Preussag’s strategy corresponds more to what Roll (1986) described as “hubris,” namely the 
tendency of corporate managers – epitomized in Warren Buffet’s quote at the beginning of the 
Introduction – to overbid for companies they want to control.74 Before we subscribe to this 
view, we investigate if Preussag’s strategy generated benefits for its management in Section 
5.3. 
5.2 The role of analysts and the press 
The press and analysts paid close attention to Preussag’s dramatic transformation and here we 
would hope for some more detailed critical comments that would emphasize the risks and 
downsides in Preussag’s strategy. In order to compile our data set we analyze a total of 2,000 
newspaper articles and press releases but find little to this effect before 2003, and nothing in 
the phase before 2000. The press and analysts commented repeatedly on tourism as a “new 
growth area” that would offer new opportunities to Preussag in comparison to its traditional 
businesses, and Preussag became a model case of “business migration.” Comments by Olaf 
Toelke, an analyst with Merrill Lynch (Frankfurt) are exemplary when he writes: “The com-
pany has come out of its cyclical corner and is now growth-oriented.”75 Stock market analysts 
apparently supported Preussag’s move to become more focused on tourism and to leave its 
former core businesses behind. The fact that Preussag’s management focused on an industry 
they did not know before received little attention. 
                                                 
74  For empirical evidence on the hubris hypothesis see Malmendier and Tate (2008), Raj and Forsyth (2003) 
and the earlier literature cited by them. 
75  The Wall Street Journal Europe, February 2, 1999. The term “business migration” was explicitly used in 
the press, see Handelsblatt, February 10, 2000, p. 56. 
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Our analysis has shown that Preussag’s stock outperformed the market during 1997-2001 only 
because of its divestitures, but many commentators and analysts argued otherwise. In fact, 
when the stock price took a dip in early 2000, a major newspaper argued, “tourism increases 
the stock price” and even attributed the recent price drop to Preussag’s failure to undertake 
more acquisitions.76 Obviously, analysts did not realize that Preussag outperformed the gen-
eral stock market in spite of its investments in tourism and not because of them. This raises 
the issue of the status of analysts, as they were not only unable to convince investors of their 
analysis, but even failed to understand market signals correctly. 
5.3 Executive compensation and private benefits 
Board seats on other companies. Our first hypothesis is that managers must have gained 
from the strategy change at Preussag, either through increased compensation or through pri-
vate benefits. German companies do not disclose itemized private benefits as U.S. companies 
do, but a measurable indicator of private benefits is the status and prestige conferred on the 
CEO in the form of additional board seats of other companies. Michael Frenzel is Preussag’s 
CEO during the entire period under consideration here. He joined Preussag’s management 
board in 1988 at age 40 and became CEO in 1994 at age 46. Previously, he had spent seven 
years at WestLB, Preussag’s major shareholder, where he was responsible for managing 
WestLB’s blockholdings in industrial companies. In 1997/98 Frenzel holds board member-
ships in seven mostly smaller companies77, three of which are only subsidiaries and another 
three are state-owned. Over the following seven years, he gives up these seven positions and 
becomes board member in seven other, bigger firms, including two of Germany’s top 30 
listed companies.78 He is also chairman of the board of Germany’s state-owned railway opera-
tor, and of one of Germany’s ten largest banks. During this time Frenzel benefited particularly 
                                                 
76  Handelsblatt, February 18, 2000, p. 16, quoting Christian Obst (an analyst with HypoVereinsbank) and 
Rolf Geck (analyst with WGZ-Bank). 
77 Deutsche Hypothekenbank AG, IVG Holding AG, PreussenElektra AG, Creditanstalt AG, Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau, Hamburgische Landesbank, Expo 2000 Hannover GmbH. 
78 AXA Konzern AG, Continental AG, Deutsche Bahn AG, Volkswagen AG, Norddeutsche Landesbank, 
E.ON Energie AG, ING Bank Deutschland AG. 
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from his close relationship to his mentor Friedel Neuber, chairman of Preussag’s supervisory 
board and CEO of WestLB (see Figure 3.1A). He followed him into the supervisory board of 
at least three companies, where Neuber was on the supervisory board before him.79 Frenzel 
also seemed to be in demand for CEO positions at other German companies.80 We can there-
fore conclude that during the period 1997-2004 Frenzel gained significantly in terms of status 
and prestige and potentially also in terms of his value in the market for managerial labor. This 
raises a more general question. Some authors, going back to Fama (1980), argue that the mar-
ket for managerial labor acts as a check on managerial discretion, because managers will not 
exercise this discretion to the disadvantage of shareholders in order not to reduce the value of 
their own human capital. Our analysis casts doubt on Fama’s theory being an accurate de-
scription of the German market for managerial labor. 
Executive compensation. German companies did not have to disclose individual salaries or 
compensation plans before 2006, therefore we only have data on the total compensation of the 
management board and can only infer averages. Table 3.8 illustrates that management board 
members received an average fixed salary of €630,000 - €650,000 annually during the period 
1994-1997, which puts it significantly above the average for German corporations with more 
than €1 billion sales, which was €420,000 in 1996 (see Schwalbach, 1999). After 1997, com-
pensation increases dramatically as this fixed salary is complemented by “performance re-
lated” pay. This is a €500,000 of bonus dependent on dividend payouts and a phantom stock 
scheme, where managers can sell phantom shares at the actual share price after a vesting pe-
riod of two years.81 Management board members received €7.7 million worth of phantom 
                                                 
79 Neuber was on the board of Deutsche Bahn AG from 1997– 2004, Frenzel follows 1999; Neuber is on the 
board of AXA S. A. from 1997– 2001, Frenzel joints AXA Colonia AG’s board in 1998, Neuber was on 
the board of Bank Austria AG from 1997 – 2000, Frenzel is on Creditanstalt’s (acquired by Bank Austria in 
1998) board. In all cases, we provide the earliest date of board membership we can establish, so board 
membership may have existed before. 
80  RWE (Die Welt am Sonntag, April 28, 2002), where Neuber is chairmen of the supervisory board, and 
Deutsche Telekom (press release of Preussag, July 12, 2002). 
81  To sell phantom stocks after the vesting period no absolute or relative performance target has to be met, 
which is unusual for German compensation practice. 
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stock during 2001-2003 that lost approximately €3.4 million during the same period.82 As a 
result, the average salary of Preussag’s management board members increased by 279% from 
€526,000 in fiscal year 1993/94 to €1,992,000 in fiscal year 2004 (see Table 3.8).83 Therefore, 
while Preussag’s shareholders did not benefit from the company’s tourism strategy, its man-
agement certainly did. The overall increase in compensation can rationalize why Preussag’s 
management was concerned with size. While the company did not increase in value, it did 
increase in sales and total assets (see Table 3.1 for sales, the development of assets is similar). 
This is consistent with the general result that managers benefit from acquisitions when these 
increase size and thereby lead to higher managerial salaries. This view can be dated back to 
Baumol (1959) and evidence for the U.S. was found by Khorana and Zenner (1998). 
Insert Table 3.8 here 
Our compensation analysis also suggests that contracts did not align the interests of manage-
ment with those of shareholders. Management board members together held 1,690 shares 
worth €27,000 and representing about 0.001% of Preussag’s capital in 2002.84 So compensa-
tion on the whole had practically no relationship to performance, in line with the practice of 
most German companies until the late 1990s.85 The question of how much performance sensi-
tivity would constitute a sufficiently high-powered compensation contract is open to debate. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) establish that U.S. CEOs receive an additional $3.25 for every 
$1,000 of shareholder value they create and regard this value as too low. Murphy (1999) 
points out that the picture had changed during the 1990s when performance sensitivity in-
creased. Schwalbach and Graßhoff (1997) indicate that the situation is generally worse in 
Germany than in the United States. Preussag’s pay for performance sensitivity was just 1 cent 
                                                 
82  Preussag Annual Report 2002, pp. 207-208, Preussag Annual Report 2003, pp. 206-207. 
83  In fiscal year 2004 Preussag disclosed individual salaries for the first time. Michael Frenzel earned 
€3,220,000 in 2004 (Preussag Annual Report 2004, pp. 196-197). 
84  Preussag Annual Report 2002 pp. 208-209. At the end of 2003, the shareholdings of the management board 
dropped to 784 shares worth €13,000 or about 0.0005% (Preussag Annual Report 2003, p. 208). The num-
ber of shares stayed constant in 2004 (Preussag Annual Report 2004, p. 198). 
85  This calculation of performance sensitivity does not include the phantom stock scheme that was introduced 
in 2001 (Preussag’s Annual Report, 2002), as we do not know the parameters of this scheme. 
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for every thousand € of shareholder value created, a number that falls short of Jensen and 
Murphy’s number and that appears too low to provide effective incentive alignment. 
The case of Preussag therefore corroborates the findings of Mehran, Nogler, and Schwartz 
(1998) who document a relationship between voluntary liquidation decisions and CEO incen-
tives. An example of a case where good alignment of incentives created shareholder value 
through a partial liquidation is General Dynamics (see Dial and Murphy, 1995). However, 
Mehran, Nogler, and Schwartz (1998) also point to the importance of complementary govern-
ance structures, particularly the board of directors, to induce voluntary liquidations, a subject 
to which we turn next. 
5.4 Ownership and control: The role of WestLB 
A change in strategy could have been forced upon management by its large shareholders or its 
supervisory board. Typically, this would take the form of replacing management with one that 
is more likely to execute a strategy that is in the interest of shareholders. However, Frenzel, 
who assumed the position of CEO on January 1, 1994 still held this position eleven years 
later, after initially failing to restructure the core business, and then failing equally at guiding 
Preussag to a more profitable future by entering a new industry. Generally, the rate of CEO 
turnover for German companies is high (see Kaplan, 1994), and this continuity is therefore 
surprising. However, this outcome can be easily understood, if we look at the distribution of 
votes and the composition of the supervisory board. 
Insert Table 3.9 here 
Voting power. WestLB has been the only major blockholder at Preussag since 1969 (see Sec-
tion 2 and Figure 3.1A). Table 3.9 displays data on WestLB’s voting power in nine of the ten 
annual general meetings of Preussag during the period under consideration. On average, 57% 
of the capital was represented and WestLB had 59.2% of the votes represented by virtue of its 
direct shareholdings, sufficient to command a majority at four of these meetings. At another 
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four meetings WestLB commanded the majority jointly with Niedersachsen Holding (see 
Figure 3.1A). At the one remaining meeting on March 31, 1999 WestLB commanded 49.3% 
of the votes, just short of a majority. We therefore conclude that WestLB dominated Preussag 
through its voting power. 
Supervisory board.86 The supervisory board of Preussag is subject to the German co-
determination act, so half of its twenty members are representatives of workers and the other 
half represent shareholders. Of the latter, two are representatives of WestLB as its major 
shareholder and Neuber, CEO of WestLB, is also the chairman of Preussag’s supervisory 
board throughout the entire period.87 Figure 3.4 demonstrates that WestLB strengthened its 
influence through board interlocks. At any time at least two of Preussag’s supervisory board 
members were members of the management board in other firms in which Neuber was also 
chairman of the supervisory board (RWE) or at least held supervisory board memberships 
(like Deutsche Bahn or ThyssenKrupp). The supervisory board also included representatives 
of other German banks and corporations, an independent (Frantz Vranitzky, former social-
democratic chancellor of Austria) and an organization representing small shareholders 
(DSW). Only this last supervisory board member should have had a clear interest in furthering 
shareholder value, but we are not aware that he ever raised his voice. On December 31, 2002, 
when the shareholdings of the supervisory board were disclosed for the first time, all board 
members together held 0.002% of Preussag’s shares (Preussag, Annual Report 2002, pp. 208-
209). Economists have always viewed board interlocks with skepticism (the classic reference 
is Dooley, 1969). Loderer and Peyer (2002) and our analysis in Chapter II relate interlocks to 
performance. Loderer and Peyer (2002) show for a sample of Swiss firms that the proportion 
of directors who are also directors on the board of a bank has a negative impact on Tobin’s q. 
                                                 
86  All the information about supervisory board meetings and committees are taken from the annual reports of 
Preussag from 1994 to 2004 (Bericht des Aufsichtsratsvorsitzenden). 
87  Friedel Neuber unexpectedly died at the age of 69 on October 23, 2004. 
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The analysis in Chapter II suggests that bank representation on the board causes lower valua-
tions of German companies. 
Insert Figure 3.4 here 
We conclude that WestLB’s voting power was matched by the control it exercised over 
Preussag’s supervisory board. We therefore need to understand why WestLB was unwilling to 
use its hold on Preussag in order to push for a more shareholder-friendly strategy and why, in 
particular, it failed to prevent the catastrophic acquisition of Thomson Travel. WestLB itself 
is state-owned and its management is accountable only to the political representatives of 
North Rhine Westphalia, Germany’s largest and most populous state. The governance struc-
ture of WestLB itself does not impress any particular profit motive or incentive for value 
maximization on its management. To the contrary, the bank serves a distinct political purpose 
and repeatedly used its financial muscle to prevent decisions that would increase shareholder 
value but conflict with other, politically defined interests. Examples include the prevention of 
layoffs at financially distressed firms or of relocations of headquarters or production facilities 
into another state.88 Beyond its politically defined objectives, WestLB’s management seems 
to enjoy considerable freedom in shaping its policies. 
When Preussag entered tourism, WestLB already had a number of large, if not controlling 
stakes in other tourism companies (see Figure 3.1A). Preussag’s engagement in tourism 
opened the opportunity for WestLB to divest itself of its tourism assets. Preussag bought 
WestLB’s TUI-stakes and 50.1% of its Thomas Cook block. Preussag also bought WestLB’s 
22% stake in the First chain of travel agencies. Hence, it is at least plausible that WestLB 
found Preussag to be a willing partner to divest themselves of their tourism holdings. It is 
therefore natural to suppose that Preussag was merely a victim of a policy forced upon it by 
its large shareholder. However, in the transactions where Preussag bought assets from 
                                                 
88  Examples of such interventions include Horten AG and Geresheimer Glas (Handelsblatt, December 3, 1990 
p. 21), LTU (Handelsblatt, December 24, 2001, p. 12) and Babcock (Handelsblatt, January 17, 2003, p. 10). 
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WestLB, notably in the case of Thomas Cook, Preussag’s stock gained and these gains are 
economically and sometimes also statistically significant (see Section 4.2). We therefore con-
clude that WestLB sold its assets to Preussag at a discount to their intrinsic value, which is 
clearly inconsistent with WestLB abusing its power over Preussag. A more plausible interpre-
tation is that Preussag continued a strategy initially formulated and pursued by Neuber and 
WestLB. When WestLB collected its tourism stakes in the period 1989 – 1997, the press 
speculated repeatedly about Neuber’s overall strategy.89 Press speculation just days before the 
announcement of the Hapag Lloyd takeover (Die Zeit, June 6, 1997 p. 17) discussed the dif-
ferent possibilities available to WestLB: either to divest its tourism holdings by merging them 
into a new, independent company, or by merging them with those of Preussag. It therefore 
appears that Frenzel completed a former project of Neuber, but without creating tangible 
benefits for either Preussag or WestLB. 
In the final conclusion, we therefore caution against the notion that large controlling share-
holders are always a blessing as they help to overcome the separation of ownership and con-
trol. The literature on large shareholder monitoring typically assumes that large blockholders 
have a strong interest in maximizing shareholder value and ignores the additional agency con-
flicts if these large shareholders are companies or institutions.90 In the case of Preussag, how-
ever, the largest shareholder is an intermediary whose management has ambitions of its own. 
Our findings are more in line with the view of Franks and Mayer (2001) that the gains from 
                                                 
89  Examples include Handelsblatt, June 29, 1990. Handelsblatt, June 5, 1992 p. 21, Die Zeit, January 6, 1995 
and Handelsblatt February 21, 1995. The last article argues that Neuber plans an IPO of WestLB’s tourism 
holdings in the medium term. 
90  This literature is devoted to the role of large shareholders in helping shareholders to overcome the free-rider 
problem when they need to take action against management. It dates back at least to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986). Contributions include Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), 
Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), who all focus exclusively on shareholders’ collective action prob-
lem. 
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block trades in Germany are not shared with minority shareholders: they are mainly about 
private benefits from control.91 
Our findings also lend some support to the more general view that poor governance arises 
almost inevitably from combinations of public with private governance as it results in incom-
patible supervisory mechanisms and in a lack of accountability. Aktas, de Bodt, and Liagre 
(2003) summarize their reading of the literature on state-owned enterprises and privatizations 
in the same way, arguing that the government protects the interests of employees and other 
constituencies more than shareholders and that managers are hardly ever held accountable.92 
We view the state ownership of WestLB as a contributing factor rather than as a prime cause 
because the agency problem within WestLB discussed above would exist even for a privately 
owned bank. 
5.5 Conflicts of interest 
We conclude this section with a discussion of conflicts of interest in Preussag’s corporate 
governance structure. We show that these are obvious and significant but contribute little to 
the explanation of Preussag’s underperformance. 
Political affiliations. Both Neuber and Frenzel were members of the social democratic party 
(SPD), Germany’s labor party. Relationships within this party seem to have played a particu-
lar role in the sale of Preussag’s steel business to a holding controlled by the state of Lower 
Saxony under its then prime minister Gerhard Schröder. According to one magazine report, 
Schröder was surprised to learn so late of Frenzel’s and Neuber’s plans to sell Preussag’s steel 
                                                 
91  See also Dyck and Zingales (2004) for an international comparison of private benefits of control measured 
from block trade data. 
92  See Megginson and Netter (2001) for a survey of the empirical literature on privatizations, especially their 
Table 1 (p. 333) that summarizes 10 empirical studies, 9 of which find underperformance of state-owned 
enterprises compared to private enterprises. In a study of 50 international airlines, Backx, Carney, and Ge-
dajlovic (2002) also investigate mixed public and private ownership, which is also the case of Preussag. 
They find that mixed ownership companies underperform privately owned companies, but not as much as 
fully state-owned enterprises. 
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business to an Austrian company.93 Preussag initially negotiated with the Austrian group 
Voest-Alpine, but Gerhard Schröder, then fighting for re-election as prime minister of Lower 
Saxony, could not afford to confront the unions and Preussag steelworkers and therefore 
agreed to purchase the stakes from Preussag in order to buy time for an IPO. Preussag man-
agement board member Wolfgang Schultze was a representative of the SPD in the Lower 
Saxonian legislature and Bodo Hombach, CEO of Preussag’s steel trading unit became chief 
of staff of chancellor Schröder’s office in the fall of 1998. With Neuber and Frenzel, these 
negotiations included five members of this party on all sides of the transaction, which ousted 
Austrian Voest Alpine from the negotiations. While Preussag asserted that the offers by the 
state of Lower Saxony and Voest Alpine where of “equivalent value,” the Voest Alpine offer 
was structured differently, including a 20% stake in a joint venture with Preussag, and valued 
by some to be higher by about €100 million.94 It is conceivable that party affiliations also 
played a role when Preussag wanted to take over the 25% stake of TUI held by Deutsche 
Bahn (DB), Germany’s state-owned railway company. They could not agree with DB on a 
price under the then conservative government. When Schröder became Chancellor of Ger-
many in September 1998, Preussag’s luck turned: negotiations went more smoothly and 
Preussag acquired the DB-stake in April 1999.95 
Lack of arms-length bargaining. Our event-study analysis suggests that Preussag overpaid 
for Hapag-Lloyd, as their share price dropped when the final sales price was announced (see 
Table 3.3). Here two blockholders, owning 10% of Hapag-Lloyd’s shares each, were 
Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank (see Figure 3.1A). Both were also represented on Preus-
sag’s supervisory board at the same time (see Figure 3.4), so that from this point of view there 
was a conflict of interest as these supervisory board members represented buyer interests and 
seller interests at the same time. 
                                                 
93  Der Spiegel, January 1, 1998, pp. 24-25. 
94  See Handelsblatt, February 5, 1998, p. 13. 
95  See Handelsblatt, May 15, 1998 p. 15 and Tagesspiegel, April 6, 1999 p. 21. 
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The strongest conflict of interest arose when Preussag sold its plant construction and ship-
building operations to Babcock Borsig AG. This time the conflict was resolved in Preussag’s 
favor. WestLB was the largest shareholder of Babcock with only a 10% stake, and Neuber 
chaired its supervisory board as he did Preussag’s. In addition, Preussag management board 
member Klaus Linnebach, responsible for plant construction and shipbuilding, was a member 
of Babcock’s supervisory board, effectively putting the same individuals on both sides of the 
negotiation table, and presenting Preussag with an excellent opportunity to divest itself of its 
loss-making plant construction and shipbuilding arm. Minority shareholders of Babcock pro-
tested in vain, arguing that the transaction did not fit Babcock’s strategy to focus on power 
plants.96 When the details of the transaction where disclosed on March 15, 1999, Preussag 
gained 7.2% and Babcock’s share lost 5% over the (0, 1) window, although we need to take 
into account simultaneous disclosures of financial statements and planned issues of new secu-
rities (see also Table 3.3). Hence, this transaction supports our general conclusion that sell-
offs generated value for Preussag, but this time it took the form of a redistribution at the ex-
pense of Babcock shareholders. Babcock filed for bankruptcy on July 5, 2002 and the state 
persecution service (equivalent to the district attorney in the U.S.) took up investigations 
against Neuber, Frenzel and others because of alleged violations of German securities laws in 
this context.97 
All of these cases are evidence for poor corporate governance, and they certainly resulted in 
poor decisions. However, none of them can account for the massive value destruction at 
Preussag and the particular strategy followed by Preussag’s management. Conflicts of interest 
were blatant and may have caused a loss of value in some cases (Preussag steel, Hapag 
Lloyd), but in other instances (notably Babcock) they benefited Preussag. 
                                                 
96  Handelsblatt, March 19, 1999, p. 14. 
97  Handelsblatt, January 14, 2003, p. 1. 
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6 Reaction by Preussag’s management 
We did not receive any support from Preussag in writing this study. We therefore rely exclu-
sively on publicly available information. In April 2005, “Capital,” a German business maga-
zine, picked up our story and confronted Preussag’s CEO Michael Frenzel during an inter-
view with some of the results from a previous version of this chapter (Capital, April 28, 2005, 
pp. 54-55). Frenzel’s arguments are revealing. He argued that our calculation according to 
which Preussag destroyed several billions (see Section 4.4) is “unfair, because it ignores com-
pletely that the TUI management succeeded in building Europe’s largest tourism company,” 
thereby reemphasizing his focus on size.98 
Next, Frenzel argued that the TUI-management had “created high-quality tourism jobs in 
Germany” and suggested that the liquidation of Preussag would have destroyed 50,000 jobs. 
This argument not only defies economic logic (the jobs in tourism companies would exist 
quite independently of whether Preussag acquired these companies or not) but also neglects 
that tourism employment at Preussag fell by more than 10% between 2002 and 2004. 
Frenzel also expressed the view that Preussag’s stock was underpriced and did not reflect the 
company’s true earnings potential. When the interviewer confronted him with the result that 
the future profitability of Preussag was not priced into its stock, but seemed to be well antici-
pated in increased managerial salaries, he retorted that compensation was about average for a 
DAX-30-corporation. This is correct, and restates why size is important from the point of 
view of management, as we suspected. Still, the argument does not recognize that Preussag 
was among the smallest companies in the index and almost dropped from the index when its 
value declined in 2004. 
Last, the interviewer asked Frenzel why Preussag’s management would not invest in their 
own stock if they considered it to be underpriced (they held 784 shares at the end of 2004). 
                                                 
98  All translations from the German interview are ours. 
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The response was that “buying [shares] is not the problem. The difficulties begin, when man-
agers sell shares. Then there is an automatic presumption of insider trading based on the as-
sumption that managers have additional information.” Hence, managers did not want to buy 
shares because they would not be able to sell them again. Clearly, the notion of holding shares 
for the long term was not considered. 
Between October 2006 and May 2008, TUI’s management was approached by a number of 
investors (in particular, Hermes Focus Asset Management) with requests, among others, to 
restructure the company and to impose a stricter M&A discipline. Investors also demanded 
the resignation of Frenzel. At the annual general meeting on May 7, 2008, a Norwegian inves-
tor who had acquired 12% of TUI shares launched a proxy fight (to the best of our knowledge 
the first in Germany in a large company), but the incumbent management won the contest by 
receiving 57% of the vote. 
7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we analyze the history of Preussag, later renamed TUI, over the decade from 
1994 to 2004, where they rebuilt an originally diversified industrial conglomerate into 
Europe’s largest tourism company. We collect data on 125 announcements relating to 93 
transactions and 292 news events during this period and analyze the sometimes puzzling his-
tory of Preussag’s stock. We categorize events in order to disentangle the value impact of 
different parts of Preussag’s strategy and test competing hypotheses for the sources of value 
creation and value destruction. 
We find that Preussag benefited from its divestitures, whereas its engagement in tourism de-
stroyed value. The underperformance of its stock is a direct consequence of its business strat-
egy and cannot be attributed to exogenous shocks like the events of September 11, 2001. In 
the tourism industry, size seems to matter little for profitability as economies of scale and 
gains from market power are limited. We conclude that Preussag’s management sought size 
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for its own benefit. Our analysis of corporate governance at Preussag yielded three insights 
that are likely to have contributed to Preussag’s underperformance: 
• Management compensation increased by more than 200% over the decade considered 
in this study. At the same time, compensation was practically unrelated to firm per-
formance. 
• Personal networks generated private benefits through additional board seats and cre-
ated a governance structure where accountability was easily lost. 
• The agency problem within the largest shareholder made it not only a poor monitor 
but in all likelihood even a motor of the tourism strategy. Hence, the largest share-
holder helped creating benefits from control rather than constraining them. 
Curiously, none of the watchdogs felt particularly alarmed by the ongoing destruction of 
shareholder value. Preussag’s stock outperformed the market during the period when they 
entered tourism, and analysts and the press misread this as a good signal about its decision to 
focus on tourism. Here our analysis becomes valuable as it shows that aggregate performance 
is misleading. We disentangle the impact of divestitures from the investments in tourism and 
show that the former created the value that camouflaged the losses from the latter. We are 
therefore skeptical about the role of independent analysts, some of whom did not only fail to 
inform the market but also failed to understand market signals as investors started to abandon 
the stock. 
The misguided management policies at Preussag bring out an important point of the “free 
cash flow” theory: The problem is not just high operating cash flows, but managerial discre-
tion over large amounts of liquid resources, independently of their source.99 At Preussag, di-
vestitures created additional liquidity – and they appear to have only been undertaken to pro-
                                                 
99  The free cash flow theory goes back to Jensen (1986), (1993). DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002) 
make a point related to ours in their analysis of managerial discretion created by liquid working capital at 
L. A. Gear. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) show that the stock market discounts companies who retain the 
proceeds from asset sales. Allen and McConnell (1998) make a similar point on equity carve-outs. 
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vide this liquidity – without any corresponding incentives for management to use this liquid-
ity efficiently or any check against management’s pet project to be the dominant tourism com-
pany in Europe. 
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8 Tables 
Table 3.1: Preussag’s sales by business units 
This table displays the sales of Preussag’s business units, including sales between units. In 2001, Preussag changed its end of fiscal year from September 30 to December 31. 
The table does not report sales for the shortened fiscal year that consisted only of the last quarter of 2000. The Herfindahl index reflects the degree of diversification of the 
conglomerate. It is equal to the sum over all divisions of their squared percentages of sales. All numbers before conversion to the € in 1999 are reported in € using the official 
conversion rate of 1.95583 DM/€. 
Panel A: Preussag’s sales from 1992/93 to 1997/98 
  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97 1997/98 
  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € % Mill. € %
Tourism - - - - - - - - - - 5,530 27.9%
Steel production 1,409 10.4% 1,683 12.4% 1,876 12.4% 1,615 11.2% 1,787 11.5% - -
Non-ferrous metal production 652 4.8% 612 4.5% 691 4.6% 723 5.0% 370 2.4% - -
Oil and gas production 524 3.9% 501 3.7% 520 3.4% 577 4.0% 702 4.5% 905 4.6%
Mining activities 953 7.0% 718 5.3% 742 4.9% 678 4.7% 556 3.6% 607 3.1%
Trading 4,986 36.9% 5,613 41.4% 6,574 43.4% 5,571 38.5% 6,145 39.5% 5,081 25.7%
Logistics 479 3.5% 479 3.5% 954 6.3% 1,025 7.1% 1,060 6.8% 3,242 16.4%
Shipbuilding 822 6.1% 688 5.1% 576 3.8% 911 6.3% 610 3.9% 572 2.9%
Railcar manufacturing 220 1.6% - - - - - - - - - -
Plant construction 1,512 11.2% 1,475 10.9% 1,706 11.3% 1,675 11.6% 2,121 13.6% 1,663 8.4%
Information technology 591 4.4% 310 2.3% - - - - - - - -
Building engineering 950 7.0% 1,036 7.6% 1,137 7.5% 1,321 9.1% 1,840 11.8% 1,909 9.6%
Components 178 1.3% 171 1.3% 104 0.7% 93 0.6% 89 0.6% - -
Other/Consolidation 242 1.8% 257 1.9% 253 1.7% 294 2.0% 289 1.9% 282 1.4%
Total 13,518 100.0%  13,543 100.0%  15,133 100.0%  14,483 100.0%  15,569 100.0%  19,791 100.0%
Earnings before Taxes 177 1.3% 258 1.9% 317 2.1% 239 1.7% 360 2.3% 521 2.6%
Herfindahl index  18.1%  21.6%   23.4%   19.8%  21.2%   19.1%
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Panel B: Preussag’s sales from 1998/99 to 2004 
  1998/99  1999/2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %
Tourism 8,480 45.5% 12,768 50.8% 12,782 57.0% 12,432 61.2% 12,701 66.1% 13,204 73.2%
Steel production - - - - - - - - - - - -
Non-ferrous metal production - - - - - - - - - - - -
Oil and gas production 765 4.1% 983 3.9% 836 3.7% 448 2.2% 177 0.9% - -
Mining activities - - - - - - - - - - - -
Trading 3,818 20.5% 4,800 19.1% 3,144 14.0% 3,150 15.5% 2,056 10.7% 972 5.4%
Logistics 3,332 17.9% 3,972 15.8% 3,891 17.4% 3,778 18.6% 3,915 20.4% 3,972 19.2%
Shipbuilding - - - - - - - - - - - -
Railcar manufacturing - - - - - - - - - - - -
Plant construction - - - - - - - - - - - -
Information technology - - - - - - - - - - - -
Building engineering 1,999 10.7% 2,372 9.4% 1,611 7.2% 203 1.0% - - - -
Components - - - - - - - - - - - -
Other/Consolidation 243 1.3% 217 0.9% 147 0.7% 292 1.4% 366 1.9% 398 2.2%
Total 18,637 100.0% 25,112 100.0% 22,411 100.0%  20,303 100.0% 19,215 100.0% 18,046 100.0%
Earnings before Taxes 620 3.3% 747 3.0% 811 3.6% 608 3.0% 913 4.8% 622 3.4%
Herfindahl index 29.4%  33.1%  38.2%  43.4%  49.0%  57.6%
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Table 3.2: Preussag’s abnormal returns in Phase 1: 
Consolidate core businesses (1994-1997) 
This table presents the results of eight regressions of Preussag’s daily abnormal log returns over phase 1 from 
January 1, 1994 to June 10, 1997 on an intercept and three dummy variables: acquisitions, sell-offs, and news. 
The dummy variables are set equal to one on every day of the event windows around the events they indicate. 
The table reports the estimated regression coefficients multiplied by the number of days the respective dummy 
variable is equal to one. Unexplained return is the estimated intercept multiplied by the number of observations 
in the regression. °, *, **, *** marks significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
Results are displayed for four different event windows (-x, y) from x days before to y days after the event. Panel 
A presents regression results for abnormal returns calculated relative to the Frankfurt market portfolio CDAX. 
Panel B contains similar results when abnormal returns are calculated relative to our weighted industry bench-
mark. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns relative to the market index (CDAX) 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Acquisitions 12 0.13% -1.58% -2.72% -4.58% 
Sell-offs 15 3.97% -0.15% 6.92% 2.62% 
News 67 -24.35%** -25.99%* -35.62%** -43.36% *** 
Unexplained returns N/A 3.13%  10.60% 14.30%  28.21%  
Total return N/A -17.11%  -17.11% -17.11%  -17.11%  
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns relative to weighted industry benchmark 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Acquisitions 12 -1.82% -1.59% -5.73% -5.72% 
Sell-offs 15 11.53%* 0.26% 10.79% -0.81% 
News 67 -21.76%° -26.87%° -30.78%* -40.09%** 
Unexplained returns N/A -10.71% 5.44% 2.96% 23.86%  
Total return N/A -22.76% -22.76% -22.76% -22.76%  
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Table 3.3: Individual cumulative abnormal returns in Phase 2: Enter tourism (1997-2001) 
This table displays the cumulative abnormal log returns over four different event windows (-x, y) from x days before to y days after the event. 
Cumulated Abnormal Returns Date of 
Ann. Description of event (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
11 Jun 97 Preussag announces the plan to acquire the tourism and logistics company Hapag-Lloyd. Sales: €2.3bn. 3.1%  2.4%  2.7%  2.0%  
02 Sep 97 Preussag announces the agreement with Hapag-Lloyd shareholders to acquire 99.2% of all shares for €1.43bn. -4.7%** -6.4%** -6.4%** -8.1%***
12 Jan 98 Preussag sells 51% and an option for the remaining 48.8% of its steel production unit (Preussag Stahl AG) to the state of Lower Saxony and NordLB. Price: €542m  6.2%*** 6.0%** 4.5%* 4.2%  
02 Mar 98 
German federal cartel office allows Preussag to acquire Hapag-Lloyd and the majority of 
TUI. At the same time, Schickedanz-Group announces to sell its 20% stake of TUI. After 
WestLB and Deutsche Bahn exercise their pre-emptive rights to purchase 7.5% respec-
tively 5% of TUI shares, Preussag acquires the remaining 7.5%. Price: €96m 
3.6%° 3.3% 4.3%° 4.1% 
09 Jun 98 Preussag announces the acquisition of 12.6% of TUI from WestLB. Preussag becomes majority shareholder of TUI. Price: €160m 3.0%  1.8%  3.0%  1.9%  
02 Jul 98 Preussag reorganizes its tourism activities in a new holding (Hapag Touristik Union). Sales: €5.3bn 1.0% 0.2% 4.4%* 3.6% 
06 Jul 98 Reorganization of Preussag's management board. The division managers lose power. This is an important step for the coming divestitures of Preussag. 9.1%*** 10.6%*** 13.3%*** 14.8%***
06 Oct 98 WestLB and Carlson agree on a merger of Thomas Cook and the U.K. business of Carlson; Carlson will hold 22% and WestLB 78% of the merged company. -6.3%** -4.3% -3.5% -1.6% 
08 Oct 98 Rumors about further transactions between Preussag and WestLB. Preussag confirms talks with WestLB about an acquisition or cooperation with Thomas Cook. 6.7%*** 4.6%* 9.0%*** 7.0%** 
12 Nov 98 
After an intervention of Germany's federal cartel office WestLB has to sell its stake in 
LTU. Until the end of 2000, WestLB formally keeps 10.2% of LTU because of interna-
tional aviation laws. 
0.3% 1.2% -1.6% -0.7% 
02 Dec 98 Rumors that Preussag plans to acquire Thomas Cook and negotiates with WestLB about WestLB's stake in Thomas Cook. 0.5% 5.4%** 3.6% 8.6%***
17 Dec 98 Preussag acquires 100% of First travel agencies (22% from WestLB). Sales: 1.8bn. 3.3%° 4.8%* 3.5%  5.0%° 
23 Dec 98 Preussag acquires 24.9% and an option for further 25.2% of Thomas Cook from WestLB for €146m. 0.5% -1.8% -0.5% -2.8% 




Cumulated Abnormal Returns Date of 
Ann. Description of event (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
05 Jan 99 Preussag sells its complete share of 50.2% of Deilmann-Haniel GmbH (mining and engi-neering firm) to the Heitkamp-Group. Sales: €373m  1.6% 7.4%*** -1.3% 4.5%° 
02 Feb 99 
Preussag announces talks about its plant construction and shipbuilding units with Babcock 
(a German plant construction company). Sales: €2.1bn. At the same day: publication of 
Preussag's annual accounts and announcement of an equity rights issue.  
-4.6%** 1.0%  -6.8%** -1.2%  
08 Feb 99 Babcock's supervisory board agrees to the acquisition of Preussag's plant construction and shipbuilding business. 4.0%* 7.0%*** -0.8% 2.3% 
15 Mar 99 Preussag and Babcock close the deal. Preussag receives €180m in stock and €142m in cash for 100% of its plant construction and 50% of its shipbuilding unit. 7.2%*** 4.4%° 4.3%° 1.5%  
06 Apr 99 Preussag's acquires 25% of TUI from Deutsche Bahn (German railway operator). Price: €320m. 1.5%  0.0%  4.7%° 3.2%  
17 Jun 99 
Preussag and Kuoni (largest Swiss tourism company) announce a cooperation of their 
tourism activities in Switzerland. Kuoni gets the option to acquire up to 49% of TUI Suis-
se. Sales of TUI Suisse: €343m 
2.1% 2.2% 8.1%*** 8.3%***
01 Jul 99 Preussag acquires the remaining 24.9% of TUI from WestLB.  -2.3%  -2.6%  2.3%  2.1%  
30 Sep 99 Preussag exercises its option to acquire another 25.2% of Thomas Cook from WestLB. -3.9%° -6.3%* -2.5% -4.8% 
04 Feb 00 Preussag announces to acquire 75% of Goulet Touropa (Austria's largest tourism com-pany). Sales: €330m -1.2%  -1.3%  -7.6%*** -7.6%***
12 May 00 
Rumors about a new bidder, most probably Preussag, in the takeover battle between C&N 
(3rd largest European tourism group) and Thomson Travel Group plc (4th largest Euro-
pean tourism company). 
-9.1%*** -10.5%*** -15.8%*** -17.3%***
15 May 00 
Preussag announces the friendly takeover of the Thomson Travel Group plc. Price: €2.8bn. 
At the same day: publication of Preussag's interim semi-annual accounts, which were in 
line with market expectations. 
-11.9%*** -15.8%*** -9.9%*** -13.9%***
13 Jul 00 Profit warning from Airtours (3rd largest European tourism company). -7.9%*** -8.5%*** -10.0%*** -10.7%***
01 Aug 00 Preussag announces the plan to sell all 21,000 apartments of its real estate activities. Price: ca. €500m 6.4%*** 9.4%*** 9.9%*** 12.9%***
09 Oct 00 Preussag announces the stepwise acquisition of Nouvelles Frontières (largest French tour-ism company). Price for the complete acquisition: €123m 4.6%** 4.4%° 3.0% 2.8% 
05 Dec 00 
Preussag sells its share (50.1%) of Thomas Cook to C&N Touristic to avoid an interven-
tion of European competition authorities against the Thomson Travel takeover. Price: 
€450m 
5.0%** 7.0%** 4.9%* 6.8%** 
04 Apr 01 Preussag acquires the remaining 50% of its Belgian tourism subsidiary TUI Belgium. -3.7%* -3.6%  -5.2%** -5.1%* 
  120
Table 3.4: Preussag’s abnormal returns in Phase 2: 
Enter tourism (1997-2001) 
This table presents the results of eight regressions of Preussag’s daily abnormal log returns over phase 2 from 
June 11, 1997 to September 10, 2001 on an intercept and six dummy variables: tourism acquisitions from 
WestLB, other tourism acquisitions, other (non-tourism) acquisitions, sell-offs, tourism news, and other news. 
The dummy variables are set equal to one on every day of the event windows around the events they indicate. 
The table reports the estimated regression coefficients multiplied by the number of days the respective dummy 
variable is equal to one. Unexplained return is the estimated intercept multiplied by the number of observations 
in the regression. °, *, **, *** marks significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
Results are displayed for four different event windows (-x, y) from x days before to y days after the event. Panel 
A presents regression results for abnormal returns calculated relative to the Frankfurt market portfolio CDAX. 
Panel B contains similar results when abnormal returns are calculated relative to our weighted industry bench-
mark. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns relative to the market index (CDAX) 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions          
 from WestLB 6 10.37%° 9.20% 16.27%* 15.05%° 
 other 23 -22.59%° -37.37%** -34.92%** -52.41%*** 
Other acquisitions 10 13.44%° 10.00% 13.01% 10.00% 
Sell-offs 25 44.69%*** 52.17%*** 26.87%° 37.47%* 
Tourism news 8 8.00% 20.18%** 4.24% 16.59% 
Other news 80 16.21% 42.58% 18.09% 43.85% 
Unexplained returns N/A -47.99% -74.63% -21.43% -48.42% 
Total return N/A 22.13% 22.13% 22.13% 22.13% 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns relative to weighted industry benchmark 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions          
 from WestLB 6 8.81% 9.19% 15.79%* 16.13%* 
 other 23 -17.29% -37.83%** -24.49%° -47.53%** 
Other acquisitions 10 15.98%* 16.90%° 11.74% 12.90% 
Sell-offs 25 37.88%*** 48.31%*** 14.41% 27.44% 
Tourism news 8 2.74% 8.42% 0.71% 6.57% 
Other news 80 34.08% 49.32%° 36.08% 52.25%° 
Unexplained returns N/A -58.13% -70.26% -30.16% -43.68% 
Total return N/A 24.07% 24.07% 24.07% 24.07% 
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Table 3.5: Event study approach for Phase 2: 
Enter tourism (1997-2001) 
This table displays cumulative abnormal log returns (CARs) over the event windows of several groups of events 
over phase 2 from June 11, 1997 to September 10, 2001. The ‘number of events’ is the number of days on which 
events of the respective event group took place. Note that this number can be lower than the corresponding num-
ber in Table 3.4, because days on which more than one event (from different event groups) took place are classi-
fied as ‘Multiple events’ here. Around these days, event windows are fitted, and abnormal returns are cumulated 
across these windows. °, *, **, *** marks significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respec-
tively. Results are displayed for four different event windows (-x, y) from x days before to y days after the event. 
Panel A presents regression results for abnormal returns calculated relative to the Frankfurt market portfolio 
CDAX. Panel B contains similar results when abnormal returns are calculated relative to our weighted industry 
benchmark. The table also shows a breakdown of the CARs of tourism acquisitions into the CARs of tourism 
acquisitions from WestLB and the CARs of other tourism acquisitions. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns relative to the market index (CDAX) 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions 27 -12.61% -34.51%** -10.32% -25.15%° 
 from WestLB 6 9.92%° 6.59% 12.97%* 9.64% 
 other 21 -22.53%** -41.10%*** -23.29%* -34.79%** 
Other acquisitions 9 14.02%* 6.05% 16.75%* 7.80% 
Sell-offs 20 40.52%*** 47.67%*** 21.51%° 34.48%** 
Tourism news 8 5.04% 23.14%*** 13.24%* 23.78%*** 
Other news 68 13.43% 17.10% 23.67% 25.46% 
Multiple Events 6 8.38% 16.07%° -8.12% 1.97% 
Days without events 939 -46.65% -53.40% -34.60% -46.21% 
Sum 1077 22.13% 22.13% 22.13% 22.13% 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns relative to weighted industry benchmark 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions 27 -12.51% -34.37%** -12.62% -23.66%° 
 from WestLB 6 8.47% 6.96% 11.19%* 9.67% 
 other 21 -20.98%* -41.32%*** -23.81%* -33.33%** 
Other acquisitions 9 14.64%** 11.76% 14.01%* 11.84% 
Sell-offs 20 35.41%*** 45.29%*** 12.94% 29.74%** 
Tourism news 8 -0.16% 10.66% 6.77% 10.54% 
Other news 68 24.41% 22.76% 25.21% 27.07% 
Multiple Events 6 13.30%* 16.77%° 6.10% 6.94% 
Days without events 939 -51.03% -48.80% -28.34% -38.41% 
Sum 1077 24.07% 24.07% 24.07% 24.07% 
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Table 3.6: Preussag’s abnormal returns in Phase 3: 
Consolidate tourism (2001-2004) 
This table presents the results of eight regressions of Preussag’s daily abnormal log returns over phase 3 from 
September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2004 on an intercept and five dummy variables: tourism acquisitions, other 
acquisitions, sell-offs, tourism news, and other news. The dummy variables are set equal to one on every day of 
the event windows around the events they indicate. The table reports the estimated regression coefficients multi-
plied by the number of days the respective dummy variable is equal to one. Unexplained return is the estimated 
intercept multiplied by the number of observations in the regression. °, *, **, *** marks significance at the 15%, 
10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. Results are displayed for four different event windows (-x, y) 
from x days before to y days after the event. Panel A presents regression results for abnormal returns calculated 
relative to the Frankfurt market portfolio CDAX. Panel B contains similar results when abnormal returns are 
calculated relative to our weighted industry benchmark. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns relative to the market index (CDAX) 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions 11 5.07% 1.69% 10.32% 6.81% 
Other acquisitions 1 1.89% 3.61% 1.21% 3.07% 
Sell-offs 22 -4.53% -14.92% -13.79% -24.12% 
Tourism news 36 -20.45% -16.92% -16.38% -9.36% 
Other news 101 22.88% 55.36% 30.24% 82.95%°
Unexplained returns N/A -54.71% -78.66% -61.44% -109.18% 
Total return N/A -49.84% -49.84% -49.84%  -49.84% 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns relative to weighted industry benchmark 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions 11 -3.29% -5.67% -1.02% -3.47% 
Other acquisitions 1 2.23% 1.94% 3.08% 2.87% 
Sell-offs 22 -13.28% -29.12%° -15.59% -31.96%°
Tourism news 36 -12.30% -7.21% -1.10% 3.68% 
Other news 101 36.00% 56.54% 38.91% 71.10% 
Unexplained returns N/A -89.96% -97.09% -104.88% -122.82% 
Total return N/A -80.60% -80.60% -80.60%  -80.60% 
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Table 3.7: Return of a hypothetical liquidation of Preussag 
This table displays the evolvement and the (actual) returns of two hypothetical liquidation strategies of Preussag 
AG. The hypothetical strategy starts on September 30, 1997. From then on, all free cash flows including all pro-
ceeds from sell-offs are assumed to be paid out to shareholders and invested either in the tourism and transporta-
tion index or in the market index (CDAX). Index returns are actual returns and not log returns. No new acquisi-
tions are made, and the existing debt is repaid on September 30, 1997. For each date, the value of the investment 
in the index of all cash flows that have previously been paid out is shown in the column ‘value’. For a few 
smaller sell-offs, we could not obtain the proceeds, so we set the cash inflow equal to zero. For the remaining 
subsidiaries on December 31, 2004, we use prices obtained after December 31, 2004 or balance sheet data. 
Investment in Tour-
ism and Transport   
Investment in mar-
ket index Date Description of inflow Inflow Index 
return Value   
Index 
return Value 
09/30/97 Liquid assets (1,093) minus debt (852) at the end of fiscal year 1996/97 241.0         241.0      241.0 
01/12/98 Preussag sells steel business 542.0 0.38%      783.9 -2.73%     776.4 
04/20/98 Preussag sells its uranium business (share 50%) 153.0 24.64%    1,130.0 30.34%   1,165.0 
06/02/98 Preussag sells a company from its compo-nents business 0.0 2.60%    1,159.5 2.31%   1,191.9 
09/30/98 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 116.9 -27.99%       951.8 -19.06%   1,081.7 
10/20/98 Preussag sells its recycling unit 0.0 3.76%       987.6 1.84%   1,101.6 
11/11/98 Preussag sells part of its plant construction business 0.0 2.38%   1,011.1 3.37%   1,138.8 
01/01/99 Preussag sells its coal mine 82.0 7.56%    1,169.6 5.05%   1,278.3 
01/05/99 Preussag sells the mining and engineering company Deilmann-Haniel (share: 50.2%) 29.0 0.35%    1,202.7 4.19%   1,360.8 
03/15/99 Preussag sells 100% of its plant construc-tion unit and 50% of the shipbuilding unit 322.0 14.85%    1,703.3 -3.22%   1,638.9 
09/08/99 Preussag sells 4.6% of Metaleurop S.A. 10.0 1.23%    1,734.3 6.55%   1,756.3 
09/30/99 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 233.5 -5.01%    1,880.8 -4.66%   1,908.0 
03/27/00 Preussag sells 8.6% of Metaleurop S.A. 20.0 7.61%    2,044.1 49.36%   2,869.8 
09/30/00 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 494.1 -5.67%    2,422.3 -14.55%   2,946.4 
10/05/00 Preussag sells part of its trading business 58.0 1.11%    2,507.3 0.60%   3,022.0 
12/31/00 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 139.4 -2.82%    2,575.9 -11.58%   2,811.4 
12/31/00 Preussag sells 6800 apartments 162.0 0.00%    2,737.9 0.00%   2,973.4 
03/30/01 Preussag sells the fire protection firm Minimax 276.0 -4.65%    2,886.5 -7.16%   3,036.6 
03/30/01 Preussag sells 400 apartments 10.0 0.00%    2,896.5 0.00%   3,046.6 
04/26/01 Preussag sells the sanitary equipment pro-ducer Kermi Group 140.0 1.73%    3,086.7 4.28%   3,317.0 




ism and Transport   
Investment in mar-
ket index Date Description of inflow Inflow Index 
return Value   
Index 
return Value 
07/06/01 Preussag sells most of its heating technol-ogy business 300.0 0.38%    4,205.3  -2.00%   4,229.9
07/16/01 Preussag sells part of its oil and gas explo-ration and its stake in Ruhrgas AG 350.0 -1.07%    4,510.4  -0.28%   4,568.1
08/23/01 Preussag sells the storage specialist KBB 21.0 -2.90%    4,400.6  -8.24%   4,212.7
08/31/01 Preussag sells its oil drilling business (Deutag Group) 210.0 -1.11%    4,562.0  -1.32%   4,367.2
12/31/01 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 402.2 -6.94%    4,647.5  -0.30%   4,756.5
03/11/02 Preussag sells the remaining 50% of its shipbuilding unit (HDW AG) 400.0 10.14%    5,518.8  3.61%   5,328.1
06/06/02 Preussag sells part of its components busi-ness 0.0 -5.28%    5,227.6  -10.07%   4,791.4
07/01/02 Preussag sells its software subsidiary 0.0 -3.40%    5,049.8  -5.16%   4,544.4
12/06/02 Preussag sells its electric-chemical busi-ness (share: 50%) 0.0 -11.33%    4,477.8  -25.34%   3,392.9
12/19/02 Preussag sells 14000 apartments 260.0 -3.42%    4,584.5  -7.34%   3,403.7
12/27/02 Preussag sells its domestic oil business 1000.0 -2.39%    5,474.8  -3.70%   4,277.7
12/31/02 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 190.3 0.66%    5,701.1  1.76%   4,543.2
01/22/03 Preussag sells its foreign oil business 300.0 -5.13%    5,708.8  -2.58%   4,726.0
09/11/03 Preussag sells a large part of its trading business 200.0 28.76%    7,550.9  27.78%   6,238.9
09/19/03 Preussag sells its 24% stake in a power plant 0.0 2.84%    7,765.4  0.52%   6,271.3
12/31/03 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 38.9 3.22%    8,054.4  9.95%   6,934.0
03/31/04 Lehnkering AG (100%) 250.0 7.12%    8,877.8  -1.32%    7,092.7 
07/19/04 Algeco S.A. market capitalization (67%) 320.0 4.01%    9,553.4  -0.83%    7,353.5 
12/31/04 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 129.1 7.98%  10,445.2   10.84%    8,279.6 
12/31/04 VTG AG (100%) 400.0 0.00%  10,845.2  0.00%    8,679.6 
12/31/04 Metal trading unit (PNA Group) 414.4 0.00%  11,259.6  0.00%    9,094.0 
12/31/04 Wolf GmbH (80%) 16.0 0.00%  11,275.6 0.00%    9,110.0 
12/31/04 Preussag Immobilien GmbH (100%) 96.4 0.00%  11,372.1  0.00%    9,206.4 
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Table 3.8: Management compensation at Preussag 
This table displays the average number of officers on Preussag’s management board and their total and their 
average compensation for each fiscal year. In 2001, Preussag changed its end of fiscal year from September 30 to 
December 31. The table does not report the compensation for the shortened fiscal year that consisted only of the 
last quarter of 2000. 
Compensation (€ ‘000)Fiscal 
year 
Average number 
of officers Total Average 
1993/94 8.25 4,337 526 
1994/95 8.00 5,157 645 
1995/96 8.00 5,227 653 
1996/97 8.00 5,024 628 
1997/98 6.50 5,232 805 
1998/99 4.00 5,163 1,291 
1999/00 4.00 6,323 1,581 
2001 6.00 8,165 1,361 
2002 6.00 10,222 1,704 
2003 5.17 9,342 1,808 
2004 4.00 7,969 1,992 
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Table 3.9: Voting rights at Preussag’s AGM controlled by WestLB 
This table displays the percentage of Preussag’s equity capital that was represented at Preussag’s Annual General 
Meetings (AGM) from 1995 to 2004. It also shows the proportion of these voting rights that were controlled by 
WestLB alone or by WestLB and Niedersachsen Holding (NH). WestLB held a 33.3% stake in Niedersachsen 
Holding (see Figure 3.1A). Niedersachsen Holding was dissolved by the end of 1998. 
   Voting rights at the AGM held by 
Date of AGM   
Capital repre-
sented at AGM  WestLB WestLB and NH 
24. Mar. 1994  N/A N/A N/A 
30. Mar. 1995  70.3% 41.4% 56.2% 
21. Mar. 1996  74.0% 39.3% 53.4% 
26. Mar. 1997  66.5% 43.8% 59.4% 
26. Mar. 1998  65.5% 44.5% 60.3% 
31. Mar. 1999  67.0% 49.3%  
12. Apr. 2000  39.0% 84.6%  
18. May 2001  37.2% 88.8%  
26. Jun. 2002  42.2% 78.2%  
18. Jun. 2003  54.0% 61.1%  
18. May 2004  54.3% 60.8%  
Average:   57.0%  59.2%   
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9 Figures 
Figure 3.1: Description of the WestLB/Preussag network 
The following figures show the cross-holdings and interlocking directorates in the WestLB/Preussag network at 
three points in time during the period 1994 to 2004. The percentages next to the arrows provide the voting rights 
of the firm at the start of the arrow in the firm at the tip of the arrow. The figures also list selected members of 
the executive and the supervisory boards. MM stands for ‘member of the management board’, CS for ‘chairman 
of the supervisory board’, and MS for ‘member of the supervisory board.’* 














































                                                 
*  According to Handelsblatt from June 5, 1992, WestLB holds 34.3% of LTU’s cash-flow rights but has the 
majority of the voting rights. 
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Figure 3.2: Preussag’s stock price history 
The three figures show Preussag’s performance index (‘Preussag’) and the German stock market’s performance 
index (‘CDAX’) over the decade from January 1994 to December 2004. Both series are normalized to 100 on 
January 1, 1994, June 11, 1997, and September 11, 2001. 
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Figure 3.3: Correlations of Preussag’s stock with the market and with in-
dustry portfolios 
Panel A shows the regression coefficient of a regression of Preussag’s daily stock returns on the daily CDAX 
returns and an intercept over a 500 trading day moving window (-250 to +250 days). The intercept is not dis-
played in the figures. Panel B shows the results of a similar regression on the returns of the tourism and transport 
index and the steel and engineering index. 
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Figure 3.4: Preussag’s supervisory board and board overlaps 
This figures displays the firms, organizations and individuals that were represented in Preussag’s supervisory 
board between 1994 and 2004. Three of these firms had themselves a WestLB representative on their supervi-
sory board. Details on the individual interlocks are provided in the footnotes. MM stands for ‘member of the 
management board’, CS for ‘chairman of the supervisory board’, and MS for ‘member of the supervisory board.’ 
 
(1) Friedel Neuber: CEO of WestLB (until 2001), CS of Preussag (died 10/23/2004), followed by Norbert 
Emmerich (11/5/2004 - 1/26/2005); new chairman Jürgen Krumnow (since 11/10/2004). 
(2) Hans Henning Offen: MM of WestLB (until 2002); Since Mr. Offen left Preussag's supervisory board 
(6/18/2003), WestLB was represented by Jürgen Sengera (6/18/2003 - 8/21/2003), followed by Johannes 
Ringel (9/8/2003 - 1/12/2004) and Thomas Fischer (CEO) (1/16/2004 - 1/26/2005).  
(3) Friedel Neuber: Chairman of RWE's supervisory board (died 10/23/2004), followed by Thomas Fischer; 
H.-H.Offen: Supervisory board memberships of a subsidiary of RWE. 
(4) Friedel Neuber: Member of Deutsche Bahn's supervisory board (died 10/23/2004). 
(5) Friedel Neuber: Chairman of ThyssenKrupp's supervisory board (died 10/23/2004); H.-H.Offen: Supervi-
sory board memberships of a subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp. 
(6) Herbert Krämer: MM of RWE and MS of Preussag (until 1996). Dietmar Kuhnt: CEO of RWE and MS of 
Preussag (1996-2003). 
(7) Heinz Dürr: CEO of Deutsche Bahn (until 1997) and CS of Deutsche Bahn (1997-1999). 
(8) Ekkehard Schulz: CEO of ThyssenKrupp. 
(9) Günther Saßmannshausen: Former CEO of Preussag (until 1988). 
(10) Rolf-E. Breuer: CEO of Deutsche Bank and MS of Preussag (until 1997). Jürgen Krumnow: MM of 
Deutsche Bank (until 1999), Advisor of Deutsche Bank (since 2000) and MS of Preussag (since 1997). 
Deutsche Bank sold their 10% stake in Hapag-Lloyd to Preussag in 1997. 
(11) Franz Vranitzky: Former Austrian Chancellor and member of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. 
(12) Bernd W. Voss: MM (until 2001) and MS (since 2002) of Dresdner Bank. Dresdner Bank sold their 10% 
stake in Hapag-Lloyd to Preussag in 1997. 
(13) Klaus Liesen: CEO of Ruhrgas (until 1996) and CS of Ruhrgas (since 1996). 
(14) Hans Carl Deilmann: Owner and CEO of C.Deilmann AG, a company taken over by Preussag in several 
steps during the 1980s and early 1990s, MS of Preussag (until 1996). Jürgen Deilmann: CEO of Deilmann-
Montan GmbH and MS Preussag (1997-2001). 
(15) Gerold Bezzenberger: MM of DSW, a German investor protection association, and MS of Preussag (until 
2001). Jella S. Benner-Heinacher: CEO of DSW and MS of Preussag (2001-2004). 
(16) Manfred Schneider: CS of Bayer. 
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Chapter IV 
4 Defensive Mergers and Acquisitions 
1 Introduction 
There have been many studies on the profitability of mergers and acquisitions over the last 
decades.100 The overwhelming evidence from these papers is that acquirer announcement re-
turns are on average close to zero or even negative (see, for example, Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz, 2004; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001).101 In this chapter, I present a new 
explanation for this well-known empirical result and hypothesize that firm size is an important 
factor for the survival of a stock corporation and because of that, otherwise inactive (“quiet 
life”) managers engage in defensive takeovers to secure their independence. 
A number of explanations have been put forward to explain the finding that many takeovers 
lead to the destruction of shareholder wealth in bidding firms. Roll (1986) argues that acquir-
ing firms often overvalue target companies and then overpay for them because their managers 
are prone to hubris. Another explanation of value decreasing acquisitions is Jensen's free cash 
flow theory (Jensen, 1986). It predicts that firms with substantial free cash flows and few 
profitable investment projects will engage in value reducing acquisitions, because the growth 
of the company is of major importance to managers even if firms grow beyond their optimal 
size. A very direct reasoning is based on the empirical fact that compensation is often linked 
                                                 
100  I thank seminar participants at the University of Mannheim and especially Susanne Ebert, Ernst Maug and 
Oliver Spalt for helpful comments and discussions. I gratefully acknowledge financial support of the col-
laborative research center TR/SFB 15 “Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems” at the Uni-
versity of Mannheim. All tables are gathered at the end of the chapter. 
101  Studies finding negative average abnormal returns to acquirers are Dodd (1980), Varaiya and Ferris (1987), 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Jennings and Mazzeo (1991), Servaes (1991), Banerjee and Owers (1992), 
Byrd and Hickman (1992), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Mitchell and Stafford (2000). For a recent survey 
of the literature, see Bruner (2004). 
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to size and managers have therefore strong incentives to increase firm size even if it is not 
beneficial for shareholders. Besides indirect private benefits from acquisitions caused by in-
creased firm size or growth, also direct private benefits from acquisitions may exist and mis-
lead managers to value destroying takeovers. Increased prestige and status from extensive 
press coverage of large acquisitions are examples of these direct private benefits. The unify-
ing idea behind all these explanations of value destroying acquisitions is that managers are 
interested in takeovers in order to maximize their power, prestige, and (monetary and non-
monetary) compensation. 
In contrast, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) argue that the average manager is not interested 
in empire building but in enjoying the quiet life. They find for U.S. plant level data that when 
managers are insulated from the market for corporate control because of statewide anti-
takeover laws worker wages rise, destruction of old plants and the creation of new plants de-
crease without any net effect on firm size.102 These results do not fit well with the idea that 
managerial preferences are inclined to empire building. Instead, it seems that poorly governed 
managers prefer to avoid difficult decisions and costly efforts, like bargaining with unions, 
engaging in layoffs or finding new profitable projects. I will refer to managers, who are 
mostly interested in avoiding tasks, which cause considerable effort and may require difficult 
decisions as quiet-life managers. Incidentally, this kind of behavior also seems to be in dissent 
with the hypothesis that an average manager is prone to hubris. However, if empire building 
and hubris are not the driving forces behind the actions of an average manager the question 
remains, why we see so many value destroying acquisitions.103 
                                                 
102  Giroud and Mueller (2009) find that managers not exposed to product market completion and takeover 
threats prefer the quiet life. Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2007) find for a Swedish 
data set that entrenched CEOs pay their workers more. They suggest that entrenched CEOs pay higher 
wages to enjoy private benefits from lower wage bargaining and better social relations. These results are 
consistent with entrenched CEOs preferring the quiet life. 
103  Negative bidder announcement returns can also be explained without managers being prone to hubris or 
following their own objectives instead of shareholder value maximization. For example, if takeover an-
nouncements reveal negative information about the bidder’s profitability relative to expectations (see 
McCardle and Viswanathan, 1994; Jovanovic and Braguinsky, 2004). 
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One possible explanation would be that a relatively small number of managers prone to hubris 
or empire building undertake a large proportion of all takeover transactions. There is anecdo-
tal and empirical evidence supporting this explanation. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2004), for example, find that large firms, whose managers are likely to be more prone to hu-
bris or empire building, undertake (and complete) more acquisitions, pay higher premiums 
and create lower synergy gains than small firms. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that CEOs, 
who are overconfident (or prone to hubris), undertake more acquisitions and destroy more 
shareholder value with these transactions than non-overconfident (rational) CEOs. However, 
it has not been shown that other kinds of managers are not inclined to execute value-
destroying acquisitions. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) investigate personal objectives of managers that lead to 
acquisitions that reduce (acquiring firm) shareholder value. Morck et al. identify four major 
managerial objectives, which are (1) assuring the continuity of the firm, (2) improving their 
own job security, (3) diversifying the risk to their own human capital, and (4) creating attrac-
tive career opportunities for insiders.104 To achieve these objectives managers undertake di-
versifying acquisitions and try to buy growing firms. But not only empire builders are inter-
ested in the continuity of their firms and the security of their jobs, also managers who are usu-
ally enjoying the quiet life should have this interest. Therefore, we should observe that quiet-
life managers are willing to undertake value-reducing acquisitions if the independence of their 
firms and the security of their jobs are threatened. In contrast to empire builders who are 
mainly interested in acquisitions to maximize the assets under their control, quiet-life manag-
ers are only interested in acquisitions in order to defend their jobs (future compensation) and 
the private benefits associated with these jobs. These private benefits could be social status 
and prestige associated with their management role as well as all kinds of non-cash compen-
                                                 
104  See also Amihud and Lev (1981) and May (1995). 
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sation items, like corporate jets, golf club memberships, sponsoring of their favorite sports 
team or cultural institution by the firm.  
Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2005) present a model of defensive mergers, where managers can 
reduce the likelihood of being acquired by acquiring competitors. The increased size of their 
own firm essentially acts as a takeover defense.105 Then they show that if managers care suffi-
ciently about private benefits of control, they may undertake unprofitable acquisitions in order 
to retain their jobs. Gorton et al. call these transactions defensive acquisitions, because they 
would not happen in the absence of a takeover threat. 
Based on their theoretical model, Gorton et al. make a number of empirical predictions about 
the influence of industry structure and firm size on the dynamics and the profitability of 
mergers and acquisitions. Their predictions that acquirer size, deal size, and relative size of 
the target and the acquirer are negatively correlated with acquirer returns are also consistent 
with other merger theories and largely corroborated by empirical results (see, for example, 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). However, the model of Gorton et al. has some addi-
tional implications. They argue that the firm size distribution in an industry is an important 
driver of merger activity. In industries with firms of similar size (homogeneous firm size in-
dustries) defensive acquisitions are more likely because mergers between most firms in these 
industries would create a new market leader (or at least a large enough firm to protect future 
independence) and therefore have considerable defensive value for management. In contrast, 
industries with firms of very different sizes (heterogeneous firm size industries) are less likely 
to exhibit defensive acquisitions, because most firms could not increase their size enough by 
merging with competitors to protect themselves from future takeovers. There are two implica-
tions from this observation. First, the model of Gorton et al. predicts ceteris paribus the lowest 
                                                 
105  There is empirical evidence that the probability of becoming a target in an acquisition is decreasing in firm 
size, see, for example, Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986) or Trimbath, Frydman, and Frydman (2001). The 
standard explanation for this finding is the difficulty to finance large takeover transactions in particular if 
the target is larger than the acquirer is. 
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acquirer returns for homogeneous firm size industries and the highest for heterogeneous firm 
size industries. Second, in industries classified neither as homogenous nor heterogeneous 
(mixed firm size industries) we should observe most mergers, because firms engage in defen-
sive as well as in value enhancing acquisitions. Since both types of acquisitions are probable 
the acquirer returns in mixed firm size industries should be larger than in homogenous but 
lower than in heterogeneous firm size industries.106 
In this chapter, I will show that there is only limited empirical evidence for Gorton et al.'s 
prediction that the negative effects of defensive transactions on shareholder value can be de-
tected by classifying industries according to their firm size distribution. However, I find 
strong evidence that firms that are likely to be managed by quiet-life managers undertake 
worse acquisitions than an average firm does. I interpret this finding as support for the hy-
pothesis that not only empire building and overconfident managers are destroying shareholder 
value with acquisitions, but also defensive transactions of managers usually enjoying the quiet 
life. 
The major empirical challenge is to identify the different types of managers. Ideally, one 
would identify and track individual managers over time and infer from their behavior which 
type they are.107 This procedure would require a relatively long time series with information 
about the identity of officers (and possibly directors) of a large number of firms in the sample. 
The data requirements would be different across countries. For the U.S., where the role of the 
CEO is comparably strong and most strategic decisions are mainly influenced by her, it would 
probably suffice to track her identity. In countries like Germany, where the role of the CEO is 
less powerful and most decisions are made by the management board collectively, it would be 
necessary to track the identity of all officers in the management board. In other countries, like 
                                                 
106  The model of Gorton et al. does not make any particular predictions about the size of target returns across 
different industries. 
107  Malmendier and Tate (2008) choose this approach to identify overconfident CEOs for a U.S. data set by 
using data on early option exercises and characterizations in the press and then investigate the profitability 
and number of acquisitions undertaken by these CEOs.  
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Japan with its Keiretsu structure maybe even more persons have to be followed. Given the 
fact that there is no such database for other countries than the U.S. currently available, I de-
cided to resort to a different identification scheme, which allows me carry out the analysis for 
an international data set of mergers and acquisitions.108 Since I cannot track the identity of 
managers, I do not attempt to classify them directly.  
Instead, I classify the acquisitions undertaken by them based on prior acquisition activity of 
their firm and the primary industry their firm is operating in. Acquisitions are classified as 
undertaken by quiet-life managers, if three conditions hold: (1) the firm was relatively inac-
tive in the market for corporate control during the preceding two calendar years before exe-
cuting this acquisition, (2) the target operates in the same primary industry as the acquirer, 
and (3) the acquisition takes place in a period (last and current year) of high takeover activity 
in the primary industry of the firm. The first two conditions follow from the definition of 
quiet-life managers, who prefer to avoid difficult decisions and costly effort and therefore will 
not undertake many or large acquisitions, in particular not in industries they are not familiar 
with. The third condition is based on the notion that quiet-life managers only become active in 
the market for corporate control if there is a threat of being taken over. This threat is of course 
particularly large during times when merger activity is high in an industry. In contrast, I clas-
sify acquisitions as undertaken by empire-building managers, if the following condition holds: 
the firm was relatively active in the market for corporate control during the preceding two 
calendar years before executing this acquisition. This definition naturally follows from the 
idea that empire-building managers are interested in maximizing assets under management 
and therefore undertake acquisitions quite frequently. I do not classify acquisitions undertaken 
by overconfident managers, because using this identification scheme they are indistinguish-
able from acquisitions undertaken by empire-building managers. However, this problem does 
not influence the definition of acquisitions undertaken by quiet-life managers and therefore 
                                                 
108  For the U.S. it is possible to track the five highest paid executives via Compustat’s ExecuComp database.  
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should not influence the results with regard to this group. Of course, the proposed identifica-
tion procedure is only indirect. Nonetheless I do not see any reason why the results should be 
systematically biased, which would invalidate the approach. 
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold. First, I test with a global data set 
of mergers and acquisitions whether the essential assumption of Gorton et al. for the existence 
of defensive acquisitions holds: the probability of becoming a takeover target is decreasing in 
firm size. Prior studies have often found a negative relation between size and takeover prob-
ability (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986). However, this literature mainly used logit and 
probit regressions to analyze takeover data.109 This chapter employs the hazards regression 
model proposed by Cox (1972), which is a sub-class of survival models. In contrast to static 
logit or probit models, where the dependent variable is a binary variable (target vs. non-
target), in the Cox model the dependent variable is the duration until a firm becomes a target. 
The Cox model has two major advantages over static logit and probit models. First, it easily 
incorporates time-varying covariates (e.g., annually changing firm characteristics). Second, it 
accommodates the censoring problem present in takeover data. Whereas logit and probit mod-
els treat all firms, which have not experienced a takeover until the end of the sample period as 
non-targets, the Cox model treats these firms just as not taken over yet. The first and only 
study using the Cox model in the context of mergers and acquisitions is to the best of my 
knowledge Trimbath, Frydman, and Frydman (2001). However, their focus is more on the 
influence of cost inefficiencies on takeover risk and they apply it to a much smaller and older 
domestic U.S. data set.110 
The second contribution of this chapter is to test the empirical predictions of the Gorton et al. 
model about defensive transactions. There has been ample empirical research on other mana-
                                                 
109  An example for using probit models in the context of takeovers is Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). 
Logit models are used by Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986), Barnes (1999), and more recently Brar, Gia-
mouridis, and Liodakis (2009). 
110  Their data set only includes Fortune 500 firms in the period between 1980 and 1997. 
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gerial merger theories but defensive transactions initiated by managers to retain their jobs and 
private benefits have not been studied much so far. Louis (2004) analyzes defensive takeovers 
in the U.S. banking sector. Other managerial merger theories have attracted considerably 
more empirical research. A recent study testing the hubris hypothesis is Malmendier and Tate 
(2008). Another recent study analyzing the empire-building hypothesis is Duchev and 
Schmidt (2008). An early empirical study investigating managerial objectives, which drive 
acquisitions, is Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990). 
The third contribution of this chapter is to introduce a new explanation for value destroying 
takeovers by connecting the existing literature on quiet-life managers with the literature on 
managerial merger theories.  
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 derives the hypotheses. Section 
3 introduces the data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and presents the results. Sec-
tion 5 concludes. 
2 Hypotheses 
There is substantial evidence that managers are interested in keeping their firms independent 
and thereby securing their jobs and the private benefits associated with them (Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1988b; 1990). Following the ideas of Gorton et al. (2005), managers can prevent 
a takeover of their firms by acquiring another firm in the industry. The assumption made is 
that a firm can only acquire firms of smaller size and therefore increasing its own size by ac-
quisitions can prevent becoming a target.111 The main rationale behind this assumption is that 
it gets increasingly more difficult for acquirers to raise sufficient financing the larger the ac-
quisition becomes. Of course, this argument depends partly on the costs and availability of 
takeover financing. In particular, if acquirers can finance acquisitions via stock issues and 
junk bonds they can be enabled to acquire also targets larger than themselves. This relation-
                                                 
111  Louis (2004) provides direct evidence that U.S. banks that were takeover targets and then engaged in acqui-
sitions are less likely to be acquired subsequently than targeted banks that do not make an acquisition. 
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ship is corroborated by empirical evidence. Trimbath, Frydman, and Frydman (2001) find that 
during the 1980ies “junk bond era” the negative influence of firm size on takeover probability 
was considerably smaller than during the 1990ies. However, even if firm size is not a perfect 
takeover deterrent it should decrease the likelihood of being acquired. 
Hypothesis 1: The probability that a firm is taken over decreases with firm size. 
Based on the assumption that increased firm size can indeed reduce the probability of being 
taken over Gorton et al. develop a model that combines elements of neoclassical and manage-
rial merger theories and predicts defensive acquisitions. Defensive acquisitions are defined as 
inefficient acquisitions undertaken by managers to secure the independence of the firm. The 
neoclassical ingredient of the Gorton et al. model is that there are at least in some states of the 
world (e.g., after technology shocks or regime shifts) efficient, value increasing, mergers. 
These value-increasing mergers of course are a threat for potential target companies and their 
management to lose their independence and possibly their jobs. At this point, Gorton et al. 
connect their model to managerial merger theories and assume that managers have prefer-
ences to keep their firms independent in order to preserve the private benefits associated with 
their jobs. Gorton et al. then show that under these assumptions, there are two types of acqui-
sitions: (1) efficient acquisitions that are carried out to increase shareholder value, (2) ineffi-
cient defensive acquisitions that are only undertaken to preempt efficient acquisitions in order 
to secure the independence of the firm. The latter type of acquisition allows managers to pre-
serve their private benefits of control and only occurs if there is a threat of an efficient acqui-
sition and managers care sufficiently enough about these private benefits. Based on the sim-
plifying assumptions that all mergers are intra-industry mergers and that private benefits are 
homogeneous across firms in the same industry, Gorton et al. derive a number of testable pre-
dictions about the influence of industry structure on the likelihood of defensive acquisitions. 
Industry structure in this case means the distribution of firm sizes in an industry. 
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Gorton et al. consider three different types of industry structure in their analysis. (1) Homo-
geneous firm size industry is an industry where all firms are of similar size such that the 
merger of any two firms would create a new industry leader. (2) Heterogeneous firm size 
industry is an industry where firms have very different sizes such that no merger of two firms 
in the industry could create a firm larger than the current industry leader (an industry with a 
dominant firm). (3) Mixed firm size industry is an industry where firms have again different 
sizes but such that at least some firms in the industry could create a new industry leader by 
merging.112 This type of industry is therefore in between the two extreme cases of homogene-
ous and heterogeneous firm size industries. Based on these definitions of industry structure 
the model of Gorton et al. predicts that the firm size distribution in an industry determines the 
likelihood of defensive transactions. Defensive transactions will mainly cluster in industries 
where most firms are of similar size (homogeneous firm size industries), because in these in-
dustries acquisitions offer the possibility to sufficiently increase firm size to deter potential 
bidders. In homogeneous firm size industries, almost all firms can make acquisitions, which 
increase firm size sufficiently enough to deter industry peers from a takeover. In other words, 
most acquisitions in these industries also offer a defensive value to the management. In con-
trast, in heterogeneous firm size industries, which are characterized by a large dispersion of 
firm sizes, most firms are not able to implement an acquisition that would deter other industry 
peers from future takeover attempts. Therefore, the basic difference between heterogeneous 
and homogeneous firm size industries is that in the latter acquisitions also can have a defen-
sive motive. If there are more inefficient defensive transactions in homogeneous firm size 
industries, then the average abnormal return at acquisition announcements should be lower for 
these industries.113 
                                                 
112  Gorton et al. characterize a mixed firm size industry by the fact that the second and third largest firm in the 
industry can merge with a smaller firm and create a new industry leader, whereas a merger of the two 
smallest firms does not create a new industry leader. 
113  Gorton et al. also predict that more merger waves take place in mixed firm size industries, because in these 
industries unprofitable defensive as well as profitable efficient merger waves can occur. Homogeneous firm 
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Hypothesis 2: The market reaction to acquisition announcements is smaller in homogeneous 
than in heterogeneous firm size industries. 
A second prediction following from the model of Gorton et al. is that we should observe a 
negative correlation between acquirer returns and acquirer size because large firms are more 
likely to engage in defensive acquisitions than small firms. The reason is that large firms can 
always undertake defensive acquisitions to deter future takeover attempts by competitors, 
whereas small firms are not able to undertake acquisitions with defensive value because there 
would be always competitors large enough to acquire them even after a defensive takeover. 
The returns of medium size firms should be somewhere in between because they can only 
undertake defensive acquisitions if they acquire a relatively large company. Another closely 
connected factor affecting the motivation of defensive acquisitions is target (or deal) size. 
Gorton et al. predict also a negative correlation between acquirer returns and target size, be-
cause larger acquisitions are more likely to be defensively motivated. This prediction builds 
on the fact that larger acquisitions increases firm size more than smaller acquisitions and 
therefore reduce the probability of being acquired more. In other words, a larger acquisition 
has greater defensive value than a smaller acquisition. 
Hypothesis 3: (1) Abnormal acquirer returns are smaller for large firms than for small firms. 
(2) Abnormal acquirer returns are smaller for acquisitions of larger targets. 
Another prediction of Gorton et al.'s model is that medium sized firms are most likely to un-
dertake acquisitions, because they tend to make profitable as well as unprofitable (defensive) 
acquisitions. Small firms usually do not undertake defensive acquisitions because they are too 
small to grow large enough by acquiring another firm. Whereas large firms undertake pre-
dominantly defensive acquisitions if there is a threat of becoming a takeover target. 
                                                                                                                                                        
size industries are likely to be characterized by defensive merger waves, whereas heterogeneous firm size 
industries are more likely to exhibit efficient merger waves. I test this hypothesis following the approach of 
Harford (2005) to identify merger waves. However, I do not find that mixed firm size industries are charac-
terized by more merger waves. I do not include this analysis, because it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Hypothesis 4: Medium sized firms undertake more acquisitions than large and small sized 
firms do. 
The model of Gorton et al. focuses on one particular managerial motive, which is survival of 
the firm as independent entity, to explain value-destroying acquisitions. Their approach ab-
stracts from all other managerial motives or potential biases, which allows them to spell out 
the consequences of the one managerial motive under study. Of course, survival of the firm as 
independent entity is a very important managerial objective if managers enjoy private benefits 
of control and it is also obvious that this objective is crucial in explaining inefficient defen-
sive acquisitions. However, the implicit assumption that all managers are equally prone to 
defensive acquisitions and it only depends on firm size, industry structure and that private 
benefits of control are sufficiently high to predict whether a manager is likely to initiate a de-
fensive acquisitions, is somewhat at odds with prior managerial explanations for inefficient 
mergers. So far most research on managerial merger theories has emphasized the importance 
of empire-building preferences and overconfidence (or hubris) of managers to explain value 
destructing acquisitions (see Jensen, 1986, 1993; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Duchin 
and Schmidt, 2007; Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). However, managers prone to 
empire building or overconfidence are unlikely to arrive in a situation where they have to es-
cape a takeover threat by initiating a defensive acquisition. These kinds of managers should 
already search the market for possible acquisition targets well before an immediate takeover 
threat (e.g., caused by a technology shock) occurs and initiate acquisitions as soon as they 
find a suitable target. In turn, this means that there has to be another type of manager, who 
initiates defensive acquisitions if these exist at all.  
Based on the results of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2009), 
who find that the average manager prefers the quiet life if she has not to threat a takeover or 
strong product market competition, I introduce a new type of manager, the quiet-life manager, 
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to the discussion of managerial merger theories. So far, the role of quiet-life managers has 
been overlooked in the context of mergers and acquisitions. This is quite surprising given that 
the results of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) suggest that managerial behavior is for the 
most part not consistent with empire building. Of course, the three types of managers (empire-
building, overconfident, and quiet-life manager) discussed here, are not necessarily strictly 
distinct types of managers. It is actually more likely that all managers share these characteris-
tics to some extent, but some may be more prone to empire building, whereas others lean 
more towards quiet life. 
Overconfidence is a behavioral bias, which seems to be more common among empire-
building managers as Malmendier and Tate (2008) suggests. As noted already in the Introduc-
tion, the identification strategy used for classifying managers in this study does not allow to 
distinguish between overconfident and empire-building managers, therefore, I will only focus 
on two types of managers: (1) Empire-building managers, who initiate acquisitions mainly to 
increase assets under management. (2) Quiet-life managers who get private benefits from 
managing their firms but at the same time prefer to avoid difficult management decisions. 
They prefer to pay their workers more, do less internal restructuring (shutting down old 
plants) and also avoid difficult investment decisions (opening new plants, initiating acquisi-
tions). Of course, also quiet-life managers can only enjoy private benefits from control as long 
as their firms survive independently. In case of a merger wave in their industry, they are faced 
with an immediate takeover threat, which leaves them only with the option: “eat or be eaten”. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that in such a situation, also quiet-life managers become active and 
may initiate an acquisition. I call these transactions defensive acquisitions because their main 
purpose is to secure management’s jobs. Given that, the primary motive for these acquisitions 
is to protect manager's private benefits it is unlikely that considerations to increase share-
holder value play the main role in these transactions. Therefore, I predict that defensive trans-
actions undertaken by quiet-life managers lead to negative abnormal announcement returns. 
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Hypothesis 5: The market reaction to defensive acquisitions undertaken by quiet-life manag-
ers is negative. 
This hypothesis is an extension of the ideas of Gorton et al. and is not in dissent with their 
model. Therefore, I will start testing their predictions and then turn to the question whether 
firms run by quiet-life managers initiate (inefficient) defensive takeovers. 
3 Data set 
The data set consists of all corporate control transactions listed in the Thomson Financial 
SDC database from January 1, 1973 to December 31, 2006. These are in total 537,990 obser-
vations from 211 countries. I drop all transactions where either the acquirer or its parent has 
an identical SEDOL number to either the target or its parent. I am able to obtain for 180,079 
announcements sufficient return data from Datastream (using the companies' SEDOL num-
bers provided by SDC) to estimate abnormal returns for at least one party taking part in the 
transaction (acquirer, acquirer parent, target, or target parent). To be included in the sample I 
require that the transaction is completed, that at least 50% of the shares outstanding were ac-
quired, and that sufficient market data for the acquiring firm exists to estimate abnormal event 
returns. I drop all transaction where either the acquirer or the target comes from an industry 
with SIC code between 8000 and 9999. These are mostly companies from the public sector, 
which operate, for example, in health, educational, and social services. Since the competitive 
situation in these markets is quite different from other sectors, firms operating in these indus-
tries are excluded from the analysis.114 After matching the remaining 51,274 observations to 
the prior year accounting data from Worldscope, I also exclude the 42 transactions, which 
took place before 1981. Finally, I only include observations if the deal value and the market 
value of the acquirer are known and the deal value relative to the market value of the acquirer 
                                                 
114  I do not exclude financial firms from the analysis because the dependent variable of most interest is cumu-
lated abnormal returns, which is not affected by differences of accounting variables compared to firms in 
other sectors. I follow Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), who also not exclude financial firms. As a 
robustness check (not tabulated) I exclude all firms with primary SIC codes 6000-6799, results remain 
qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. 
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is larger than 1%. These exclusions leave a final data set of 20,978 observations, about 53% 
of these observations are domestic (non-cross-border) U.S. transactions. 
Insert Table 4.1 here 
The industry level variables are constructed using the complete Worldscope database, only 
excluding firms with sales less than one million U.S. $. For the period 1980 to 2005, these are 
44,338 firms with 373,681 firm-year observations.115 In a first step, all firm-year observations 
of multi-segment firms are split up according to the number of four-digit SIC segments re-
ported by Worldscope. Then for each firm-year, I aggregate all segments with the same three-
digit SIC code. Using this procedure I ensure that all firms and subsidiaries operating in the 
same industry are considered by the analysis. Industries are generally defined at the three-
digit SIC level. If there are fewer than three active firms or subsidiaries operating in an indus-
try in a given year I drop these observations. After excluding all firms and subsidiaries with 
negative assets, sales less than one million U.S. $, SIC codes between 8000 and 9999, the 
final data set has 437,621 segment-year observations.116 Since Worldscope contains mostly 
public companies, the research design with Worldscope as the sole source of accounting in-
formation has the drawback that many private companies are not taken into account for esti-
mating the industry level variables. However, I do not see any reason why this should system-
atically bias the results. Given that I conduct a cross-country study all variables delivered by 
Worldscope in domestic currency are converted into U.S. $ and deflated. All currency de-
noted variables are measured in 2000 U.S. $. 
Insert Table 4.2 here 
All company and deal specific variables used in the analysis are standard, definitions and de-
scriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. The following deal specific 
                                                 
115  All variables, which are based on accounting information, use prior year Worldscope data, to avoid any 
biases caused by the investigated acquisitions themselves. 
116  The data set includes 233,344 single segment firms and 204,277 subsidiaries (single segments) from 
124,303 firms with multiple segments. 
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dummy variables classify transactions into a number of commonly used groups: AllCash 
(AllEquity) equals one if only cash (equity) is used to pay for the acquisition. Competed 
equals one if there is more than one bidder competing for the same target. Conglomerate 
equals one if the target has a different two-digit SIC code than the acquirer. Hostile equals one 
if the acquisition is hostile according to SDC. Private (Public) equals one if the target is a 
private (public) firm. TenderOffer is equal to one if the acquisition is a tender offer. Large 
(Small) equals one if the acquirer has a market capitalization equal to or greater (less) than the 
market capitalization of the 75th (25th) percentile of firms listed in Worldscope in the same 
year and the same three-digit SIC industry. The size of transactions are measured by DealSize, 
which is defined as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and 
expenses in million 2000 U.S. $. RelativeSize is defined as the target's market value of equity 
divided by the acquirer's market value of equity. DeltaSizeRank is used as a proxy for the de-
fensive value of an acquisition. The idea is to measure the number of size ranks a firm ad-
vances, because of the acquisition. It is defined as the difference between the rank of the ac-
quirer before the transaction and the estimated rank of the merged firm (measured by market 
value of equity) in the respective industry’s size distribution. It is only calculated if acquirer 
and target operate in the same three-digit SIC industry.  
Two variables measure the merger activity of the acquirer before the respective transaction: 
#Deals is the total number of deals completed by the firm in the two years prior to the acquisi-
tion; AcqVolume is the total value of mergers (measured by deal value in million 2000 U.S. $) 
completed by the firm in the two years prior to the acquisition. Another set of variables meas-
ures the merger activity in the acquirer’s industry. These variables are used as proxies to 
quantify the takeover threat for a firm: #DealsIndustry is the total number of deals completed 
in the acquirer’s major three-digit SIC industry in the two years prior to the acquisition. Ac-
qVolumeIndustry is the total value of mergers (measured by deal value in million 2000 U.S. 
$) completed in the acquirer’s major three-digit SIC industry in the two years prior to the ac-
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quisition. LiquidityIndex measures the merger activity in the target’s industry. It is defined, 
following Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002), as the value of all corporate control 
transactions for one million U.S. $ or more reported by SDC for each year and target's three-
digit SIC industry divided by the total book value of assets of all Worldscope firms in the 
same three-digit SIC industry in that year. 
The variables measuring firm characteristics are defined as follows: Assets is the book value 
of total assets at the end of the last calendar year in million 2000 U.S. $. EquityMarket is the 
market value of equity at the end of the last calendar year in million 2000 U.S. $. Sales are net 
sales or revenues over the last calendar in million 2000 U.S. $. SizePercentileCountry 
(SizePercentileIndustry) is defined as the firm’s percentile of EquityMarket of all firms in the 
same country (three-digit SIC industry), with 100% being the highest and 1% being the low-
est percentile. MarketToBook is defined as the acquirer's market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity at the end of the last calendar year. FirmAge is the difference be-
tween the current year and the founding year. MultiSegment equals one if acquirer is active in 
more than one three-digit SIC industry and zero otherwise. If a variable name is preceded by 
“Log”, the natural logarithm of the respective variable has been taken. 
For analyzing the impact of industry structure on acquirer abnormal announcement returns, a 
number of industry level variables (all on the three-digit SIC level) are defined, which meas-
ure the competitive situation and the market environment for corporate control transactions. 
#Firms is the number of active firms and subsidiaries in an industry. A common measure for 
product market competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (Herfindahl), which is de-
fined as the sum of squared market shares in an industry (measured in sales). Another meas-
ure for market power is the Lerner Index, which is commonly proxied by the industries me-
dian net profit margin (MedianNetProfitMargin) in the industrial organization literature. The 
intuition is that firms in less competitive industries can set their prices above marginal costs 
  151
and therefore earn higher margins. On the firm respective subsidiary level the net profit mar-
gin (NetProfitMargin) is defined as operating income over sales. The main problem with 
these measures is that they are solely based on public firms listed in the Worldscope database. 
Hence, Herfindahl is biased upward and #Firms is biased downward. Such a bias is rather 
unlikely for MedianNetProfitMargin, because indirectly the competition by private firms also 
affects the profitability of the (public) sample firms. Therefore, I am going to use MedianNet-
ProfitMargin in the multivariate analysis as proxy for competitive situation, rather than Her-
findahl and #Firms, but I report if there are any important differences. 
HomogeneousIndustry, HeterogeneousIndustry, and MixedIndustry are dummy variables in-
dicating that firm sizes in an industry are relatively homogeneous, heterogeneous or in be-
tween. I adopt the terms used by Gorton et al., who call these three different types of industry: 
homogenous, heterogeneous and mixed firm size industry. They categorize industries depend-
ing on the fact which firms (ranked by size) could create a new industry leader by merging. A 
homogeneous firm size industry, for example, is defined as an industry where the merger of 
the two smallest firms would create a new industry leader. However, this definition has the 
draw back that empirically almost no industry is classified as homogeneous. Therefore, I re-
sort to a different classification scheme based on the empirical industrial organization litera-
ture, which has analyzed firm size distributions quiet extensively (see Sutton, 1997). Since the 
industrial organization literature is more concerned with the evolution of firm size distribu-
tions over time, there is only limited guidance how precisely to classify different industries 
according to their firm size distribution. However, the literature provides insights on which 
measures are important to describe firm size distributions. Two commonly used moments of 
firm size distribution are standard deviation and skewness (see Dinlersoz and MacDonald, 
2009; Cabral and Mata, 2003). Therefore, I measure firm size heterogeneity by the variance 
and the skewness of (single segment) firms' and subsidiaries' total assets scaled by the assets 
of the largest firm or subsidiary in the respective industry. Industries are ranked according to 
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their variance and skewness of scaled total assets separately and then an equally weighted 
index of both rankings is calculated. This ranking is done for each sample year. Industries 
with a large variance and a large skewness of scaled total assets are relatively heterogeneous 
and will have the highest index values. Therefore, industries in the upper index tercile are 
classified as HeterogeneousIndustry and industries in the lower tercile as HomogeneousIndus-
try. Industries in the middle index tercile are classified as MixedIndustry. As noted above this 
classification is different from the one used by Gorton et al. in their theoretical model, which 
means that I will not be able to reject their theory based on this analysis. However, the pur-
pose of this chapter is not to exactly test a relatively stylized model of defensive acquisitions 
but to understand better whether defensive acquisitions exist and how they are characterized. 
To distinguish the effects of different managerial motivations for an acquisition I categorize 
the sample into three groups: (1) Defensive transactions undertaken by quiet-life managers, 
(2) Acquisitions undertaken by empire-building managers, (3) all other (potentially efficient) 
acquisitions. The three types are separated based on the historical acquisition activity of the 
firms and their industry. The QuietLifeDummy identifying defensive acquisitions of quiet-life 
managers equals one if: (1) the acquirer has been relatively inactive in the market for corpo-
rate control, AcqVolume and #Deals are in the lowest tercile of all sample firms over the two 
years preceding the respective bid; (2) acquisition activity in the bidder's industry was rela-
tively high, AcqVolumeIndustry or #DealsIndustry is in the highest tercile of all industry-
years during the last and the current calendar year; (3) the target operates in the same primary 
three-digit SIC industry as the bidder. About 5% of all acquisitions in the sample are classi-
fied as defensive transactions by quiet-life managers. The EmpireBuildingDummy identifies 
transactions of empire-building managers and equals one if the acquirer has been relatively 
active in the market for corporate control, AcqVolume or #Deals are in the highest tercile of 
all sample firms over the two years preceding the respective bid. In this case, the target's in-
dustry and the acquisition activity in the acquirer's industry are not taken into account, be-
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cause it is likely that empire-building managers also undertake acquisitions outside their pri-
mary industry and during periods of less merger activity. About one third of all acquisitions in 
the sample are classified as empire-building transactions. I assign the remaining acquisitions 
to the third group “other acquisitions”. 
Insert Table 4.3 here 
Acquirer and target returns are estimated as abnormal log returns using standard event study 
methods (see Brown and Warner, 1985). Abnormal returns are calculated over a 3-day event 
window (-1, 1) using market model benchmark returns.117 Broad value-weighted country indi-
ces provided by Datastream are used as market return. The market model parameters are esti-
mated over a 200-day estimation period (-240, -41). The remaining variables not defined yet, 
will be explained in more detail when I use them in the analysis. 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Probability of being acquired and firm size 
The first part of the empirical analysis employs the hazards regression model proposed by 
Cox (1972) to answer the question whether increased firm size can indeed act as takeover 
protection. Takeover data can be interpreted as failure time data, when we assume that all 
firms are at risk to be taken over and the survival time until takeover is observed. I construct 
such a data set by identifying all firms on the SDC database where the majority of shares out-
standing were acquired and matching these observations with the Worldscope database. The 
year of the takeover is defined as the time of failure. The resulting sample consists of firm-
year observations with two types of firms. For one set of firms the year of failure is observed 
within the sample period until 2006 but for the other set of firms it is not observed because 
these firms still existed at that point in time. Therefore, a right censoring problem is present, 
which cannot be treated properly in standard logit or probit models. Those models would con-
                                                 
117  As robustness check also the 11-day event window (-5, 5) is used. Results (not tabulated) are consistent for 
both event windows. 
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sider firms that are not taken over until the end of the sample period as non-targets.118 There-
fore, estimation outcomes crucially depend on the end point of the study. The Cox model 
treats these firms as not taken over yet, which means that for these firms the variable takeover 
year is correctly specified as right-censored at the end year of the study. Therefore, the de-
pendent variable in this case is duration (from entering the sample until takeover) and not just 
a dummy variable, which distinguishes targets and non-targets. Closely related to the right 
censoring problem of the takeover year is left truncation, which means that not all firms enter 
the sample at the same time. The problem of delayed entry is present in this study because 
accounting databases such as Worldscope add firms at different points in time. This happens 
either because they expand the universe of firms covered only stepwise or because over time 
firms newly founded or listed are added to the database. The Cox model also accommodates 
left truncation. Another advantage of the Cox model is that it allows including time-varying 
covariates. This is crucial because most firm and industry data change annually and it is likely 
that the hazard for takeover depends more on recent values of the covariates than on values at 
the beginning of the sample.119 
The prior literature on predicting takeover targets has already identified a number of variables 
affecting the likelihood to become a target. Palepu (1986) finds that smaller firms, less effi-
cient firms, firms with low growth but large financial resources and firms with high growth 
but low financial resources are likely takeover targets. Hasbrouck (1985) observes a negative 
influence of size and market-to-book ratio on the takeover probability. Trimbath, Frydman, 
and Frydman (2001) also find that smaller and more inefficient firms face a greater risk of 
takeover. Due to these results, I control for a number of firm characteristics when testing 
Hypothesis 1, which says that the risk of takeover is decreasing in firm size. Besides firm 
                                                 
118  Shumway (2001) was the first, who proposed to use a hazard model to avoid the deficiencies of standard 
logit and probit models in the related context of bankruptcies. 
119  See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), chapter 4, or Cameron and Trivedi (2005), chapter 17, for a thorough 
statistical discussion of the Cox model. A more applied discussion of the Cox model can be found in Hos-
mer, Lemeshow, and May (2008). Trimbath, Frydman, and Frydman (2001) discuss the econometric issues 
of the Cox model important to the context of takeovers. 
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characteristics, I also include a few industry level variables, which proxy for the competitive 
situation and the merger activity in the firm’s major industry. In total, there are 210,224 firm-
year observations of 24,563 sample firms (Number of subjects) and 9,004 takeovers (Number 
of failures). 
Insert Table 4.4 here 
The results in Table 4.4 clearly show that the risk of a takeover is significantly lower for lar-
ger firms. Across six different measures for size, including sales, assets, and market capitali-
zation this finding persists. The effect is not only statistically but also economically signifi-
cant. The coefficients on Large and Small in model (1) imply, for example, that firms with a 
market capitalization in the highest quartile (Large=1) of their three-digit SIC industry have 
an 18% lower probability of being taken over than the firms in the two middle quartiles. In 
contrast firms in the lowest quartile (Small =1) have a 10% higher chance of becoming a tar-
get than firms in the two middle quartiles. These results strongly support Hypothesis 1 and I 
conclude that firm size indeed can act as a takeover defense. However, not only firm size has 
a negative impact on the risk of takeover, also firm age (FirmAge), recent acquisition activity 
(Log#Deals), and higher profitability (NetProfitMargin) of the firm reduce the likelihood of 
being acquired.120 Log#Deals is the natural logarithm of the number of acquisitions (plus one) 
undertaken by the firm over the last two years. The result supports the notion that own (poten-
tially defensive) acquisitions can prevent a possible takeover in the future. The effect is also 
economically quite large: a one standard deviation increase in Log#Deals decreases the prob-
ability of a takeover by about 25%. The negative effect of firm age on the likelihood to be-
come a target is consistent with the widespread belief that old corporations usually do not 
disappear. Firm age is also a measure of unobserved firm characteristics, which influenced its 
prior survival and predict its survival in the future. More profitable firms (measured by Net-
ProfitMargin) are also less like to be taken over; however, the economic effect is rather small. 
                                                 
120  Comparable results (not tabulated) are obtained when using LogAcqVolume instead of Log#Deals. 
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In line with the results of Palepu (1986), I find that firms with financial resource constraints 
or high growth potential are more likely to be taken over. Leverage (Leverage) defined as 
total debt over total debt plus common equity and liquidity (PercentCash) defined as cash 
plus short-term investments over total assets are used as proxies for financial resource avail-
ability. Growth potential is proxied by research and development expenses over total asset 
(R&D).121 Firms with higher leverage are significantly more likely to be taken over, whereas 
the coefficient for PercentCash has the expected negative sign but is insignificant. Firms with 
high R&D expenditures are significantly more likely to become a target. Both results together 
imply that in particular firms with high growth potential but small financial recourses have a 
higher probability to be acquired. These are possibly smaller and younger firms, which are 
acquired by older and larger firms to augment their product portfolio. The coefficients of 
market-to-book ratio and capital expenditures (CapEx) are insignificant. 
Besides firm specific factors, industry characteristics also have an influence on the risk of 
takeover. I focus here on industry rather than country characteristics, because as neoclassical 
merger theories and also the model of Gorton et al. predict, merger waves mostly cluster by 
industry (see, for example, Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). In times of high takeover activity in 
an industry (Log#DealsIndustry), the probability of becoming a target increases as well.122 
Moreover, it seems that firms from homogeneous and heterogeneous firm size industries have 
a lower risk to become a target, however, only the coefficient of HomogeneousIndustry is 
significant. This result is in line with the prediction of Gorton et al. that most merger waves 
should be expected in mixed firm size industries, because in these industries inefficient (de-
fensive) as well as efficient merger waves should occur. The competitive situation in an in-
dustry also affects the likelihood of takeover. Firms in less competitive industries (with higher 
                                                 
121  Since research and development expenses often need not to be reported, I set this item equal to zero if it is 
missing. 
122  Comparable results (not tabulated) are obtained when using LogAcqVolumeIndustry instead of 
Log#DealsIndustry. 
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net profit margins) have a higher likelihood to become a target. However, the coefficient of 
MediumNetProfitMargin is in most of the models only marginally significant. 
4.2 Profitability of acquisitions 
The second part of the empirical analysis relates industry characteristics to the profitability of 
acquisitions. Therefore, the dependent variable in Table 4.5 is the three-day cumulated ab-
normal acquirer announcement return (AcquirerCAR). There is a large body of literature, 
which analyzes acquirer announcement returns and links them to a number of deal, firm and 
industry characteristics (see, for example, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). I include 
all standard control variables and the industry structure variables needed to test the prediction 
of Hypothesis 2 that acquirer announcement returns are lower for homogeneous industries 
than for heterogeneous industries, because the latter should exhibit fewer defensive transac-
tions. Additionally I also test Hypothesis 3, which states that (1) acquirer returns of large 
firms are smaller because they are more likely to undertake defensive acquisitions and (2) 
acquirer returns are smaller for large targets because they offer a higher defensive value for 
the acquirer. By splitting the sample into four size quartiles, I can analyze the profitability of 
acquisitions undertaken by small, medium and large firms separately (models (4) to (7)). The 
size quartiles are assigned to firms according to their size quartile in the prior year in the 
complete Worldscope database. For example, in the first size quartile are all acquirers, which 
have a market capitalization less than the 25th percentile of all firms listed in the Worldscope 
database at the end of the last year. The number of observations in each size quartile shows 
that small firms undertake considerably fewer acquisitions than medium sized or large firms. 
Insert Table 4.5 here 
The results in Table 4.5 only partly support Hypothesis 2. If I only control for year and coun-
try fixed effects, the coefficient for HomogeneousIndustry is negative and significant at the 
5% level. When controlling for other industry, deal and firm characteristics the coefficient for 
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HomogeneousIndustry remains effectively unchanged but it is only statistically significant at 
the 10% level. The economic significance is rather small. On average acquirer returns are 
lower by 0.22% in homogenous than in mixed firm size industries. The difference between 
the coefficients for HomogeneousIndustry and HeterogeneousIndustry is only significantly 
different from zero for model (1), where I do not control for other industry, deal and firm 
characteristics. Therefore, I only find limited support for Hypothesis 2. This result suggests 
that defensive acquisitions do possibly cluster in homogeneous firm size industries, as pre-
dicted by Gorton et al, but that other effects, for example, empire building or hubris, which 
probably do not cluster by industry, overlay the influence of industry structure. 
I include three additional industry level variables to measure the acquisition activity in the 
acquirer’s and the target’s industry and the competitive situation in the acquirer’s industry. In 
times of high acquisition activity, measured by the number of transactions in the acquirer's 
three-digit SIC industry over the prior two years (#DealsIndustry)123 the acquirer announce-
ment returns decrease. These results are in line with Duchin and Schmidt (2007), who find 
that within merger waves acquirer announcement as well as buy and hold returns are lower 
than outside merger waves. However, their interpretation of this finding is different. They 
argue that empire-building managers try to hide their intentions by undertaking inefficient 
acquisitions inside merger waves, whereas I propose that these lower acquirer announcement 
returns are mainly caused by defensive transactions. This kind of (inefficient) acquisitions 
should be carried out mostly inside merger waves, because during these times firms are ex-
posed to a particularly strong takeover threat. In such situations, quiet-life managers are likely 
to consider acquisitions in order to secure the independence of their firms and the associated 
private benefits. In Section 4.4, I will test this hypothesis by categorizing firms according to 
their prior acquisition activity and discuss why I find other explanations less convincing.  
                                                 
123  Results are robust if one uses aggregated transaction volume (AcqVolumeIndustry) instead of number of 
transactions. 
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As measure for the acquisition activity in the target’s industry, I use the liquidity index pro-
posed by Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). The index measures the turnover of as-
sets in the target’s industry and high values imply stronger competition for these assets. 
Therefore, I expect a negative effect of LiquidityIndex on acquirer announcement returns. 
However, the coefficient is mostly positive and always statistically insignificant. It seems that 
LiquidityIndex has no explanatory power above what is already explained by #DealsIndustry, 
even though the correlation between both measures is rather moderate (Pearson correlation 
coefficient: 0.4). 
Besides the acquisition activity, I also measure the influence of competition in the acquirer's 
industry. As a proxy for competitive situation the median net profit margin in the acquirer's 
three-digit SIC industry (MedianNetProfitMargin)124 is used. Giroud and Mueller (2009) 
show that competition in the product market mitigates managerial agency problems. There-
fore, I expect lower acquirer announcement returns in less competitive industries. Consistent 
with this hypothesis a negative coefficient for MedianNetProfitMargin is estimated. Indeed, it 
seems that managers in non-competitive industries undertake more shareholder value destroy-
ing acquisitions. However, the effect is economically small and not statistically significant in 
all size quartiles. The coefficients for the complete sample, models (2) and (3), imply that an 
increase of MedianNetProfitMargin by one standard deviation decreases acquirer announce-
ment returns by about 13 basis points. Results are comparable if I use the Herfindahl index or 
the number of firms in the industry (#Firms) as proxies for the competitive situation (not re-
ported), however, significance levels are generally lower.125 It seems that product market 
competition has a positive but relatively small influence on acquirer announcement returns. 
                                                 
124  The industrial organization literature uses the industry net profit margin commonly as an empirical proxy 
for the Lerner Index. The intuition is that monopolists and oligopolists can set prices in excess of marginal 
costs, which yields higher margins. 
125  The Herfindahl index is likely to be biased in my sample because it is based solely on data from World-
scope, which contains mostly public firms. Therefore, the Herfindahl index is overestimated for industries 
with a large number of private firms, since the market share of these firms is ignored. The median net profit 
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As predicted by Hypothesis 3 I find that large firms tend to undertake fewer profitable acqui-
sitions than small firms. Announcement returns for large acquirer are about 0.5 percentage 
points smaller than for medium sized acquirer and about 1.5 percentage points smaller than 
for small acquirer (see model (2)). Coherent with this result the coefficient for LogEquity-
Market implies that an increase of LogEquityMarket by one standard deviation decreases ac-
quirer announcement returns by about 0.5 percentage points.  
The second prediction of Hypothesis 3 that the relative size of the target and acquirer has a 
negative effect on abnormal returns does not seem to hold given the significantly positive 
coefficients for RelativeSize in model (2) and (3). However, when splitting the sample into 
size quartiles (models (4) to (7)) I find a significantly positive effect of RelativeSize for small 
and medium sized acquirers but a significantly negative effect for large acquirers. Together 
with the first result that large firms undertake acquisitions, which are less profitable, I inter-
pret this finding as evidence that only firms of a certain size are able to undertake defensive 
transactions and that the defensive value of the acquisition increases with target size. In other 
words, managers of larger firms seem to be willing to pay inefficiently high premia and this 
willingness increases with the size of the target, because the acquisition of a larger target of-
fers better protection from future takeover attempts. Since large firms are more likely to pay 
excessive premia, especially for relatively large targets, we observe lower average announce-
ment returns for this group of firms. Already Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find a 
significantly negative effect of firm size on acquirer announcement returns and that the effect 
of relative size of target and acquirer depends on the size of the acquirer (for small firms posi-
tive, for large firms negative).126 Moeller et al. do not find a clear explanation for the negative 
size effect but suggest that maybe managers of large firms are more frequently prone to hu-
                                                                                                                                                        
margin should be less affected from this problem, since the median profitability of firms in the sample is in-
fluenced by all firms in the industry independent of their inclusion in the Worldscope database. 
126  The latter observation could explain why prior studies have found different results for the relative size coef-
ficient. For instance, Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) find a positive relationship but in Travlos (1987) 
it is (insignificantly) negative. 
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bris. Another possible explanation could be that empire-building managers in large firms with 
substantial free cash flows and few investment opportunities prefer to undertake acquisitions 
instead of paying out the excess cash flow to shareholders. If this hypothesis would be true, 
one should expect large firms to hold more excess cash. However, Moeller et al. do not find 
evidence that larger firms hold more excess cash than smaller firms. 
The other results from these regressions are mostly in line with the prior literature (see, for 
example, Fuller, Netter, and Schlingemann, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). I 
find that acquisitions of public targets yield significantly lower abnormal acquirer returns 
whereas tender offers lead to significantly higher acquirer returns. These results hold for most 
specifications. Pure equity as well as pure cash acquisitions have lower abnormal returns; 
however, the respective coefficients are in most specifications insignificant. The other deal 
and firm specific control variables are almost always insignificant. 
4.3 Acquisition activity and firm size 
Based on the model of Gorton et al. Hypothesis 4 predicts that medium sized firms undertake 
more acquisitions than large and small firms, because medium sized firms undertake ineffi-
cient (defensive) as well as efficient acquisitions. Table 4.6 shows how the average number of 
acquisitions and the average total acquisition volume per year and firm differs between firm 
size deciles. Firms are assigned to firm size deciles according to their market value of equity 
decile at the end of the last year in the complete Worldscope database. For example, firms in 
the largest firm size decile 10 have a market value of equity above the 90th percentile of all 
firms listed in Worldscope at the end of the last year. An analysis of firm size and acquisition 
activity could become severely biased if the likelihood of a deal to be included in the SDC 
database is increased by the size of the acquirer or target. Such a selection bias of the SDC 
database would induce a positive correlation between firm size and the measures of acquisi-
tion activity. Since the SDC database is highly incomplete and skewed towards larger acquir-
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ers and targets for the years preceding 1990, I exclude observations before 1990 from the 
sample. Undoubtedly, the quality of SDC's coverage has strongly improved over time and it is 
unlikely that after the late 1990ies still a severe bias towards large acquirers and targets exists. 
Particularly, this bias should not be present for U.S. domestic transactions. As a robustness 
check, I repeat the analysis for a subsample that includes only the years 1998 to 2006, and for 
the subsample of U.S. domestic acquisitions (both not tabulated) but results remain un-
changed.  
Insert Table 4.6 here 
The results in Table 4.6 show a positive and monotonic relationship between the acquirer's 
market value of equity and both measures of acquisition activity. The differences in average 
number of acquisitions and average acquisitions volume (per year and firm) between firm size 
deciles are always positive and highly significant. This finding suggests that with increased 
firm size on average also the acquisition activity increases, which is in contrast to Hypothesis 
4. There is no support for the prediction of Gorton et al. that medium sized firms undertake 
more acquisitions than large firms. A possible explanation for this contradiction is that the 
model of Gorton et al. does not take into account any other managerial merger motives than 
survival of the firm. If, for example, large firms are more likely managed by empire-building 
managers, ceteris paribus large firms should undertake more acquisitions than small or me-
dium sized firms. Other explanations why large firms undertake more acquisitions are that (1) 
managers of large firms could be more frequently prone to hubris, (2) large firms have more 
resources and therefore face fewer obstacles in making acquisitions, and (3) large firms are 
more likely to be further along their life cycle and therefore have less internal growth oppor-
tunities and therefore rely more on external growth. 
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4.4 Defensive acquisitions and abnormal announcement returns 
As the preceding analysis shows, there is only limited support for the empirical predictions 
made by the model of Gorton et al. A possible reason for this partial failure is that their model 
focuses solely on the role of industry structure and firm size leading to testable hypotheses, 
which can identify the impact of defensive acquisitions only imprecisely. Like Gorton et al. I 
also build on the assumptions that increased firm size reduces the probability of being ac-
quired by another firm and that managers value private benefits of control. However, I pro-
pose an alternative identification strategy to test the hypothesis that managers are willing to 
undertake unprofitable defensive acquisitions to secure private benefits of control. As I estab-
lished in the hypothesis discussion above there seem to exist managers, who are prone to em-
pire building and other managers, who prefer the quite life. The fact that empire-building and 
quiet-life managers should exhibit very different behavior with respect to acquisitions opens 
the possibility to test the hypothesis that defensive, shareholder value destroying, acquisitions 
indeed exist. The four crucial assumptions to distinguish firms run by either type of managers 
are that (1) quiet-life managers only become active in the market for corporate control if there 
is an immediate takeover threat, but mostly abstain from acquisitions otherwise. (2) While 
empire-building managers undertake acquisitions frequently and independent of an immediate 
takeover threat. (3) Empire-building managers undertake conglomerate as well as non-
conglomerate acquisitions, (4) whereas quiet-life managers focus on acquisitions within their 
industry. Assumptions (1) and (4) are consistent with the behavior described by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and assumption (3) follows naturally from the definition of empire-
builders as managers who like assets under management and tend to expand the boundaries of 
the firm far beyond its optimal scope. 
Assumption (2) differs from the ideas formulated by Duchin and Schmidt (2007), who sug-
gest that empire-building managers try to hide their real intentions by undertaking acquisi-
tions mostly during merger waves. The assumption made is that managers weigh the costs and 
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benefits of empire building, and only initiate acquisitions when the benefits outweigh the 
costs. According to Duchin and Schmidt career concerns (i.e., forced turnover after share-
holder value destroying acquisitions) let managers refrain from maximizing assets under man-
agement.127 Duchin and Schmidt suggest that the costs of empire building are lower during 
merger waves and therefore the number of empire building (inefficient) acquisitions is higher. 
The argument that empire-building managers are at least partially aware of fact that they de-
stroy value by pursuing their acquisition strategy and try to wait for the right moment to cam-
ouflage their actions is not implausible. However, it is not clear why this behavior should 
cause a higher proportion of transactions inside merger waves to be driven by empire building 
considerations than outside waves. By definition more acquisitions take place inside merger 
waves, therefore, an increased number of empire building transactions does not necessarily 
imply that there is a higher proportion of them. There are also good arguments for empire-
building managers to undertake acquisitions outside merger waves because there should be 
less competition for targets and therefore lower prices. In particular, if managers are aware of 
their potentially value destroying behavior, they should also be aware of the fact that targets 
are usually cheaper outside merger waves. Nonetheless, I see a clear reason for an increased 
proportion of defensive transaction initiated by quiet-life managers inside merger waves, be-
cause they face an immediate takeover threat harming their private benefits of control. 
Duchin and Schmidt try to support their idea that empire-building transactions are predomi-
nantly carried out during merger waves by the fact that corporate governance measures of 
acquiring firms are worse during than outside merger waves. This interpretation implies that 
firms with weaker corporate governance either are more frequently managed by empire build-
ers or give mangers with empire-building preferences more possibilities to pursue their 
agenda. However, given the results of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and 
                                                 
127  They also note that compensation schemes designed to better align the incentives of managers and share-
holders could curb managerial empire building behavior. 
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Mueller (2009) it is not clear that managers, who are not under direct scrutiny of shareholders, 
use their additional leeway for building empires. Instead, it seems that on average managers 
actually prefer to enjoy the quite life if shareholders and completion allow them. Therefore, 
the results of Duchin and Schmidt are in line with my hypothesis that during merger waves 
firms run by quite-life managers initiate inefficient defensive acquisitions. 
I start my analysis by a univariate comparison between the three different groups of takeover 
classified above: (1) acquisitions by firms run by quite-life managers, (2) acquisitions by 
firms managed by empire builders, and (3) other (potentially efficient) acquisitions. 
Insert Table 4.7 here 
Table 4.7 shows that defensive acquisitions by quiet-life managers and empire-building trans-
actions have significantly lower abnormal acquirer returns than other acquisitions. However, 
the average abnormal acquirer return of empire-building transactions is only negative for the 
longer event window (-5, 5). The target announcement returns are positive and between 12% 
and 13% but do not significantly differ across the three groups, which implies that the lower 
acquirer returns do not simply stem from larger takeover premiums. Empire-building firms 
are about two times larger than other acquirers, and firms undertaking defensive acquisition 
are about 50% larger than other acquirers and about 10% larger than the average firm in the 
sample (measured by EquityMarket and Assets), which implies that both types of firms are 
rather large. However, the proportion of acquirers managed by quiet-life managers in the larg-
est and smallest firm size quartile (Large and Small) does not differ significantly from other 
acquirers. Firms categorized as defensive acquirers undertake larger transactions in absolute 
(DealSize) as well as relative terms (RelativeSize), operate in industries with more rival firms 
and smaller Herfindahl index (potentially higher consolidation pressure), and the number of 
ranks the acquirer advances in its industry's size ranking (DeltaSizeRanks) is two to three 
times larger than for the two other acquirer groups. All these facts suggest that the categorized 
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transactions are indeed of defensive nature. The three groups of acquisition types also differ 
substantially in their deal characteristics. Firms run by quiet-life managers acquire signifi-
cantly more public and therefore are also more likely to make a tender offer and to pay only 
with stocks (AllEquity), which underscores the importance to control for these effects in the 
following multivariate analysis. 
Insert Table 4.8 here 
The multivariate results in Table 4.8 confirm that defensive transactions by quiet-life manag-
ers have significantly lower announcement returns before controlling for other effects. The 
abnormal return is 1.1 percentage points lower for transactions classified as defensive. Em-
pire-building acquisitions also lead to lower abnormal acquirer returns. The negative effect is 
with 0.3 percentage points much smaller but still statistically significant. After controlling for 
industry, deal and firm characteristics as well as year and country fixed effects the magnitude 
of the coefficient on the QuietLifeDummy is substantially reduced to about -0.6%, but remains 
significant. The coefficient on the EmpireBuildingDummy becomes positive in two out of 
three models but is always economically and statistically insignificant. Therefore, the results 
are consistent with Hypothesis 5: defensive acquisitions undertaken by quiet-life managers 
indeed exist and are characterized by lower announcement returns. The economic effect is 
also quite substantial, abnormal returns are lower by 0.58 to 1.2 percentage points for this 
kind of acquisition.128 The magnitude of value destruction is comparable to the results of Mal-
mendier and Tate (2008), who find in their regression analysis that acquirer returns of firms 
run by overconfident CEOs are 0.78 to 1.15 percentage points lower than for an average firm. 
At first sight the positive (but insignificant) coefficient of the EmpireBuildingDummy seems 
somewhat striking, however, there are three control variables, which also proxy for empire-
building tendencies of the management. Both the size proxy (LogEquityMarket) and the prox-
                                                 
128  The effect is somewhat larger in the domestic U.S. sample (not tabulated). 
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ies for the firm's historical acquisition activity (Log#Deals and LogAcqVolume) are linked to 
empire building and absorb the effect of the EmpireBuildingDummy. It is of course not sur-
prising that the EmpireBuildingDummy is closely related to #Deals and AcqVolume, given 
that its definition is based on both variables. Model (6) shows that after exclusion of 
LogEquityMarket, Log#Deals, and LogAcqVolume the coefficient of EmpireBuildingDummy 
is significantly negative and of similar magnitude as in the models (1) and (2).  
The significantly negative coefficients of LogEquityMarket confirm the negative size effect 
already found in Table 4.5. The measures for prior acquisition activity (Log#Deals and 
LogAcqVolume) do not have a significant influence on the acquirer announcement returns. 
Taking also into account the results for the EmpireBuildingDummy it does not seem that fre-
quent acquirers undertake acquisitions, which are significantly more or less profitable than an 
average acquisition after controlling for firm size. Therefore, I cannot conclude that the main 
motive of frequent acquirers is inefficient empire building. However, there is also no evi-
dence, that firms that undertake many acquisitions are particularly good at identifying profit-
able acquisition opportunities. One possible explanation is that both effects are roughly equal 
and therefore cancel each other out. However, it is also not unlikely that the market already 
anticipates future transactions of firms that made many acquisitions in the past and therefore 
the abnormal returns at the announcement are attenuated. 
The coefficients for industry level variables are comparable to the results in Table 4.5. Ac-
quirers from homogenous firm size industries have lower announcement returns than acquir-
ers from mixed firm size industries, but the statistical and economic significance in rather 
marginal. Their returns are not significantly different from firms active in heterogeneous firm 
size industries. Acquirer returns are also lower when acquisition activity in the acquirer’s in-
dustry is rather high, if Log#DealsIndustry or LogAcqVolumeIndustry increase by one stan-
dard deviation the acquirer returns are reduced by approximately 0.4 percentage points. Re-
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duced product market competition (measured by MedianNetProfitMargin) has again a signifi-
cantly negative but quite small influence on acquirer returns. The results for the other control 
variables are in line with the ones obtained from Table 4.5 and are already discussed above.  
5 Conclusions 
This chapter analyses the influence of industry and firm characteristics on the profitability and 
likelihood of mergers and acquisitions. I find that firm size is, as hypothesized by Gorton et 
al. (2005), an important takeover defense. Therefore, it is plausible that self-interested manag-
ers make use of this defense by undertaking value destroying defensive acquisitions. How-
ever, in contrast to the predictions of Gorton et al.’s model I cannot find empirically a strong 
impact of the firm size distribution in an industry on the profitability of acquisitions. In addi-
tion, the predictions about merger activity across firms do not seem to hold. These results lead 
to the conclusion that defensive transactions most likely do not cluster by industry structure 
(distribution of firm sizes in an industries). Nonetheless, this result does not mean that defen-
sive transactions are generally not undertaken. I suggest a different identification strategy of 
defensive acquisitions based on firm and industry characteristics. I propose that the group of 
managers most prone to defensive acquisitions is quiet-life managers, who are not interested 
in maximizing assets under their management, but care sufficiently enough about the private 
benefits from managing an independent firm. The self-interest to keep their private benefits 
and the possibility to avoid becoming a target by increasing firm size leads those managers to 
undertake defensive transactions. I find strong evidence that firms that were not active in the 
market for corporate control before undertake acquisitions if the recent merger activity in their 
industry is high. I also show that these acquisitions destroy value. Based on these results I 
conclude that besides the well-known empire-building and overconfident managers a third 




Table 4.1: Sample design 
This table displays how our sample is constructed from raw Thomson Financial SDC Platinum (SDC) data to the 
final sample. I include all corporate control transactions listed in the SDC database from January 1, 1973 to De-
cember 31, 2006 in the initial data set. I report the losses of observations because of consistency checks, missing 
information, and sample selection criteria. 
 Transactions lost 
Transactions left 
after this step 
All corporate control transactions listed in the Thomson Financial 
SDC database from January 1, 1973 to December 31, 2006  567,080 
- transactions where either the acquirer or its parent has an identical 
SEDOL number to either the target or its parent, or all SEDOL 
numbers are missing 
-387,001 180,079 
- transactions not completed or less than 50% of shares outstanding 
acquired -75,267 104,812 
- insufficient data for event window or estimation period for ac-
quirer company -48,647 56,165 
- acquirer or target active in an industry with SIC code between 
8000 and 9999 -4,891 51,274 
- no match with Worldscope possible -389 50,885 
- transactions before January 1, 1981 -42 50,843 
- deal value relative to the market value of the acquirer is smaller 
than 1% -29,865 20,978 
All observations in the sample  20,978 
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Table 4.2: Definitions of variables used in this chapter 
This table defines all variables used in this chapter. Data on mergers and acquisitions are taken from Thomson 
Financial’s SDC Platinum (SDC), accounting data from Worldscope (WS), market data from Datastream (DS). 
The numbers in brackets refer to Worldscope items, taken from the Worldscope Data Definition Guide. 
Variable Description Source
#Deals Accumulated number of deals completed by the firm in the two years prior to 
the acquisition 
SDC 
#DealsIndustry Accumulated number of deals completed in the acquirer’s major three-digit 
SIC industry in the two years prior to the acquisition 
SDC 
#Firms number of active firms and subsidiaries in the acquirer's major three-digit  
SIC industry 
WS 
AcqVolume Accumulated value of mergers (measured by deal value) completed by the 




Accumulated value of mergers (measured by deal value) completed in the 
acquirer’s major three-digit SIC industry in the two years prior to the acquisi-
tion (in million 2000 U.S. $) 
SDC 
AllCash = 1 if only cash is used to pay for the acquisition SDC 
AllEquity = 1 if only equity is used to pay for the acquisition SDC 
Assets Total assets [07230] at the end of the last calendar year (in million 2000 
U.S.$) 
WS 
CapEx = capital expenditures [04601] / total assets [02999]  
Competed = 1 there is more than one bidder SDC 
Conglomerate = 1 if the target has a different two-digit SIC code than the acquirer SDC 
DealSize Is the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and 
expenses (in million 2000 U.S. $) 
SDC 
DeltaSizeRank Difference between the rank of the acquirer before the transaction and the 
estimated rank of the merged firm (measured by EquityMarket), only calcu-





= 1 if #Deals & AcqVolume are in the upper tercile of the acquirer's three-
digit SIC industry in the preceding and the current year 
SDC 
EquityMarket Market value of equity [07210] at the end of the last calendar year (in million 
2000 U.S. $) 
WS 
FirmAge = year – founding year [18272] WS 
Herfindahl Herfindahl index (sum of squared market shares measured in sales) in the 




= 1 if the equally weighted index of skewness and variance of total assets 
across all (single segment) firms and subsidiaries in the acquirer's major three-




= 1 if the equally weighted index of skewness and variance of total assets 
across all (single segment) firms and subsidiaries in the acquirer's major three-
digit SIC industry is in the lower tercile of all three-digit SIC industries 
WS 
Hostile = 1 if the acquisition is hostile SDC 
Large = 1 if the acquirer has a market capitalization equal to or greater than the mar-
ket capitalization of the 75th percentile of firms listed in WS in the same year 
and three-digit SIC industry 
WS 
Leverage = total debt [03255] / (total debt + common equity [03501]) WS 
LiquidityIndex Value of all corporate control transactions for one million U.S. $ or more 
reported by SDC for each year and target's three-digit SIC industry divided  
by the total book value of assets of all WS firms in the same three-digit SIC 






MarketToBook Acquirer's market value of equity [07210] divided by the book value of  




Median net profit margin defined as operating income over sales across all 
(single segment) firms and subsidiaries in the acquirer's major three-digit SIC 
industry 
WS 
MixedIndustry = 1 if the equally weighted index of skewness and variance of total assets 
across all (single segment) firms and subsidiaries in the acquirer's major three-
digit SIC industry is in the middle tercile of all three-digit SIC industries 
WS 
MultiSegment = 1 if acquirer is active in more than one three-digit SIC industry WS 
NetProfitMargin = operating income [01250] / net sales or revenues [01001]  
PercentCash = cash & short term investments [02001] / total assets [02999]  
Private = 1 if the target is a private firm SDC 
Public = 1 if the target is a public firm SDC 
QuietLifeDummy = 1 if #Deals & AcqVolume are in the lower tercile of the acquirer's three- 
digit SIC industry in the preceding year and #DealsIndustry & AcqVolumeIn-
dustry are in the upper tercile of the acquirer's three-digit SIC industry’s his-
tory in the current year and acquirer & target operate in the same 
SDC 
R&D = R&D expenses [01201] / total assets [02999] WS 
RelativeSize = target's EquityMarket / acquirer's EquityMarket WS 





= percentile(EquityMarket) of all firms in the same country, with 100%  




= percentile(EquityMarket) of all firms in the same three-digit SIC industry, 
with 100% being the highest and 1% being the lowest percentile 
WS 
Small = 1 if acquirer have a market capitalization equal to or less than the market 
capitalization of the 25th percentile of firms listed in WS in the same year  
and three-digit SIC industry 
WS 
TenderOffer = 1 if the acquisition is a tender offer SDC 
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics 
This table displays descriptive statistics for 40 variables used in the analysis. See Table 4.2 for a definition of all 
variables. Data on mergers and acquisitions is obtained form Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum. Accounting 
data are taken from Worldscope and market data from Datastream. 
Variable N Mean Median Standard deviation 
#Deals 20978 3.7 2.0 4.4 
#DealsIndustry 20978 193.9 60.0 324.6 
#Firms 19853 422.2 222.0 537.9 
Acquirer CAR(-1, 1) 20978 0.005 0.003 0.068 
Acquirer CAR(-5, 5) 20978 0.002 0.001 0.106 
AcqVolume 20978 521.3 95.2 2,153.8 
AcqVolumeIndustry  20978 34,338.9 8,052.2 64,747.5 
AllCash 20978 0.557 1.000 0.497 
AllEquity 20978 0.171 0.000 0.377 
Assets 20978 9,159.6 814.3 48,385.1 
Competed 20978 0.138 0.000 0.345 
Conglomerate 20978 0.431 0.000 0.495 
DealSize 20978 434.0 60.0 2,553.2 
DeltaSizeRank 5141 16.9 4.0 42.3 
EmpireBuildingDummy 20978 0.330 0.000 0.470 
EquityMarket 20978 3,311.3 734.0 10,974.8 
Herfindahl 19853 0.071 0.041 0.091 
HeterogeneousIndustry 19853 0.107 0.000 0.309 
HomogeneousIndustry 19853 0.379 0.000 0.485 
Hostile 20978 0.004 0.000 0.066 
Large 20978 0.524 1.000 0.499 
LiquidityIndex 19252 0.045 0.018 0.081 
MarketToBook 20654 3.898 2.208 18.502 
MedianNetProfitMargin 19853 0.104 0.072 0.094 
MixedIndustry 19853 0.514 1.000 0.500 
Private 20978 0.416 0.000 0.493 
Public 20978 0.216 0.000 0.411 
QuietLifeDummy 20978 0.049 0.000 0.216 
RelativeSize 20978 0.239 0.083 0.700 
Small 20978 0.038 0.000 0.190 
Target CAR(-1, 1) 1773 0.126 0.109 0.183 
Target CAR(-5, 5) 1773 0.129 0.116 0.211 
TenderOffer 20978 0.069 0.000 0.253 
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Table 4.4: Firm and industry characteristics and the risk of takeover 
The table presents the results for Cox hazards regressions with duration until takeover in years as dependent 
variable. See Table 4.2 for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the 
relative hazards defined as i ihr exp( ) 1= β − , where iβ  is the estimated coefficient and, in italics, the p-value of 
the two-sided t-test. The p-values are based on robust standard errors with firm-clusters. 
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   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Large -0.1829      
 0.000      
Small 0.0962      
 0.000      
LogAssets  -0.0622     
  0.000     
LogSales   -0.0330    
   0.000    
LogEquityMarket    -0.0577   
    0.000   
SizePercentileIndustry     -0.3107  
     0.000  
SizePercentileCountry      -0.2634 
      0.000 
CapEx 0.0221 -0.0042 -0.0031 0.0318 0.0283 0.0244 
 0.659 0.905 0.968 0.482 0.540 0.622 
FirmAge -0.0097 -0.0108 -0.0099 -0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0097 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.5474 0.5659 0.5492 0.5397 0.5370 0.5398 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log#Deals -0.3748 -0.4036 -0.4007 -0.3658 -0.3728 -0.3814 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MarketToBook -0.0013 -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 0.315 0.329 0.306 0.319 0.315 0.321 
NetProfitMargin -0.0258 -0.0268 -0.0270 -0.0254 -0.0256 -0.0259 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PercentCash -0.0370 -0.0755 -0.0707 -0.0312 -0.0298 -0.0432 
 0.630 0.380 0.311 0.685 0.699 0.572 











  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HomogeneousIndustry -0.0807 -0.0803 -0.0805 -0.0796 -0.0807 -0.0798 
 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 
HeterogeneousIndustry -0.0580 -0.0542 -0.0553 -0.0578 -0.0581 -0.0579 
 0.199 0.203 0.201 0.201 0.199 0.201 
Log#DealsIndustry 0.0910 0.0903 0.0904 0.0968 0.0906 0.0954 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 













  0.076 0.059 0.061 0.033 0.077 0.043 
 Observations 210,224 210,224 210,224 210,224 210,224 210,224 
 Number of subjects 24,563 24,563 24,563 24,563 24,563 24,563 
 Number of failures 9,004 9,004 9,004 9,004 9,004 9,004 
 Pseudo R² 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 




















Table 4.5: Determinants of abnormal acquirer announcement returns 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with acquirer CAR(-1, 1) as dependent variable. See Table 4.2 for 
a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in italics, 
the p-value of the two-sided t-test for zero slope. The p-values are based on robust standard errors with firm-
clusters. Intercept is not displayed. Additionally, the significance level of the F-test for the equality of the coeffi-
cients on HomogeneousIndustry and HeterogeneousIndustry is displayed (*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance 
level, - insignificant). 
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  Size Quartiles 
  
All All All 
1 2 3 4 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
HomogeneousIndustry -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0128 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0022 
 0.037 0.053 0.064 0.228 0.893 0.555 0.095 
HeterogeneousIndustry 0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0332 -0.0073 -0.0017 -0.0001 
 0.091 0.170 0.171 0.029 0.248 0.619 0.978 
LiquidityIndex  0.0034 0.0030 -0.0457 -0.0075 0.0128 0.0078 
   0.610 0.659 0.419 0.720 0.304 0.342 
Log#DealsIndustry  -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0041 -0.0047 -0.0030 -0.0014 
  0.000 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.006 












  0.011 0.013 0.089 0.178 0.086 0.638 
Large  -0.0052      
  0.000      
Small  0.0097      
  0.000      
LogEquityMarket   -0.0028     
   0.000     










  0.331 0.472 0.013 0.277 0.927 0.642 
AllCash  -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0034 0.0002 -0.0041 0.0007 
  0.407 0.451 0.733 0.956 0.069 0.661 
AllEquity  -0.0036 -0.0037 0.0045 0.0063 -0.0134 -0.0006 
  0.028 0.023 0.719 0.246 0.000 0.747 
Competed  0.0029 0.0035 0.0304 0.0029 0.0018 0.0034 
  0.060 0.021 0.082 0.653 0.585 0.034 
Conglomerate  -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0055 -0.0021 -0.0015 0.0003 
  0.605 0.661 0.524 0.548 0.442 0.796 
Hostile  -0.0105 -0.0095  -0.0239 -0.0217 -0.0071 
  0.176 0.221  0.636 0.320 0.327 
Private  -0.0018 -0.0025 -0.0054 -0.0004 -0.0026 -0.0018 
  0.134 0.033 0.556 0.910 0.212 0.220 
Public  -0.0199 -0.0191 0.0478 -0.0325 -0.0212 -0.0177 
  0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RelativeSize  0.0032 0.0028 0.0008 0.0173 0.0003 -0.0043 
  0.000 0.000 0.586 0.000 0.880 0.010 











  0.002 0.002 0.145 0.109 0.230 0.006 
 Observations 19,853 18,940 18,940 682 2,597 5,896 9,765 
 Adj. R² 0.002 0.022 0.024 0.020 0.025 0.019 0.020 
 HomogeneousIndustry = HeterogeneousIndustry *** - - - - - - 














Table 4.6: Number and volume of acquisitions sorted by acquirer size 
This table displays the average number and volume of acquisitions per firm and year in each acquirer market 
value of equity decile. It reports the difference between deciles and difference tests based on t-tests for equality 
in means together with p-values. The sample contains all mergers and acquisitions between 1990 and 2006 as 





























1 30,662 0.062   0.3   
2 31,082 0.094 0.032 10.16 0.6 0.3 5.41 
3 31,180 0.119 0.025 6.67 1.2 0.5 5.28 
4 31,084 0.149 0.030 6.92 2.0 0.9 4.66 
5 31,012 0.185 0.035 6.72 3.2 1.2 5.02 
6 31,285 0.224 0.040 6.40 5.2 2.0 7.33 
7 31,175 0.274 0.050 7.08 9.2 4.1 9.73 
8 31,091 0.341 0.067 8.38 16.4 7.2 9.81 
9 31,169 0.406 0.065 7.10 35.9 19.5 12.43 
10 30,754 0.688 0.282 22.73 205.7 169.8 15.54 
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Table 4.7: Variable means by acquisition type 
This table displays means and the differences of means between acquisition types for 32 variables used in the 
analysis. See Table 4.2 for a definition of all variables. The difference tests are based on t-test for equality in 
means. Data on mergers and acquisitions is obtained form Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum. Accounting data 
































#Deals 0.6 7.3 2.1 -6.7 91.23 -1.5 55.17 5.2 72.29 
#DealsIndustry 337.0 208.7 174.8 128.3 9.29 162.2 11.98 33.9 7.15 
#Firms 679.3 403.5 411.5 275.8 13.03 267.8 12.85 -8.0 1.01 
Acquirer CAR(-1, 1) -0.005 0.004 0.007 -0.008 2.97 -0.011 4.02 -0.003 3.11 
Acquirer CAR(-5, 5) -0.008 -0.001 0.004 -0.007 1.66 -0.011 2.81 -0.005 3.05 
AcqVolume 108 1,133 229 -1,026 23.63 -122 5.68 904 22.23 
AcqVolumeIndustry  77,842 38,166 28,890 39,676 13.77 48,952 17.38 9,276 9.69 
AllCash 0.332 0.590 0.556 -0.258 16.29 -0.225 14.65 0.034 4.58 
AllEquity 0.316 0.158 0.166 0.158 10.40 0.150 10.05 -0.008 1.50 
Assets 10,458 13,543 6,733 -3,085 1.46 3,725 1.86 6,810 8.36 
Competed 0.126 0.155 0.129 -0.029 2.60 -0.003 0.32 0.026 4.90 
Conglomerate 0.000 0.440 0.460 -0.440 73.76 -0.460 105.31 -0.019 2.60 
DealSize 1,192 457 362 736 4.85 830 5.59 94 2.39 
DeltaSizeRank 30.0 11.8 17.5 18.2 7.25 12.5 4.89 -5.7 5.24 
EquityMarket 3,649 4,559 2,623 -910 2.22 1,027 2.63 1,937 11.09 
Herfindahl 0.046 0.067 0.075 -0.021 8.32 -0.030 12.24 -0.009 6.46 
HeterogeneousIndustry 0.044 0.110 0.110 -0.066 8.77 -0.067 9.38 0.000 0.06 
HomogeneousIndustry 0.350 0.420 0.359 -0.069 4.23 -0.009 0.57 0.060 8.08 
Hostile 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 1.26 0.001 0.29 -0.002 2.69 
Large 0.459 0.656 0.459 -0.197 11.89 0.000 0.01 0.197 27.41 
LiquidityIndex 0.071 0.048 0.041 0.023 7.27 0.030 9.88 0.007 5.42 
MarketToBook 6.120 3.931 3.707 2.189 1.17 2.413 1.29 0.224 1.15 
MedianNetProfitMargin 0.101 0.119 0.095 -0.018 6.15 0.006 2.03 0.024 16.06 
MixedIndustry 0.606 0.470 0.530 0.136 8.10 0.076 4.66 -0.060 7.87 
Private 0.251 0.426 0.423 -0.175 11.85 -0.172 12.12 0.003 0.42 
Public 0.542 0.146 0.228 0.397 24.59 0.315 19.69 -0.082 14.60 
RelativeSize 0.452 0.187 0.251 0.265 12.18 0.201 9.54 -0.064 6.21 
Small 0.056 0.012 0.049 0.043 5.93 0.006 0.83 -0.037 15.96 
Target CAR(-1, 1) 0.126 0.121 0.127 0.005 0.33 -0.001 0.07 -0.006 0.44 
Target CAR(-5, 5) 0.129 0.130 0.129 -0.001 0.07 0.000 0.01 0.001 0.07 
Tender 0.139 0.044 0.076 0.095 8.55 0.062 5.63 -0.032 9.59 
Observations 1025 6914 13039       
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Table 4.8: Announcement returns and defensive acquisitions 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with acquirer CAR(-1, 1) as dependent variable. See Table 4.2 for 
a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in italics, 
the p-value of the two-sided t-test. The p-values are based on robust standard errors with firm-clusters. Intercept 
is not displayed. 
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   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EmpireBuildingDummy -0.0029 -0.0028 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0030 
 0.004 0.008 0.660 0.608 0.896 0.007 
QuietLifeDummy -0.0113 -0.0120 -0.0066 -0.0059 -0.0064 -0.0058 
 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.047 0.031 0.050 
Log#Deals   -0.0014  -0.0019  
   0.218  0.131  
LogAcqVolume    0.00004 0.00028  
    0.913 0.462  
LogEquityMarket   -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0028  
   0.000 0.000 0.000  











     0.437 0.400 0.432 0.234 
HomogeneousIndustry   -0.0021 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0025 
   0.059 0.195 0.075 0.025 
HeterogeneousIndustry   -0.0024 -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0025 
   0.169 0.320 0.158 0.157 
LiquidityIndex   0.0032 -0.0009 0.0023 0.0036 
   0.690 0.909 0.778 0.654 
Log#DealsIndustry   -0.0024  -0.0018 -0.0023 
   0.000  0.017 0.000 
LogAcqVolumeIndustry    -0.0012 -0.0004  
    0.000 0.238  













     0.007 0.026 0.012 0.003 
AllCash   -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0014 
   0.441 0.411 0.426 0.284 
AllEquity   -0.0037 -0.0040 -0.0037 -0.0038 
   0.065 0.048 0.063 0.058 
Competed   0.0035 0.0037 0.0035 0.0022 
   0.039 0.028 0.037 0.183 
Conglomerate   -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0008 
   0.376 0.360 0.354 0.435 
Hostile   -0.0097 -0.0095 -0.0097 -0.0114 
   0.115 0.124 0.116 0.071 
Private   -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0010 
   0.030 0.014 0.027 0.380 
Public   -0.0189 -0.0188 -0.0188 -0.0209 
   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RelativeSize   0.0029 0.0030 0.0029 0.0042 
   0.070 0.056 0.068 0.010 











     0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 Observations 20,978 20,978 18,940 18,940 18,940 18,940 
 Adj. R² 0.001 0.003 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.020 












5 Stealth Trading by Corporate Insiders 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we investigate stealth trading by corporate insiders.129 Stealth trading is the 
strategy to break up trades into sequences of smaller trades in order to reduce their impact on 
market prices (Barclay and Warner, 1993). As a result, there is a non-monotonicity between 
trade size and price impact: Small trades have no price impact, but they do not generate sig-
nificant trading profits and are therefore unattractive. Large trades reveal more of the trader’s 
information. Therefore, they have a larger price impact, which makes them less profitable. 
Supposedly, medium-sized trades then provide an optimal trade-off between the desired scale 
of the transaction and the objective to conceal information and they are therefore the strategy 
of choice. Barclay and Warner (1993) and the subsequent literature have documented this 
non-monotonicity for stock and option markets by investigating the informativeness of trades 
of different sizes.130 However, this non-monotonicity provides only indirect evidence of 
stealth trading.131 In this chapter, we provide direct evidence by investigating a class of trad-
ers for whom we can directly identify all their trades: the officers and directors of companies. 
We investigate how much and under what circumstances company insiders split their trades 
                                                 
129  This chapter is based on joint work with Ernst Maug, therefore I retain the personal pronoun “we”, used in 
the original paper, throughout this chapter. All figures and tables are gathered at the end of the chapter. We 
thank Bohui Zhang for sharing the TAQTIC data with us. We are grateful to Piers Trepper and seminar par-
ticipants at the conference of the TR/SFB 15 in Caputh for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge 
financial support of the collaborative research centers SFB 504 “Rationality Concepts, Decision Making 
and Economic Modeling” and TR/SFB 15 “Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems” at the 
University of Mannheim and the Rudolf von Bennigsen-Foerder foundation for financial support. 
130  Chakravarty (2001), Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004), and Anand and Chakravarty (2007). 
131  Chakravarty (2001) identifies the class of traders (institutional or individual) from the account type in the 
clearing records, but his data cannot identify individual traders. 
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by looking at sequences of repeated trades in the same direction.132 We analyze is the profit-
ability of stealth trading and how it differs from non-stealth trading where trades are not split. 
The issue of stealth trading is especially important for corporate insiders, because these trad-
ers gain their information by virtue of their relationship with the company. Their trading be-
havior is therefore of independent interest and the subject of a separate and large literature.133 
Regulators in most countries have outlawed informed insider trading and have tightened regu-
lations and reporting requirements considerably over the last one or two decades (Bhatta-
charya and Daouk, 2002). We are interested in the extent to which regulation affects stealth 
trading and whether stealth trading allows insiders to gain additional advantages from their 
informational position. 
In our analysis, we first show that stealth trading of insiders exists and that it is pervasive. 
Then we formulate two hypotheses based on the fact that the stock price change caused by a 
trade consists of two components. First, a transitory component, which compensates the mar-
ket maker (or other intermediary) for providing liquidity and second, a permanent component 
reflecting the new information revealed by the trade (Barclay and Warner, 1993). Since both 
components increase with transaction size, an insider can increase her trading profit by split-
ting her transactions into pieces and spread them over time, whether or not she trades on pri-
vate information. 
The information-content hypothesis assumes that insiders are informed traders and that stealth 
trading allows them to use their private information more profitably. Barclay and Warner 
(1993) argue, based on Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), that informed traders 
have an incentive to spread their information over time in order to have their trades matched 
                                                 
132  We use the term “insider trading,” “insiders,” and related formulations exclusively in order to refer to legal 
trades as reported to the regulator by persons who are classified as insiders by applicable insider trading 
laws. The term “directors’ dealings” as used in the U.K. is arguably more precise (see Fidrmuc, Goergen, 
and Renneboog, 2006), but their definition is not quite applicable to the U.S. context. 
133  This is a large literature to which we cannot do any justice in this article. Bainbridge (1999) is a good sur-
vey. The earliest contributions we could trace are Rogoff (1964), Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Pratt and 
DeVere (1970), Scholes (1972), Jaffe (1974), and Finnerty (1976). 
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with those of more liquidity traders. If their information is long-lived, then they have an in-
centive to spread it over the entire period of time before this information becomes public. In-
siders have to resolve one additional trade-off compared to other informed traders, because 
insiders have to disclose their trades to a regulator and can therefore not keep their informa-
tion private indefinitely. Disclosure requirements limit the period over which they can use-
fully spread their trades. The information-content hypothesis implies that insiders split their 
trades when they have more information or when the information asymmetry between insiders 
and other investors is larger. Also, from this perspective stealth trading should be used more 
by those insiders who have more access to private information in the company. 
By contrast, the price-impact hypothesis considers insiders simply as large traders who use 
stealth trading in order to reduce the price impact of their trades. According to this view, in-
siders are in principle no different from any other trader, except that they seem to trade larger 
stakes than other investors. In an anonymous and finitely liquid market, large trades will have 
an impact on market prices even if trades are not caused by private information. The price-
impact hypothesis therefore postulates that insiders use stealth trading in illiquid markets and 
whenever they are on the short side of the market and trading becomes more difficult. 
Both hypotheses are not mutually exclusive because any transaction based on private informa-
tion of course also has a transitory price impact and transactions not based on private informa-
tion still reveal some new information and hence have a permanent component as well. Since 
we cannot directly measure both components of the price impact, we will develop below six 
testable sub-hypotheses. Therefore, we understand the information-content and price-impact 
hypotheses more as systematization to facilitate the discussion of the sub-hypotheses. 
When analyzing the factors that influence the probability of stealth trading, we find that 
stealth trades in aggregate (i.e., the sum over all trades of the whole sequence of trades) are 
much larger than non-stealth trades. Stealth trading is more frequent if many insiders trade at 
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the same time in the same direction and when insiders are on the short side of the market. Ad-
ditionally, stealth trading is more prevalent in opaque and less liquid firms. Controlling for 
other factors, stealth trading occurs more for purchases than for sales. The group of insiders 
using stealth trading most frequently is non-management insiders followed by the chairmen of 
the board and CEOs. Overall, we interpret these findings as more supportive for the price-
impact than for the information-content hypothesis. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley-Act (SOX) reduced the time insiders have to disclose their trades from 
up to forty calendar days to just two business days. At a first glance, this regulation should 
have reduced the scope for stealth trading. However, there is no evidence that this change in 
regulation substantially reduced stealth trading by insiders. Instead, we find that insiders 
adapted to the regulatory change by executing their stealth trades over a shorter period.  
Finally, we perform multivariate regression analyses to evaluate the profitability of stealth 
trading for insiders. It seems that insiders can indeed reduce the price impact of their trades by 
stealth trading. 
The argument proceeds as follows. We describe the main features of the relevant institutional 
framework and the construction of our data set in Section 2. In Section 3, we establish that 
stealth trading of corporate insiders actually exists. We develop our hypotheses on different 
aspects of stealth trading and test them in Section 4. We analyze the impact of SOX in Section 
5. In Section 6, we examine the profitability of stealth trading for insiders and in Section 7, 
we evaluate whether it is more profitable for outsiders to mimic stealth than non-stealth 
trades. Section 8 concludes. 
2 Institutional framework and data 
2.1 Institutional framework 
According to Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all insiders have to disclose 
their transactions to the SEC. Insiders are direct and indirect beneficial owners of more than 
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ten percent of any class of equity securities and any director or officer of the issuer of equity 
securities (Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC rule 16a-2). Tradi-
tionally, insider transactions had to be reported on a monthly basis within 10 days after the 
end of each calendar month in which the transaction occurred (Form 4), which gave insiders 
up to forty days to disclose their trades. In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) changed this 
practice. Since August 29, 2002, insiders have to report their trades within two business days 
(SEC rule 16a-3(g)). Small acquisitions, which do not exceed $10,000 in market value within 
six months (SEC rule 16a-6), are exempt from these reporting requirements. These small ac-
quisitions are not reported on Form 4 as usual insider transactions but on Form 5, which is 
due only within 45 days after the issuer's fiscal year end (SEC rule 16a-3(f)). 
2.2 Construction of the data set 
Our data source for insider transactions is the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) provided by 
Thomson Reuters. IFDF is based on three forms insiders have to file with the SEC: Form 3 
(“Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”), Form 4 (“Statement of Changes 
of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”), and Form 5 (“Annual Statement of Beneficial Own-
ership of Securities”). We include all open market purchases and sales as well as private 
transactions between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2006 with complete data (including 
CUSIP, transaction date, and disclosure date) on IFDF. 
Insert Table 5.1, Table 5.2, and Table 5.3 here 
Table 5.1 provides the definition of all variables used in our study and Table 5.2 provides the 
details of the construction of our data set. Table 5.3 displays some descriptive statistics for the 
variables in our data set. We extract 2,432,168 transactions for 137,806 insiders from 16,522 
firms. 26.7% of these transactions are purchases and the remaining 73.3% are sales. We lose 
about 15% of the observations because the firm is not listed on CRSP and another 2.7% be-
cause the stock data available on CRSP are insufficient to compute cumulated abnormal re-
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turns. We also delete all transactions where the number of shares in the transaction (as re-
ported on IFDF) exceeds the number of shares traded on the exchange on the same day (as 
reported by CRSP); these transactions (about 5%) are most likely privately negotiated and 
therefore not of interest for our analysis. We have a small number of cases where insiders 
trade in different directions on the same day (about 0.7%) and where the transaction data on 
IFDF is incomplete (about 0.3%). We delete these transactions. We are left with 1,855,068 
transactions by 97,205 insiders of 9,563 firms, or 76.3% of the raw data. Of these 20.9% are 
purchases and 79.1% are sales. 
The data for bid-ask spreads is taken from the TAQTIC database and available only for 
NYSE-firms. Therefore, the sample size declines by two thirds for those analyses where we 
use the two spread variables (EffectiveSpread and RelativeSpread) in our analysis. 
3 Definition and existence of stealth trading 
We regard a transaction as a stealth trade if there exists a subsequent transaction in the same 
direction and by the same insider before or on the same day where the first transaction is dis-
closed. The reason for this definition is that stealth trading is relevant only for the period 
where the information, respectively the trade, have not been disclosed. Disclosure require-
ments changed with SOX on August 29, 2002. However, before and after SOX insiders did 
sometimes not comply with these regulations. Therefore, we use the actual rather than the 
mandated disclosure date to identify sequences of stealth trades. We define the maximum 
length of a stealth trading sequence to be 40 days. If the first trade of a stealth trading se-
quence is not reported after 40 days, then we consider this sequence to be finished to avoid 
sequences that stretch over extremely long periods.134 
The first step of our analysis is to establish that stealth trading even exists. The evidence in 
the extant literature is indirect and does not establish a clear-cut criterion that defines stealth 
                                                 
134  These 40 days define the upper legal bound for reporting most insider trades before SOX became effective. 
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trading. We consider the clustering of trades by the same person in the same direction as evi-
dence for stealth trading. Absent stealth trading, insiders’ trades should be uncorrelated over 
time, i.e., if an insider executes purchases with probability p and sales with probability 1-p, 
then this unconditional probability p should be equal to the conditional probability given that 
the last transaction was a sale. A symmetric argument applies to purchases. We first perform 
univariate tests to see whether the unconditional probability and the conditional probability of 
a sale given the direction of the previous transaction are the same. In addition, we perform 
multivariate tests to control for other factors that may lead insiders to cluster their trades. 
Insert Table 5.4 here 
Table 5.4 (Panel A) reports the results for the univariate tests. Since we need the sign of the 
previous transaction, the calculations do not include the first transaction for each person. 
Table 5.4 shows that trades are clustered. In total, 20.9% of all transactions are purchases and 
79.1% are sales (see Table 5.3). Yet, conditional on the previous transaction being a sale (pur-
chase), the next transaction is also a sale (purchase) in 98.7% (96.8%) of all cases. We use a 
standard Chi-squared test and a Fisher test to test for the statistical significance of these dif-
ferences and find that the p-values are below 0.01% in both cases. We repeat the analysis for 
sub samples of the data where the next transaction is restricted to occur within six months 
(column (2)) and within 40 days (column (3)) of the first transaction. The six months restric-
tion is motivated by the short-swing rule, which requires insider to disgorge all profits from 
trading in the opposite direction (e.g., first buying and then selling) in shares of their own 
company within six months. The 40-day restriction is motivated by the pre-SOX regulation, 
which gave insiders a maximum of 40 days to disclose their trades. As expected, we see that 
insiders are more likely to trade in the same direction if transactions are closer to each other, 
although these differences are economically insignificant. 
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In Table 5.4 (Panel B), we address the same question with a standard Probit model, where the 
dependent variable equals one if the transaction is a purchase, and regress it on the same 
dummy variable for the previous transaction (LagPurchaseDummy). Many papers document 
the influence of investor sentiment on investment decisions of retail investors and asset prices 
(see, for example, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991). If insiders behave like retail investors we 
expect that they buy stocks more frequently if investor sentiment is high and sell stocks more 
frequently if investor sentiment is low. In contrast, if insiders behave rationally we expect 
exactly the opposite pattern because insiders may recognize that stock prices are temporarily 
misvalued. In regression (2) in Table 5.4B we control for investor sentiment, following Lem-
mon and Portniaguina (2006) and Qiu and Welch (2006), by including CCI, the consumer 
confidence index, as an independent variable. The insider trading literature has shown that 
insiders often purchase (sell) shares after periods of negative (positive) abnormal stock per-
formance.135 Seyhun (2000) calls these contrarian trades passive transactions. We control for 
this insider behavior by including two additional independent variables in model (3) and (4): 
past stock performance measured by RunupCAR, the abnormal return over the 20 trading days 
before the transaction, and StockTercile, which is the tercile of the stock return in the calendar 
month before the transaction of all sample companies with sufficient data for this period. Both 
variables measure the relative development of firm’s stock price in the month before an in-
sider transaction. Model (5) includes all four independent variables. Across all these regres-
sions, the coefficient of LagPurchaseDummy is close to 0.94, which means that the condi-
tional probability that the next transaction is again a purchase is about 94%. This is economi-
cally significantly different from its unconditional probability and statistically significant at 
all conventional significance levels. The statistically significant coefficient on CCI shows that 
investor sentiment influences insiders similar to retail investors. However, the impact is eco-
nomically small: a one point increase in consumer confidence increases the likelihood that the 
                                                 
135  Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2002), Jenter (2005), and Fidrmuc, Korczak, and Korczak 
(2009) find that insiders on aggregate are contrarian investors. 
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next transaction is a purchase by 0.06%. The impact of StockTercile is negative, which shows 
that insiders are contrarians: if the stock has performed relatively well over the previous cal-
endar month, then they are significantly less likely to purchase additional shares, where an 
upward move from the bottom to the middle or from the middle to the top tercile reduces the 
probability by 2.5%.136 Interestingly, RunupCAR, the return relative to the index before the 
first transaction has no significant impact. All observations also hold for the model, which 
includes all control variables. Therefore, we conclude from this analysis that stealth trading is 
pervasive. Insiders are much more likely to purchase (sell) shares if the previous transaction 
was also a purchase (sale). Our subsequent discussion formulates and tests hypotheses about 
how stealth trades differ from non-stealth trades and when and why stealth trading occurs. 
4 Who undertakes stealth trading and when? 
In this section, we investigate the two main hypotheses, the price-impact and the information-
content hypothesis, by testing six different sub-hypotheses that potentially explain who under-
takes stealth trading, when it is undertaken, and how the market reacts to the disclosure. For 
this purpose, we aggregate sequences of stealth trades into aggregate trades and refer to these 
as aggregate stealth trades. If we analyze individual trades of a stealth trading sequence, we 
refer to them as single stealth trades. The aggregation of stealth trades is important because 
we are interested in the characteristics of the firms, the liquidity of the market for their stock, 
and the identity of the insiders rather than in the characteristics of individual trades. Aggregat-
ing stealth trades is particularly relevant when we wish to compare the volume or stake of 
stealth trades to those of single trades, because then we are interested in the size of the entire 
sequence and not only in the size of its components. For each hypothesis, we will first discuss 
the univariate evidence presented in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 before we turn to the multivariate 
results presented in Table 5.7. The dependent variable in the multivariate analysis is Stealth, 
                                                 
136  Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) find for the U.K. that abnormal returns before insider purchases 
(sales) are significantly negative (positive) and conclude that insiders can time their trades. 
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which is equal to one if the trade is an aggregated stealth trade, and zero otherwise. Since all 
hypotheses refer to the same dependent variable, we combine these variables in one regres-
sion in order to avoid omitted variable bias. We collect the results in Table 5.7, but discuss 
each hypothesis and the respective variables in turn. Since we have spread data only for 
NYSE stocks (about one third of all trades), we repeat the analysis of models (3) and (4) for 
the smaller sample (model (5) and (6)). 
4.1 The price-impact hypothesis 
Liquidity. The objective of stealth trading is to reduce the price impact of a trade. Accord-
ingly, we expect that stealth trading is more attractive if the price impact of trades is large, 
which is the case in illiquid markets, for larger trades, and if more insiders want to trade in the 
same direction at the same time. The attractiveness for insiders to break up larger trades rather 
than smaller trades is further increased if there are fixed costs from trading. 
Hypothesis 1 (Liquidity): Stealth trading is more likely (1) in less liquid stocks, (2) for larger 
(in aggregate) trades, and (3) if more insiders trade in the same direction at the same time. 
Liquidity is a somewhat elusive concept and we use four different proxies for our analysis. 
The first proxy is RelativeSpread, which is the quoted bid-ask spread, expressed as a propor-
tion of the midpoint of the spread. Then we use EffectiveSpread, which is defined as 
t t t tES 2 P M M= − , where Mt is the midpoint of the quotes and Pt is the price at which the 
transaction is executed (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001). Finally, we use the 
Amihud measure, which is defined as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dol-
lar trading volume on that day (Amihud, 2002). Finally, some of the literature relates trading 
volume to market liquidity (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995), although the strength 
and significance of this relationship is not clear (for a critical point of view see Lesmond, 
2005). We include Turnover, defined as the total number of shares traded on the day of the 
transaction day divided by the total number of shares outstanding. We measure the size of 
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trades with two different variables: Volume is the volume of a transaction denoted in thousand 
U.S. $ and Stake is the percentage of shares outstanding traded in the transaction. 
Insert Table 5.5 here 
The univariate results in Table 5.5 shows that single stealth trades are only about half as large 
as non-stealth trades (median Volume: $28,800 vs. $56,600, median Stake 0.004% vs. 
0.011%). However, aggregate stealth trades are about four times larger than non-stealth trades 
(median Volume: $260,300 vs. $56,600, median Stake 0.049% vs. 0.011%). It seems that in-
siders indeed prefer to split-up large trades rather than small trades. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 
plot Volume and Stake for single stealth trades, aggregated trades, and non-stealth trades over 
the sample period. We observe that before SOX there was on average no large difference in 
size between single stealth trades and non-stealth trades. After SOX the average size of single 
stealth trades and aggregated stealth trades is somewhat reduced. However, aggregated stealth 
trades are substantially larger than non-stealth trades over the whole sample period. In our 
multivariate analysis, we will control for changes over time by including a SOX dummy and 
year dummies in all regressions. 
Insert Figure 5.1and Figure 5.2 here 
We also use the definition of trade size introduced by Barclay and Warner (1993). They de-
fine transactions as small if the number of shares is less than 500, as medium-size if the num-
ber of shares is at least 500 but less than 10,000, and as large if at least 10,000 shares are 
traded. Barclay and Warner (1993) find that the price impact is largest for medium-size trades 
and conclude that informed traders use stealth trading to camouflage their information by 
spreading their trades over time. We categorize all trades into three groups: SmallTrade (less 
than 500 shares), MediumTrade (500 to 9,999 shares), and LargeTrade (10,000 or more 
shares). The results in Table 5.5 show that most non-stealth trades (54.6%) and single stealth 
trades (54.3%) fall indeed into the category MediumTrade, which is in line with Barclay and 
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Warner’s results (in their sample 45.7% of trades are medium-size) and corroborates their 
presumption that informed traders mostly execute medium-size transactions. However, in our 
sample small transactions make up only 16.6% of non-stealth trades and 28.5% of stealth 
trades, compared to 52.6% in Barclay and Warner. However, the main difference between the 
two samples is that insiders execute many more large trades 28.2% of non-stealth trades and 
17.2% of stealth trades, compared to only 1.7% in the Barclay and Warner sample. Hence, 
insiders trade on average larger stakes than other investors in the stock market, which is un-
surprising given that insiders (which also include large shareholders with more than 10% 
ownership) are wealthier with large stakes in the company. Overall, we find strong evidence 
in support of Hypothesis 1 that insiders split large trades into medium-sized and small trades. 
Insert Table 5.6 here 
In Table 5.6 we analyze the presence of stealth trading across firms, to see whether stealth 
trading is more common in firms with illiquid stocks. We order all 49,901 firm-years in our 
sample according to the proportion of stealth trading of all insider transactions in a given firm 
and year and assign them to quintiles (1=lowest and 5=highest proportion of stealth trading). 
We report average and median market capitalization, sales, turnover, volatility, and the two 
spread variables. There exists a negative relationship between stealth trading and market capi-
talization as well as sales: the larger the firm, the lower the proportion of stealth trading. Only 
the lowest stealth trading quintile is an exception. It seems that the smallest firms also have 
the lowest proportion of stealth trading. We can make a similar observation when looking at 
turnover, volatility, and spreads. These variables all increase with stealth trading, but the firms 
with the lowest proportion of stealth trading have the highest median spreads. Despite the fact 
that the relationships described are not purely monotonic, this analysis shows that, in general, 
the proportion of stealth trading is higher for smaller firms, for more volatile firms, and for 
illiquid stocks. The univariate results in Table 5.6 are therefore in line with Hypothesis 1, 
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stealth trading is more likely in less liquid stocks. However, we find a positive relationship 
between the proportion of stealth trading and daily stock turnover, which questions this inter-
pretation. We note again that some of the microstructure literature considers turnover to be a 
poor proxy of liquidity and trading costs (e.g., Lesmond, Ogden, Trzcinka, 2005). Table 5.6 
shows that the proportion of stealth trades of all insider transactions is related to firm size. 
Therefore, we control for the log of market capitalization in all regressions. 
Insert Table 5.7 here 
For our multivariate analysis in Table 5.7 we group transactions into deciles according to the 
percentage stake that is traded in the transaction and define the variable StakeDecile accord-
ingly, which is a number between 1 (= 10% of trades with the lowest percentage of shares 
outstanding traded in the transaction) and 10 (=10% of trades with the largest stake traded). In 
all regressions in Table 5.7 StakeDecile is positive and significant with p-values smaller than 
0.1%.137 The economic significance is also quite substantial: An upward move by one decile 
from the mean increases the probability of stealth trading by 8.5% to 8.8%. Hence, as pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 1, (aggregated) trade size increases the likelihood of stealth trading; 
insiders break up larger stakes rather than smaller stakes. This result corroborates our univari-
ate results in Table 5.5, Figure 5.1, and Figure 5.2, which show that single stealth trades are 
smaller, but aggregated stealth trades are substantially larger than non-stealth trades. 
The multivariate analysis also supports our conclusion from Table 5.6 that stealth trading is 
more prevalent in firms with illiquid stocks. Both spread measures and Turnover are all 
highly significant and have the predicted sign: The higher the spread and the lower turnover, 
the higher is the incidence of stealth trading, showing that stealth trading is concentrated in 
infrequently traded, illiquid stocks. The only measure of liquidity that is not significant is the 
                                                 
137  Using VolumeDecile instead of StakeDecile yields, qualitatively and quantitatively similar results (not tabu-
lated). 
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Amihud measure, which is arguably a less precise measure than the quoted spread or the ef-
fective spread. 
The hypothesis that insiders tend to use more stealth trading if also other insiders trade in the 
same direction is corroborated by the positive and highly significant coefficient for the 
dummy variable MultipleInsiders, which is one if more than one insider trades in the same 
direction on the same day. The likelihood of stealth trading increases by more than 4% if at 
least one other insider is trading in the same direction. Therefore, we conclude, in line with 
Hypothesis 1, that stealth trading is a strategy to reduce market impact, especially for large 
trades, illiquid stocks, and in situations when other insiders also execute transactions. 
Market environment. It is generally easier to sell shares in rising markets when there is more 
demand (bull markets), and to buy shares in falling markets, when there is a larger supply 
(bear markets). It is more difficult to be on the short side of the market, i.e., buy when other 
investors want to buy and vice versa. We reason that the increased difficulty of trading when 
other investors want to trade in the same direction will result in increased incentives to split 
trades. Effectively, this difficulty of trading should have the same impact as a reduction in 
liquidity, an argument we develop in relation to Hypothesis 1 above. Hence, we expect that 
stealth trading is more likely if insiders are on the short side of the market.138 
Hypothesis 2 (Market environment): Stealth trading differs in bull markets and in bear mar-
kets: There is more stealth buying in rising markets and more stealth selling in falling mar-
kets. 
We cannot measure the direction in which other traders want to trade directly and infer it from 
recent price movements instead. We conduct this analysis at the firm level and at the market 
level. At the firm level, we classify insider transactions according to the recent share price 
performance of the insider’s company assuming that it is more difficult for insiders to buy 
                                                 
138  See Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang, and Wood (2004) and Chakravarty, Kalev, and Pham, 2005. 
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(sell) shares if the stock of their company has over (under) performed compared to all other 
stocks in the market. We classify a stock as “overperforming” if its return was in the top ter-
cile of all stock returns in the sample in the month before the transaction. Analogously, a 
stock is “underperforming” if its return was in the bottom tercile in the previous month (see 
also the definition of StockTercile, which we used above). We then define a dummy variable 
ShortSideStock, which equals one if the transaction is on the short side of the market, i.e., if 
the transaction is a purchase and the stock was overperforming, and also if the transaction is a 
sale and the stock was under performing. At the market level, we classify insider transactions 
with reference to the recent overall market development. If last month’s return (before the 
insider transaction) on the CRSP value-weighted index was in the highest tercile of all 
monthly returns in our sample period, the market is considered “bullish” and vise versa as 
“bearish” if the index return was in the lowest tercile. Accordingly, we define the dummy 
variable ShortSideMarket, which equals one if the transaction is a purchase and the market 
was “bullish,” or if the transaction is a sale and the market was “bearish.” Under Hypothesis 
2, we should see that the coefficient on ShortSideStock (ShortSideMarket) is positive, so that 
there is more stealth buying if the stock (market) outperformed (“bullish”) and more stealth 
selling if the stock (market) underperformed (“bearish”). 
The results in Table 5.7 show that the coefficient of ShortSideStock always has the predicted 
sign and it is highly significant in all regressions. By contrast, the coefficient of ShortSide-
Market is insignificant across all specifications. Therefore, we conclude that insiders use 
stealth trading more often when they are on the short side of the market. However, only the 
market conditions for the firm’s stock is relevant, whereas overall market trends have no sig-
nificant impact on insiders’ decisions to split trades. 
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4.2 The information-content hypothesis 
Information hierarchy. Several papers in the insider trading literature investigate the “in-
formation hierarchy hypothesis” (Seyhun, 1986), which holds that trades by those insiders 
who have more information have a higher price impact.139 We should therefore expect that 
insiders who are more informed and who have more information to hide will engage more in 
stealth trading because they face more adverse selection problems. 
Hypothesis 3 (Information hierarchy): Stealth trading is more likely for insiders who are 
more informed. 
Based on our data we can distinguish between the CEO, officers and directors other than the 
CEO, directors who are not officers, the chairman of the board, and other insiders who hold 
none of these roles (mostly large shareholders). 
Insert Table 5.8 here 
Before we interpret the multivariate regression results from Table 5.7 in relation to the infor-
mation hierarchy hypothesis, we discuss the univariate results presented in Table 5.8. The 
univariate results show that CEOs, chairmen of the board, and other insiders use stealth trad-
ing most frequently, whereas other officers and directors use stealth trading less than all other 
categories of insiders. The findings regarding CEOs and chairmen of the board support the 
information hierarchy hypothesis, whereas the findings regarding other insiders contradict it. 
Other insiders are mostly large shareholders, who own more than 10% of the shares of the 
company but do not have a formal role in the firm. These insiders trade relatively large vol-
umes (mean volume per transaction is $416,100) compared to CEOs ($294,000), officers 
($262,100) and directors ($279,300). Only chairmen trade on average larger volumes 
                                                 
139  In the literature on insider trading, the information hierarchy hypothesis holds that trades by insiders who 
are closer to the firm have a larger information content. The evidence on this hypothesis is mixed. Seyhun 
(1986) shows that the directors and officers trade on more valuable information than other insiders. Lin and 
Howe (1990) show that trades by the CEO and the officers and directors of the firm have a higher informa-
tion content than those of unaffiliated shareholders. Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) find no evi-
dence for the information hierarchy hypothesis. 
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($420,500). Measuring transaction size by Stake reveals a similar picture. In this case, other 
insiders actually execute the largest transactions on average. Given that other insiders trade 
relatively large volumes, possibly because they hold large stakes in the firm, they have strong 
incentives to split trades. The final verdict on the information hierarchy hypothesis should 
therefore rely on multivariate regressions that also control for transaction size. 
The regression analysis in Table 5.7 includes dummy variables for all categories of insiders 
except directors, so the coefficients for the four remaining insider groups have to be inter-
preted relative to this group. The multivariate results are consistent with the univariate analy-
sis. The coefficients for OtherInsider are positive and significantly larger than the coefficients 
of all other insider groups across all specifications, even though we control for StakeDecile. 
This result is inconsistent with the information hierarchy hypothesis unless we assume that 
officers and directors are less informed than other insiders, which we find implausible. Across 
all specifications, chairmen and CEOs do more stealth trading than other officers and direc-
tors. However, this difference is only significant for the large sample (model (3) and (4)). The 
finding that CEOs and chairmen are more inclined to stealth trading than officers and direc-
tors are consistent with the information hierarchy hypothesis. Nonetheless, the overall support 
for this hypothesis is only mixed. Interestingly, the results for chairmen and for other insiders 
are stable across specifications and therefore independent of how we control for liquidity. By 
contrast, the coefficient for CEO is much larger and that for officers is much smaller in the 
larger sample compared to the NYSE-subsample. 
Direction of trade. The insider trading literature has shown that purchases have a larger in-
formation content compared to sales, probably because sales are more likely to be motivated 
by liquidity considerations, whereas purchases are more likely to be motivated by information 
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advantages.140 Our hypothesis is that stealth trading is a strategy to hide trades with a larger 
information content, so that stealth trading should be related to the direction of trades. 
Hypothesis 4 (Direction of trade): Stealth trading is more frequent for purchases than for 
sales. 
The univariate results in Table 5.5 suggest exactly the opposite of Hypothesis 4, namely that 
stealth trading is more likely for sales than for purchases. Only 25.1% of all aggregated stealth 
trades are purchases, whereas 36.9% of all non-stealth trades are purchases. However, this 
could be explained by the fact that sales are on average much larger (across all insider groups) 
than purchases and therefore offer more scope for stealth trading. As in the case of the infor-
mation hierarchy hypothesis, we have to control for trade size to test Hypothesis 4. 
Table 5.7 shows that the coefficient of PurchaseDummy has the predicted sign in all specifi-
cations but is statistically significant only in models (3) and (4), where we can use the large 
sample. In the smaller sample for which also the spread variables are available, the effect is 
statistically insignificant. Hence, when we control for trade, firm and insider characteristics, 
stealth trading is more frequent for purchases than for sales. The fact that PurchaseDummy is 
insignificant in all models that use the small sample suggests that the sample size is the reason 
for the insignificant coefficient and not the fact that we control for the spread in models (1) 
and (2). 
Asymmetric information. Stealth trading should be more attractive if the general scope for 
informed trading is larger. This will be the case if there is more asymmetric information, for 
example, in companies that are more opaque, in companies with more firm-specific risk, and 
                                                 
140  The first to make this observation was Rogoff (1964). See Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jeng, Metrick, and 
Zeckhauser (2003) or Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) for more recent analyses. 
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at times before an earnings announcement, whereas it will be less likely immediately after an 
earnings announcement.141 
Hypothesis 5 (Asymmetric information): Stealth trading is: (1) more likely if there is more 
asymmetric information and if the company is more opaque; (2) more likely in stocks with 
more firm-specific risk; (3) more likely before and less likely after earnings announcements. 
We investigate part (1) of Hypothesis 5 by looking at reporting periodicity and research and 
development expenditures as measures of firms’ transparency or opacity. We identify firms 
with higher quality accounts with QuarterlyReport, which is one for firms that file quarterly 
reports and zero otherwise. R&D is defined as research and development expenditures scaled 
by total assets. R&D is set to zero for those firms, where Compustat does not report any re-
search and development expenditures. We analyze part (2) by using Volatility, defined as the 
annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns over the calendar month preceding the 
transaction. We use this as a measure of firm-specific risk.142 Part (3) of Hypothesis 5 is ana-
lyzed by looking at earnings announcements reported by Compustat. We define two dummy 
variables BeforeEarnAnnounce and AfterEarnAnnounce, which equal one for a period of two 
weeks (14 days) before, respectively after an earnings announcement. 
The impact of QuarterlyReport is as predicted and always significant at the 5% level, al-
though the vast majority of our sample firms report earnings quarterly and therefore the em-
pirical relevance is only limited (the mean of QuarterlyReport is 0.999, see Table 5.3). The 
results for R&D are in line with Hypothesis 5. The coefficient for R&D is positive and sig-
nificant at the 0.1% level across all models, which implies that insiders from firms with 
higher R&D expenditures use more stealth trading. A one standard deviation increase of R&D 
                                                 
141  Aboody and Lev (2000) show that insider gains are larger for R&D-intensive firms and interpret R&D as a 
proxy for asymmetric information. Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) and Betzer and Theissen 
(2009) investigate the impact of news announcements on insider trading. 
142  Results do not change materially if we use the standard deviation of daily excess returns from a market 
model as a proxy for firm specific risk, where we use the CRSP-value weighted index over the preceding 
calendar year as a measure of market risk. 
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(from the mean) increases the probability of stealth trading by 2% to 6%. The picture for 
Volatility is somewhat mixed. The coefficient is positive as predicted and highly significant in 
regressions (3), (4), and (5), but insignificant in regressions (1), (2), and (6). There are two 
potential explanations why we obtain different results for these regressions. Regressions (1) 
and (2) include spread variables, whereas regressions (3) and (4) do not. The first interpreta-
tion could be that the spread already controls to some extent for firm-specific risk. Alterna-
tively, the different results may just be due to the smaller sample used in models (1) and (2). 
The results from models (5) and (6), which repeat the analysis of models (3) and (4) for the 
smaller sample, suggest that the first interpretation is more likely, because of the highly sig-
nificant coefficient for Volatility in model (5). However, the result from model (6), where the 
coefficient of Volatility has the predicted (positive) sign but is insignificant also lends some 
support to the second interpretation. The coefficient for BeforeEarnAnnounce is always posi-
tive, but only significant for models (3) and (4) where we can use the large sample. Therefore, 
it seems that insiders use stealth trading more frequently in periods when there is more 
asymmetric information. However, we do not find that insiders use less stealth trading after 
earnings announcements, when asymmetric information should be less severe, which partly 
contradicts Hypothesis 5. The coefficient of AfterEarnAnnounce is positive and significant 
across all models, not only for the large sample. This result indirectly supports the price-
impact hypothesis (more precisely Hypothesis 1). Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) show 
that about 92% of their sample firms impose trading restrictions for insiders and that the most 
common trading window is 3 to 12 days after earnings announcements. These results are cor-
roborated by our summary statistics in Table 5.3, where we can see that about 20% of the 
sample transactions are executed in the two weeks after an earnings announcement. If we as-
sume a uniform distribution of trades across the year and four earnings announcements per 
year, we should expect only 15.4% of all transactions to be executed in the two weeks after an 
  201
earnings announcement.143 It seems that in many firms all insiders (have to) trade at the same 
time right after an earnings announcement. In such a situation stealth trading offers insiders 
the possibility to reduce the price impact of their transactions by matching them with those of 
more liquidity traders. We tentatively conclude from this analysis that reducing the price im-
pact of insider trades is a more important motive for stealth trading than camouflaging the 
information content of these transactions. However, we also find some evidence that asym-
metric information leads to more stealth trading. 
If the motivation behind stealth trades is to conceal information, then stealth trades should 
systematically contain more information than non-stealth trades. We should therefore expect 
that the disclosure of stealth trades contains a stronger signal than the disclosure of non-
stealth trades. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6 (Information content): The information content of stealth trades is larger than 
that of comparable non-stealth trades. 
We measure the information content of trades by using standard event study methods. Ab-
normal returns are calculated over a 1-day event window using market model benchmark re-
turns calculated with the CRSP value-weighted index. The event day is the disclosure of the 
first trade in a stealth trading sequence or the disclosure date of non-stealth trades. We calcu-
late abnormal returns on the disclosure date separately for purchases (PurchaseAR) and for 
sales (SalesAR). 
The univariate comparison of stealth trades and non-stealth trades in Table 5.5 shows that the 
information content is approximately the same for both types of trades. This result holds for 
purchases and for sales. The mean (median) of PurchasesAR is 0.2% (0.0%) for non-stealth 
trades compared to 0.3% (0.0%) for stealth trades. The mean (median) of SalesCAR is -0.1% 
(-0.1%) for non-stealth trades compared to -0.1% (-0.2%) for stealth trades. 
                                                 
143  About 99.9% of our sample transactions come from firms with quarterly reporting, therefore 8 out of 52 
weeks per calendar year (15.4%) fall into the category AfterEarnAnnounce. 
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Insert Table 5.9 here 
The results from univariate and multivariate regressions in Table 5.9 confirm the results from 
Table 5.5. Stealth trades do not seem to have more information content than non-stealth 
trades. The coefficients for Stealth are economically insignificant in all regressions. The coef-
ficient for Stealth has different signs for univariate regressions than for multivariate regres-
sions; it only has the predicted sign in the univariate regressions. Therefore, we find no sup-
port for the hypothesis that stealth trades contain more information than non-stealth trades. 
5 Stealth trading and regulation 
Unlike other traders, insiders have to file their trades with regulators after a certain period of 
time, so their ability to split trades is limited. Most likely, the benefit from concealing their 
trades from other traders is lost or at least diminished once the first trade is disclosed, and 
after SOX insiders had shorter intervals over which they could spread their trades (see Section 
2.1 above).144 Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7 (Regulatory change): (1) The incidence of stealth trading declines after SOX 
became effective on August 28, 2002, so that stealth trades make up a smaller proportion of 
the number of trades and of trading volume. (2) Stealth trades become more concentrated in 
the shortened reporting period after SOX. 
Based on the first part of Hypothesis 7 we expect the SOX-dummy in Table 5.7 to be nega-
tive. In fact, the SOX-dummy is positive, even though the coefficient is not significant in four 
out of six specifications. Only the specifications that use the large sample have significantly 
negative coefficients for the SOX-dummy. 
Insert Figure 5.3 here 
                                                 
144  A recent literature investigates the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on insider trading (as well as a 
range of other governance-related issues). See Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2007) and Brochet (2008) on in-
sider trading and Brockman, Martin, and Puckett (2008) on stock option exercises. 
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The significance of the SOX-dummy in Table 5.7 may be spurious and pick up a general time 
trend that is not causally associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley act. To investigate this further 
we plot the number, volume, and the average stake traded in Figure 5.3. The figure reveals a 
trend, which is reversed temporarily after SOX became effective. The figure does not suggest 
a permanent change because of SOX, but rather a trend that existed a long time before SOX, 
was then interrupted briefly, and continued from 2004 onwards. Panel B of Figure 5.3 plots 
the total volume (in U.S. $) of stealth trades relative to the total volume of all insider transac-
tions, and total stakes traded (as a percentage of all shares outstanding) in stealth trades rela-
tive to the total stakes traded in all insider transactions over the sample period. Both time se-
ries are more volatile than the corresponding series in Panel A and do not exhibit a clear 
trend. Both time series show also a significant decline around time when SOX became effec-
tive. Table 5.10 presents univariate tests for the hypothesis that the characteristics of stealth 
trades reported in the table are identical for the pre-SOX and the post-SOX period. We report 
a standard t-test for differences in means and the Wilcoxon ranksum test. The Wilcoxon-test 
has slightly lower power but is more robust to outliers and deviations from normality than the 
t-test, however, it also rejects if the median is identical and the standard deviation is substan-
tially different between two samples. The comparisons in Table 5.10 reveal that the differ-
ences between the pre-SOX and the post-SOX period in terms of stakes traded and volume 
per individual trade are statistically and economically significant. However, while the drop in 
the volume of the median individual trade is significant (from $49,700 to 29,200 shares per 
trade), the drop of the median volume of a sequence of stealth trades (from 263,000 shares to 
259,800 shares) is insignificant. 
Insert Table 5.10 here 
Table 5.10 reveals also that stealth trading by insiders increases in terms of the number of 
transactions, which become more concentrated into a shorter period of time. The time span 
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between the first and the last trade decreases by a factor of 6 from 8.14 to 1.33, and the time 
span between two consecutive trades in a sequence decreases by a factor of 11 from 1.89 to 
0.17, implying that more trades of a stealth trading sequence now take place within a single 
day. 
Insert Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 here 
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 plot these developments again to distinguish trends from one-off 
changes that can be attributed to SOX. Figure 5.4 reveals that the time span between the first 
and the last trade of a stealth trading sequence was increasing for a number of years before 
SOX and then dropped sharply from about 10 days to less than 2 days in August 2002. Figure 
5.5 plots the average time span between two stealth trades of the same sequence and shows 
that this time span shortened from 2.5 days to 1.5 days before the date when SOX became 
effective and then dropped by another day to about 0.5 days around that date. 
Insert Figure 5.6 here 
We are interested in the average number of stealth trades in a stealth trading sequence. This 
number increases from 5.29 pre-SOX to 8.88 post-SOX (see Table 5.10). Figure 5.6 reveals a 
trend in the number of transactions that begins in 1998 and continues until the end of our 
sample period, without indicating a structural break at any particular date. The steady increase 
in splitting stealth trades into more pieces does therefore not seem to be affected by SOX. 
Only the temporary drop in the second half of 2002 may be related to SOX. 
Insert Figure 5.7 here 
Figure 5.7 shows that the shortened reporting period mandated by SOX let insiders to sub-
stantially increase the speed of their reporting. The average number of days between trading 
and reporting date decreased from above 40 days to approximately 3 days shortly after SOX 
becomes effective. We do not observe a significant difference in reporting delay between 
stealth and non-stealth trades. 
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Taking the results from Table 5.7, Table 5.10 and Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.7 together shows that 
insiders do not abstain from stealth trading because of SOX. To the contrary, the number and 
the proportion of stealth trades increases steadily over our sample period, with a temporary 
drop in the months immediately after SOX became effective. Rather, insiders adjusted their 
trading behavior to the new rules. They split transactions into a larger number of smaller 
trades, execute these trades faster (often several trades in one day) so that trades became more 
concentrated in a much shorter time span, and disclose these trades sooner to comply with the 
new regulation. 
6 The profitability of stealth trades 
The object of splitting trades is to realize larger trading profits. Ideally, we would like to in-
vestigate if this strategy is actually successful. Hence, we want to compare a non-stealth trade 
of a given size with a comparable sequence of stealth trades. We postulate: 
Hypothesis 8 (Insider profitability): Stealth trading is more profitable compared to non-
stealth trading. 
Testing this hypothesis requires that non-stealth trades and sequences of stealth trades are 
comparable. In particular, we need to compare sequences of stealth trades that have the same 
aggregate volume as a non-stealth trade. Ultimately, we ask the counterfactual question what 
the trading profits of insiders would have been if they had not broken up their trades. How-
ever, if all insiders trade optimally, then they choose stealth trades if stealth trading is optimal, 
and single trades otherwise, so that we can never observe the suboptimal trades that we need 
as a benchmark. Without using intraday data, there are basically two possible approaches to 
tackle this question. First, we could use standard event-study methodology to analyze insider 
returns. Second, we could use a standard matching or propensity matching approach, where 
we match each sequence of stealth trades with one non-stealth trade of the same company in 
the same year and with a comparable size and discard observations where we cannot find such 
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a trade. Since, most papers in the insider trading literature use event-study methodology we 
follow the same approach. Applying this technique to stealth trading is not straightforward 
though. With stealth trading, there is more than one beginning date from which we calculate 
CARs. For example, in a sequence of stealth purchases, we could measure CARs from the 
date of the first purchase, but then there is an upward bias simply because the subsequent pur-
chases may push up the price, thereby artificially generating a positive CAR. Conversely, if 
we measure CARs from the date of the last purchase we avoid this pitfall, but then the price 
impact of the later trades underestimates the profitability of the earlier transactions. We there-
fore estimate the profitability of stealth trading with a slightly different approach. 
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We can apply our usual analysis with cumulative abnormal returns in order to control for si-
multaneous movements in the market and define: 
 ( ) ( )1 1j j j M jCAR ,t r r ,t− = − − . (5-3) 
Here jt  denotes the day of the j
th trade and ( )1M jr ,t−  is the market return from the closing 
price before the first trade in the stealth trading sequence (normalized to be -1) to the closing 
price on date jt . Note that the calculation differs from standard CAR-calculations because jr  
is not the return based on the closing price, but is based on the actual transaction price. Ide-
ally, we would match this with the return on the benchmark at the time of the transaction, but 
since we do not have time stamps for insiders’ transactions, we use the closing price instead. 










α −∑ . (5-4) 
Equation (5-4) provides a measures of the price impact of stealth trades. The challenge is to 
benchmark these measures of price impact against a measure of the hypothetical price impact 
of a single trade with total size x . We want to compare this to the hypothetical price AP  the 
insider would have paid for the aggregate trade of size x  and hence to the ratio 1
AP P− . If 
AP P>  for purchases ( AP P<  for sales), then stealth trading is profitable. 
The raw returns and CARs for single insider trades are measured over the time interval from 
the closing price of the day before the transaction until the execution of the trade with 
1 1
NSr P P−= −  and ( ) ( )1 1MCAR ,t r r ,t− = − − . 
In a simple univariate approach we compare the CAR defined in (5-4) with the equivalent 
numbers of non-stealth trades and single stealth trades. Our results in Table 5.5 support 
Hypothesis 8 that stealth trading is more profitable for insiders than non-stealth trading. The 
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abnormal price change induced by insider trades is significantly smaller for single stealth 
trades than for non-stealth trades both for purchases (InsiderImpactPurchases) and for sales 
(InsiderImpactSales). The mean of InsiderImpactPurchases is 7.8% for non-stealth trades 
compared to only -0.6% for single stealth trades. The mean of InsiderImpactSales is -1.6% for 
non-stealth trades compared to only 0.4% for single stealth trades. However, the medians for 
both variables are almost the same for non-stealth and single stealth trades. 
Insert Table 5.11 here 
Table 5.11 reports multivariate regression results with InsiderImpactPurchases and Insider-
ImpactSales as dependent variables and Stealth as an independent variable. The regressions 
also control for other observable characteristics of trades, namely for trade size (by using 
StakeDecile), for the role of the insider, and whether more than one insider traded on the same 
day in the same direction (MultipleInsiders). Additionally, we control for firm characteristics 
such as size, turnover, and volatility and whether the transaction was executed before or after 
SOX became effective. We report the results for OLS (columns (1) to (4)) and for a specifica-
tion where we winsorize the dependent variable at the 1% level (columns (5) to (8)). We run 
the regression separately for purchases and for sales and report one specification with controls 
and one specification without controls. 
Stealth trading reduces the price impact of insider trading for purchases and for sales. The 
coefficient of Stealth is highly significant at all conventional significance levels and always 
has the expected sign, i.e. it is negative for purchases and positive for sales. Hence, stealth 
trading reduces the average purchase price and increases the average sales price. The coeffi-
cient on Stealth is never reduced much from the inclusion of controls, even though most con-
trol variables have a highly significant influence on price impact. The impact of outliers 
seems to be quite strong and the coefficient on Stealth is much smaller in absolute value for 
the winsorized regressions, so we only discuss the latter here. Stealth trading reduces the ab-
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normal price impact for purchases by about 1.39%-1.65% and for sales by about 0.43%-
0.49%, which is a significant reduction given the mean abnormal price impact of 4.5% for 
purchases and -0.5% for sales reported in Table 5.3. The summary statistics of InsiderIm-
pactPurchases and InsiderImpactSales indicate that both variables are relatively volatile 
measures, which exhibit some extreme values (see Table 5.3). 
7 The profitability of mimicking trades 
Mimicking trades are trades by outsiders who can observe insider trades and then trade in the 
same direction. Mimicking trades are puzzling from the point of view of semi-strong form 
efficient markets. The earlier insider trading literature has investigates the profitability of trad-
ing on publicly available information (see Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 
1988; Lin and Howe, 1990).145 The evidence from these papers suggests that there are posi-
tive abnormal returns even after the disclosure date of insider trades, but that after adjusting 
for risk factors and transactions costs outsiders cannot exploit this public information. In con-
trast, Bettis, Vickrey, and Vickrey (1997) argue that it is possible for outsiders to earn abnor-
mal returns by focusing on large-volume trades of high-ranking insiders, most likely because 
large transactions of high-ranking insiders contain more valuable inside information, which 
the market does not fully incorporate at the time of disclosure of the trade. A possible expla-
nation for this market inefficiency could be that most investors do not follow the SEC filings 
closely, because the information content of most transactions is rather small and does not war-
rant the effort. This explanation was suggested by Chang and Suk (1998), who find significant 
abnormal stock performance not only at the SEC filing but also at the publication in the Wall 
Street Journal “Insider Trading Spotlight” column. If the motivation behind stealth trades is 
to conceal valuable information and if insiders do not follow the SEC filings closely, then we 
                                                 
145  The phenomenon has been investigated also for the U.K. (Gregory, Matatko, Tonks, and Purkis, 1994), 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands (Heidorn, Meyer, and Pietrowiak, 2004) and Spain (Del Brio, Miguel, 
and Perote, 2002). Betzer and Theissen (2009) provide a tabular survey of the more recent studies: Fidr-
muc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006), Friederich, Gregory, Matatko, and Tonks (2002), Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001), and Chang and Suk (1998). 
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should expect that mimicking stealth trades right after the SEC filing is more profitable than 
mimicking non-stealth trades. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 9: (Outsider profitability): Imitating stealth trades is more profitable than imitat-
ing non-stealth trades. 
Outsider returns are estimated as abnormal returns using standard event study methods. The 
event day (t=0) is the first disclosure date of stealth trading sequences or the disclosure date of 
non-stealth trades. We assume that outsiders observe the filing of an insider transaction at t=0 
and can trade at the closing price of the same day. Therefore, abnormal returns are calculated 
over a 20-day event window (1, 20) starting the next trading day after the disclosure. We use 
the CRSP value-weighted index as benchmark return for the market model.146 The cumulated 
abnormal returns are calculated separately for purchases (PurchasesCAR) and for sales 
(SalesCAR). 
The univariate comparison of non-stealth trades and stealth trades in Table 5.5 shows that it is 
significantly more profitable for outsiders to imitate stealth trades than non-stealth trades. 
This result holds for purchases and for sales. The mean (median) of PurchasesCAR is 2.2% 
(0.6%) for non-stealth trades compared to 3.6% (1.4%) for stealth trades. The mean (median) 
of SalesCAR is -2.3% (-1.6%) for non-stealth trades compared to -3.1% (-2.1%) for stealth 
trades. All these differences are statistically significant at all conventional significance levels. 
Insert Table 5.12 here 
The results from univariate regressions in Table 5.12 confirm the univariate results from 
Table 5.5, namely that imitating stealth trades is more profitable than imitating non-stealth 
trades. The coefficients for Stealth are statistically and economically highly significant for 
sales and purchases as well as for winsorized and non-winsorized dependent variables. Imitat-
ing stealth trades would increase CARs to outsiders between 0.74 and 1.41 percentage points 
                                                 
146  Robustness checks (not tabulated) with shorter event windows yield similar results. 
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for a 20-day event period. However, when we control for other trade characteristics, insider 
characteristics, and firm characteristics the effect of stealth trading completely vanishes for 
purchases and actually changes its sign for sales. The results of the multivariate regressions 
for sales actually imply that imitating stealth trading is significantly less profitable than imi-
tating non-stealth trades. Therefore, we find only very limited support for Hypothesis 9 and 
cannot conclude that imitating stealth trading is more profitable for outsiders than imitating 
non-stealth trades. 
8 Conclusions 
Our analysis provides direct evidence that insiders in the U.S. engage in stealth trading and 
split large transactions into sequences of smaller orders. Almost 87% of all insider transac-
tions are part of a sequence of stealth trades during our sample period from 1996 to 2006 and 
there is an upward trend in the proportion of stealth trades relative to all insider transactions. 
The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act in 2002 was only temporary. Insiders did not stop to 
split their transactions into series of smaller trades and only changed their trading behavior to 
comply with tightened disclosure regulation. We hypothesize that stealth trading is used more 
for transactions with a larger informational content and more in markets that are less liquid or 
where the insider trades on the short side of the market. We find several pieces of evidence in 
support of the price-impact hypothesis. In particular, insiders are more likely to split trades 
into series of smaller transactions if the total size of the stake is large and if the market is 
comparatively illiquid. Insiders use stealth trading more frequently when they are on the short 
side of the market, i.e. when they purchase in rising markets and when they sell in falling 
markets. We compare the price impact of stealth trades with that of non-stealth trades. We can 
only draw tentative conclusions here because this comparison is fraught with methodological 
difficulties, but our results indicate that stealth trading is a successful strategy to reduce price 
impact. 
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The relevance of the informational content of trades is less clear. The main finding in support 
of the information-content hypothesis is that insiders use stealth trading more for purchases 
than for sales. Purchases of insiders should have more informational content than sales be-
cause sales are more likely motivated by liquidity considerations. The information-content-
hypothesis implies that insiders of more opaque firms and firms with more firm-specific risk 
should use stealth trading more frequently, but we find only limited evidence here. Under the 
information-content hypothesis, stealth trading should be used more by those insiders with 
more information (information hierarchy hypothesis). Surprisingly, insiders without a formal 
role in the firm (e.g., large shareholders) are more likely to use stealth trading compared to 
officers and directors of the company, which contradicts the information hierarchy hypothesis. 
These insiders seem to split their trades because they trade larger stakes and not because they 
have more information. Finally, a larger information content of stealth trades should result in 
larger announcement returns on the disclosure date, which we do not find. 
Our results therefore suggest that insiders use stealth trading strategically and successfully to 
reduce the price impact of their trades. By contrast, it is less clear that insiders use stealth 
trading to camouflage trades with a stronger information content. 
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9 Tables 
Table 5.1: Definitions of variables used in this chapter 
This table defines all variables used in this chapter. Insider trading data are taken from IFDF, accounting data 
from Compustat, market data from CRSP and information about spreads from TAQTIC. 
Variable Description Source 
AfterEarn 
Announce 
= 1 for all transactions executed in the 14 days after an earnings an-
nouncement (if available), zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Amihud Amihud’s measure of illiquidity defined as the average ratio of the 





= 1 for all transactions executed in the 14 days before an earnings 
announcement (if available), zero otherwise 
Compustat 
CCI Consumer confidence index based on a monthly survey of 5,000 U.S. 
households conducted for The Conference Board. The index averages 
five indexes, each of which is based on a question regarding current 
or expected economic conditions and respond 
Datastream
CEO = 1 if trade is executed by the CEO, zero otherwise IFDF 
ChairmanBoard = 1 if trade is executed by the chairman of the supervisory board, who 
is not an officer, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
DaysAfter Number of days elapsed between the current purchase (sale) and the 
last purchase (sale) of the same insider occurred 
IFDF 
DaysBefore Number of days elapsed between the current purchase (sale) and the 
next purchase (sale) of the same insider occurs 
IFDF 
Delay Number of days between the trading day and the disclosure day IFDF 
Director = 1 if trade is executed by a member of the board (not including the 
chairman) who is not an officer, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
EffectiveSpread Daily average of 2|Pt - Mt|/Mt, where Mt is the midpoint of the quotes 
and Pt is the price at which a transaction is executed; Observations 














LargeTrade = 1 if number of shares traded is ≥10000, zero otherwise IFDF 
LogMarketCap = natural logarithm of MarketCap CRSP 
MarketCap Market value of equity at the transaction date in million € CRSP 
MediumTrade = 1 if number of shares traded is ≥500 and <10000, zero otherwise IFDF 
MultipleInsiders = 1 if more than one insider trades on the same day in the same direc-
tion, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
Officer = 1 if trade is executed by an officer (not including the CEO) IFDF 
PurchaseDummy = 1 if the transaction is a purchase, zero otherwise IFDF 
PurchasesAR Abnormal return (market model) at the disclosure day for purchases IFDF 
PurchasesCAR Cumulative abnormal return (market model) over a 20-day event 
window (1, 20) starting after the disclosure day for purchases 
CRSP 
RelativeSpread Average daily quoted bid-ask spread, expressed as a proportion of the 
midpoint of the spread; Observations with RelativeSpread>0.5 are set 
to missing value 
TAQTIC 
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Variable Description Source 
RunupCAR Cumulative abnormal return over a 20-day event window 
(-20,-1) ending one day before the trading day for sales and pur-
chases, CARs of sales are multiplied by -1 
CRSP 
R&D = research and development expenditure / total assets Compustat 
Sales Sales of the last calendar year in million € Compustat 
SalesAR Abnormal return (market model) at the disclosure day for sales CRSP 
SalesCAR Cumulative abnormal return (market model) over a 20-day event 
window (0,20) starting at the disclosure day for sales 
CRSP 
ShortSideMarket = 1 for purchases (sales) if the previous calendar month’s return of 
the CRSP value weighted index was in the highest (lowest) tercile of 
all sample months, zero otherwise 
CRSP 
ShortSideStock = 1 for purchases if StockTercile=3; = 1 for sales StockTercile=1; zero 
otherwise 
CRSP 
SmallTrade = 1 if number of shares traded is <500, zero otherwise IFDF 
SOX = 1 if trade is executed after August 28, 2002, zero otherwise IFDF 
Stake = Number of shares traded by insider / total number of shares IFDF/ 
CRSP 
StakeDecile Decile of the Stake traded in the transaction of all sample transac-
tions, ranging between 1 (lowest) and 10 (highest) 
IFDF/ 
CRSP 
Stealth = 1 for all transactions of a trading sequence, where the first transac-
tion is only disclosed after (or on the same day) the insider has traded 
in the same direction again 
IFDF 
StockTercile Tercile of the firm's stock return in the previous calendar month of all 
sample firm's stock returns, ranging between 1 (lowest) and 3 (high-
est) 
CRSP 
Turnover = total number of shares traded on the transaction day / total number 
of shares 
CRSP 
Volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns over the preced-
ing calendar month 
CRSP 
Volume Volume of the transaction in thousand U.S. $ Compustat 
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Table 5.2: Sample design 
This table displays how our sample is constructed from raw Thomson Reuters Insider Filing database (IFDF) 
data to our final sample. We include all open market and private transactions in the IFDF database (Table One) 
between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2006 in our initial data set. We report the losses of observations after 
matching the IFDF data with CRSP, because of missing information, and consistency checks. 
 Transactions % Firms Insider 
IFDF data 2,432,168 100.0% 16,522 137,806 
Observations lost because of:     
   Missing stock data on CRSP 372,463 15.3%   
   Missing price or volume information on IFDF 6,526 0.3%   
   Purchases and sales by the same insider on the same day 17,089 0.7%   
   # shares traded > total # of shares traded at the same day 116,316 4.8%   
   Insufficient data for event window or estimation period 64,706 2.7%   
Final sample 1,855,068 76.3% 9,563 97,205 
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics 
This table displays descriptive statistics for 29 variables used in our analysis. See Table 5.1 for a definition of all 
variables. Insider trading data are taken from IFDF, accounting data from Compustat, market data from CRSP 
and information about spreads from TAQTIC. 
Variable N Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max 
AfterEarnAnnounce 1,855,068 0.200 0 0.400 0 1 
Amihud 1,774,488 2.765 0.004 206.543 0 59,685 
BeforeEarnAnnounce 1,855,068 0.045 0 0.206 0 1 
CCI 1,855,068 107.117 105.100 17.782 61.4 145 
CEO 1,855,068 0.177 0 0.382 0 1 
ChairmanBoard 1,855,068 0.123 0 0.329 0 1 
DaysAfter 1,708,233 33.335 0 139.874 0 3927 
DaysBefore 1,709,243 33.396 0 139.976 0 3927 
Delay 1,855,068 21.010 4 74.931 0 3635 
Director 1,855,068 0.407 0 0.491 0 1 
EffectiveSpread 613,345 0.36% 0.12% 0.94% 0.00% 50.00% 
InsiderImpactPurchases 147,357 0.045 0.000 0.311 -3.544 2.543 
InsiderImpactSales 325,645 -0.005 -0.001 0.147 -4.613 9.950 
MarketCap (in million $) 1,855,068 8,521 761 30,968 0 571,816 
MultipleInsiders 1,855,068 0.400 0 0.490 0 1 
Officer 1,855,068 0.409 0 0.492 0 1 
OtherInsider 1,855,068 0.162 0 0.369 0 1 
PurchaseDummy 1,855,068 0.209 0 0.407 0.000 1.000 
PurchasesAR 147,357 0.002 0.000 0.044 -0.514 1.012 
PurchasesCAR 147,357 0.027 0.009 0.175 -1.854 7.138 
QuarterlyReport 1,770,028 0.999 1 0.038 0 1 
R&D 1,770,028 0.047 0.000 0.096 0.000 3.956 
RelativeSpread 613,379 0.43% 0.14% 1.10% 0.02% 50.00% 
RunupCAR 473,002 -0.030 -0.019 0.181 -8.928 3.130 
Sales (in million $) 1,736,672 3,371 466 12,962 0 345,977 
SalesAR 325,645 -0.001 -0.002 0.034 -0.692 1.293 
SalesCAR 325,645 -0.027 -0.018 0.150 -1.746 4.091 
ShortSideMarket 1,855,068 0.266 0 0.442 0 1 
ShortSideStock 1,855,068 0.233 0 0.423 0 1 
SOX 1,855,068 0.588 1 0.492 0 1 
Stake 1,855,068 0.036% 0.004% 0.234% 0.000% 65.804% 
Stealth 1,855,068 0.869 1 0.337 0 1 
StockTercile 1,836,305 2.185 2 0.820 1 3 
Turnover 1,855,068 0.017 0.007 0.071 0.000 14.228 
Volatility 1,838,268 0.517 0.409 0.405 0.011 15.589 
Volume (in thousand $) 1,855,068 301 31 3,289 0 883,742 
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Table 5.4: Existence of stealth trading 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
This table displays the percentage of transactions, which are followed by a transaction in the same direction 
(separated for purchases and sales). Please note that the total number of transactions is reduced and the percent-
age of sales is different compared to the original sample because the first transaction of each individual insider in 
each firm can only be used as benchmark for the next transaction by the insider in the respective firm. 





first for each 
person 
Only within 
183 days of 
each other 
Only within 
40 days of 
each other 
Same Direction    
     Sales 98.7% 99.6% 99.8% 
     Purchases 96.8% 98.7% 99.4% 
% Sales / Total 80.5% 81.0% 82.0% 
# of observations 1,737,495 1,628,811 1,513,281 
P-value Chi2-test 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
P-value Fisher exact test 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Panel B: Probit regressions 
The table presents results for Probit regressions with PurchaseDummy as dependent variable. See Table 5.1 for a 
definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluated at the 
mean of the independent variables) and in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for a coefficient 
equal to zero. In all regressions, t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Addition-
ally, the p-values of the F-test that the coefficient of LagPurchaseDummy is equal to its unconditional mean and 
McFadden’s R² are reported. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LagPurchaseDummy 0.9387 0.9364 0.9370 0.9387 0.9347 
 (814.48) (807.27) (786.28) (814.78) (779.31) 
CCI  0.0006   0.0005 
  (37.90)   (35.76) 
StockTercile   -0.0250  -0.0244 
   (-79.56)  (-78.63) 
RunupCAR    -0.0018 0.0023 
    (-1.19) (1.61) 
Observations 1,737,495 1,737,495 1,720,191 1,737,495 1,720,191 
Pseudo R² 0.842 0.843 0.846 0.842 0.847 
LagPurchaseDummy = 0.195 (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) 
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Table 5.5: Summary statistics: non-stealth vs. stealth trades 
This table compares descriptive statistics for 13 variables used in our analysis for stealth and non-stealth transac-
tions. See Table 5.1 for a definition of all variables. For each variable, the table displays in parentheses, the p-
value of the two-sided t-test on the equality of means and the p-value of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
N Mean Median N Mean Median T-test Wilcox-on testVariable 
Non-stealth trades Single stealth trades     
SmallTrade 243,087 0.166 0 1,613,351 0.285 0 (0.0%) (0.0%)
MediumTrade 243,087 0.546 1 1,613,351 0.543 1 (0.4%) (0.4%)
LargeTrade 243,087 0.289 0 1,613,351 0.172 0 (0.0%) (0.0%)
Volume 243,087 480.0 56.6 1,613,351 274.1 28.8 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Stake 243,087 0.066% 0.011% 1,613,351 0.031% 0.004% (0.0%) (0.0%) 
PurchaseDummy 243,087 0.369 0 1,613,351 0.185 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
 Non-stealth trades Aggregated stealth trades     
SmallTrade 242,779 0.164 0 230,223 0.038 0 (0.0%) (0.0%)
MediumTrade 242,779 0.547 1 230,223 0.354 0 (0.0%) (0.0%)
LargeTrade 242,779 0.289 0 230,223 0.608 1 (0.0%) (0.0%)
Volume 242,779 480.6 56.9 230,223 1,920.8 261.4 (0.0%) (0.0%)
Stake 242,779 0.066% 0.011% 230,223 0.219% 0.049% (0.0%) (0.0%)
PurchaseDummy 242,779 0.369 0 230,223 0.251 0 (0.0%) (0.0%)
InsiderImpactPurchases 89,632 0.078 0.000 57,725 -0.006 -0.002 (0.0%) (0.0%)
InsiderImpactSales 153,147 -0.016 -0.001 172,498 0.004 -0.001 (0.0%) (0.0%)
PurchasesAR 89,632 0.002 0.000 57,725 0.003 0.000 (0.5%) (51.4%)
PurchasesCAR 89,632 0.022 0.006 57,725 0.036 0.014 (0.0%) (0.0%)
SalesAR 153,147 -0.001 -0.001 172,498 -0.001 -0.002 (93.7%) (0.0%)
SalesCAR 153,147 -0.023 -0.016 172,498 -0.031 -0.021 (0.0%) (0.0%)
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Table 5.6: Stealth trading at the firm level 
This table displays the mean and median for six firm level variables. Firms are grouped by their proportion of 
stealth trades relative to all insider transactions in a given year. StealthQuintile=1 contains those firm-year ob-
servations with the lowest proportion of stealth trading. StealthQuintile=5 contains those firm-year observations 
with the highest proportion of stealth trading. See Table 5.1 for a definition of all variables. Turnover is defined 
here as the average daily turnover of shares over the preceding calendar year. Volatility is defined here as the 
annualized standard deviation of daily excess returns (from market model) over the preceding calendar year. 
StealthQuintile Variable N Mean Median 
1 MarketCap 9977 2,001.4 140.3 
 Sales 8605 1,723.8 136.5 
 Turnover 9728 0.56% 0.31% 
 Volatility 9722 56.83% 46.24% 
 EffectiveSpread 2658 0.93% 0.36% 
  RelativeSpread 2658 1.13% 0.48% 
2 MarketCap 9981 3,236.4 304.3 
 Sales 9166 2,391.2 259.3 
 Turnover 9877 0.58% 0.35% 
 Volatility 9874 49.43% 40.77% 
 EffectiveSpread 3193 0.62% 0.29% 
  RelativeSpread 3193 0.76% 0.37% 
3 MarketCap 9979 2,968.1 282.2 
 Sales 9085 2,145.0 216.9 
 Turnover 9874 0.66% 0.40% 
 Volatility 9874 55.71% 47.48% 
 EffectiveSpread 2953 0.71% 0.30% 
  RelativeSpread 2953 0.86% 0.38% 
4 MarketCap 9982 2,638.4 303.3 
 Sales 9091 1,749.5 215.9 
 Turnover 9852 0.74% 0.47% 
 Volatility 9852 60.81% 52.68% 
 EffectiveSpread 2739 0.67% 0.28% 
  RelativeSpread 2739 0.81% 0.36% 
5 MarketCap 9982 1,876.7 164.7 
 Sales 8678 1,225.6 139.7 
 Turnover 9731 0.73% 0.45% 
 Volatility 9726 68.24% 58.90% 
 EffectiveSpread 2461 0.99% 0.34% 
  RelativeSpread 2461 1.21% 0.44% 
All MarketCap 49901 2,544.2 229.3 
 Sales 44625 1,855.0 189.1 
 Turnover 49062 0.65% 0.39% 
 Volatility 49048 58.18% 48.68% 
 EffectiveSpread 14004 0.77% 0.31% 
  RelativeSpread 14004 0.94% 0.40% 
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Table 5.7: Determinants of stealth trading 
The table presents results for Probit regressions with Stealth as dependent variable. See Table 5.1 for a definition 
of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of 
the independent variables) and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for a coefficient equal to 
zero. In all regressions, p-values are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Additionally, the p-
values of the F-tests for the equality of the coefficients on CEO and Officer as well as ChairmanBoard and Di-
rector are displayed. McFadden’s R² is reported. 
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    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LogMarketCap 0.0457 0.0458 0.0492 0.0489 0.0447 0.0432 
    (40.36) (40.23) (88.57) (86.42) (42.25) (40.90) 
StakeDecile 0.0867 0.0867 0.0845 0.0838 0.0883 0.0864 
 (124.56) (124.57) (223.45) (219.34) (123.16) (123.16) 
EffectiveSpread 1.0405      
 (5.68)      
RelativeSpread  0.9048     
  (5.73)     
TurnoverDay   -0.2554  -2.3806  
   (-7.72)  (-9.16)  
Amihud    0.00002  0.00020 
     (1.69)  (0.75) 








  (13.77) (13.77) (27.47) (25.92) (15.28) (13.40) 
CEO 0.0048 0.0048 0.0086 0.0080 0.0039 0.0042 
 (0.74) (0.74) (2.68) (2.46) (0.60) (0.64) 
Officer -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0079 -0.0095 -0.0032 -0.0026 
 (-0.96) (-0.97) (-4.11) (-4.86) (-0.93) (-0.74) 
ChairmanBoard 0.0118 0.0117 0.0142 0.0152 0.0096 0.0127 
 (1.75) (1.74) (3.96) (4.15) (1.42) (1.86) 








  (13.02) (13.03) (24.41) (23.50) (12.80) (13.07) 
VolatilityMonth -0.0111 -0.0113 0.0254 0.0197 0.0225 0.0030 
 (-1.44) (-1.47) (9.24) (7.14) (2.89) (0.39) 
QuarterlyReport -0.1129 -0.1137 -0.1784 -0.1815 -0.1101 -0.1125 
 (-2.06) (-2.08) (-7.40) (-7.41) (-2.01) (-2.06) 
R&D 0.1978 0.1974 0.0643 0.0584 0.2095 0.2241 
 (4.61) (4.59) (6.24) (5.59) (4.82) (4.92) 
BeforeEarnAnnounce 0.0030 0.0031 0.0191 0.0191 0.0079 0.0044 
 (0.40) (0.41) (4.76) (4.66) (1.04) (0.58) 








 (5.13) (5.13) (8.95) (8.86) (5.51) (5.03) 




  (-0.55) (-0.59) (11.43) (10.81) (0.23) (-0.36) 
ShortSideStock 0.0157 0.0157 0.0125 0.0129 0.0148 0.0155 
 (4.31) (4.31) (6.28) (6.37) (4.04) (4.21) 
ShortSideMarket 0.0027 0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0033 0.0025 0.0032 H
. 5
 
 (0.80) (0.80) (-1.36) (-1.74) (0.74) (0.94) 
 SOX 0.0179 0.0180 -0.0186 -0.0166 0.0154 0.0169 
    (1.69) (1.69) (-3.07) (-2.73) (1.44) (1.58) 
 Observations 140,566 140,566 444,278 427,491 140,566 138,559 
  Pseudo R² 0.146 0.146 0.138 0.137 0.148 0.146 
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Board=Director (8.0%) (8.3%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (15.7%) (6.3%) 
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Table 5.8: Stealth trading and the role of insider 
This table displays for different roles of insiders the mean and median of five transaction variables separated for sales and purchases. See Table 5.1 for a definition of all vari-
ables. 
    CEO Officer Chairman Director Other 
    Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Sales Volume 329.7 27.6 291.0 49.0 468.5 36.8 341.2 35.3 573.1 42.8 
 Stake 0.024% 0.002% 0.020% 0.003% 0.026% 0.002% 0.032% 0.004% 0.095% 0.009% 
 InsiderImpactSales -0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.007 -0.001 
 SalesAR -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 SalesCAR -0.030 -0.023 -0.032 -0.021 -0.028 -0.020 -0.029 -0.020 -0.030 -0.023 
 Stealth 0.951 1.000 0.859 1.000 0.954 1.000 0.909 1.000 0.951 1.000 
Purchases Volume 75.2 8.8 44.4 6.8 89.5 11.2 69.7 10.1 183.7 20.6 
 Stake 0.040% 0.010% 0.026% 0.005% 0.046% 0.011% 0.037% 0.008% 0.066% 0.011% 
 InsiderImpactPurchases 0.001 -0.004 0.020 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 0.016 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 
 PurchasesAR 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.001 
 PurchasesCAR 0.043 0.020 0.035 0.014 0.033 0.013 0.031 0.011 0.012 0.001 
  Stealth 0.805 1.000 0.626 1.000 0.838 1.000 0.692 1.000 0.966 1.000 
All Volume 294.0 23.4 262.1 38.9 420.5 31.2 279.3 25.5 416.1 31.5 
 Stake 0.026% 0.002% 0.021% 0.004% 0.029% 0.003% 0.033% 0.004% 0.083% 0.009% 
  Stealth 0.931 1.000 0.832 1.000 0.939 1.000 0.859 1.000 0.957 1.000 
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Table 5.9: Abnormal disclosure day returns and stealth trading 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with abnormal disclosure day returns as dependent variable. The 
1-day event window is the disclosure date of the first transaction of a series of stealth trades or the disclosure 
date of a non-stealth trade. See Table 5.1 for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table 
displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the p-value of the two-sided t-test for zero slope. In all OLS 
regressions, t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
  Purchases Sales Purchases Sales 
 OLS OLS (Winsorized 1%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Stealth 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0001 
 (2.72) (-2.12) (0.08) (2.10) (2.74) (-2.06) (-1.59) (1.13) 
LogMarketCap  -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0002  0.0000 
  (-3.79)  (-3.04)  (-3.10)  (-0.90) 
StakeDecile  0.0004  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000 
  (6.31)  (-1.22)  (6.61)  (0.22) 
Turnover  0.0251  -0.0069  0.0183  -0.0059 
  (3.17)  (-2.91)  (3.08)  (-3.33) 
Volatility  0.0026  -0.0002  0.0016  -0.0017 
  (4.08)  (-0.28)  (3.38)  (-5.68) 
CEO  0.0004  0.0002  0.0004  0.0002 
  (0.91)  (0.71)  (0.88)  (0.81) 
Officer  0.0007  0.0002  0.0007  0.0003 
  (1.84)  (1.10)  (2.08)  (1.88) 
ChairmanBoard  0.0009  0.0003  0.0007  0.0003 
  (1.48)  (1.03)  (1.36)  (1.22) 
Director  0.0006  -0.0001  0.0005  0.0000 
  (1.60)  (-0.28)  (1.65)  (0.15) 
MultipleInsiders  0.0011  -0.0004  0.0011  -0.0004 
  (4.33)  (-3.38)  (4.89)  (-4.10) 
SOX  0.0041  0.0006  0.0036  0.0006 
  (4.44)  (1.14)  (4.52)  (1.33) 
Observations 147,357 136,404 325,645 307,905 147,357 136,404 325,645 307,905
Adjusted R² 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.003 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table 5.10: Univariate comparisons of stealth trading characteristics 
before and after SOX 
This table displays mean and median Timespan, Number of transactions, aggregated Volume, aggregated Stake, 
average Volume, and average Stake of stealth trades for two legal regimes. Trades are defined as stealth if the 
last trade in a series of trades occurs before the first trade has been disclosed (or maximum 40 days after the first 
trade). For each variable, the table displays in parentheses, the p-value of the two-sided t-test on the equality of 
means and the p-value of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
  N Mean Median Standard deviation T-test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Timespan between first and last trade (in days) 
Period up to August 28, 2002 120,530 8.14 4.000 9.938   
Period after August 28, 2002 109,693 1.33 0.000 3.408 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Number of days between stealth trades of one series 
Period up to August 28, 2002 516,045 1.89 0.000 4.371   
Period after August 28, 2002 866,020 0.17 0.000 1.093 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Number of transactions (in a series) 
Period up to August 28, 2002 120,530 5.29 3.000 10.312   
Period after August 28, 2002 109,693 8.88 3.000 24.991 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Aggregated Volume in thousand $ (of all trades in one series) 
Period up to August 28, 2002 120,530 2,353 263.0 25,185   
Period after August 28, 2002 109,693 1,439 259.8 8,055 (0.0%) (26.3%) 
Average Volume in thousand $ (per individual trade) 
Period up to August 28, 2002 120,530 445 49.7 4,759   
Period after August 28, 2002 109,693 162 29.2 907 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Aggregated Stake (of all trades in one series) 
Period up to August 28, 2002 120,530 0.29% 0.07% 0.96%   
Period after August 28, 2002 109,693 0.14% 0.04% 0.64% (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Average Stake (per individual trade) 
Period up to August 28, 2002 120,530 0.05% 0.013% 0.181%   
Period after August 28, 2002 109,693 0.02% 0.004% 0.072% (0.0%) (0.0%) 
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Table 5.11: Price impact of insider transactions and stealth trading 
This table presents results for OLS regressions with abnormal price impact of insider transactions as dependent 
variable (InsiderImpactPurchases and InsiderImpactSales). See Table 5.1 for a definition of all variables. For 
each independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the p-value of the two-sided 
t-test for zero slope. In all OLS regressions, t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
  Purchases Sales Purchases Sales 
  OLS OLS (Winsorized 1%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Stealth -0.0837 -0.0810 0.0206 0.0199 -0.0165 -0.0139 0.0043 0.0049 
 (-62.04) (-49.39) (38.35) (35.34) (-43.33) (-32.05) (26.62) (29.66) 
LogMarketCap  -0.0268  0.0071  -0.0032  0.0011 
  (-41.53)  (27.02)  (-21.90)  (16.57) 
StakeDecile  -0.0006  -0.0011  -0.0006  -0.0007 
  (-1.37)  (-6.22)  (-6.33)  (-15.92) 
Turnover  -0.0008  0.3971  0.1800  0.0875 
  (-0.02)  (5.41)  (8.36)  (7.67) 
Volatility  -0.0443  0.0082  -0.0138  0.0021 
  (-14.35)  (3.70)  (-16.77)  (3.10) 
CEO  -0.0043  -0.0008  -0.0003  -0.0006 
  (-1.36)  (-0.77)  (-0.35)  (-1.66) 
Officer  -0.0023  0.0019  0.0012  0.0007 
  (-0.91)  (2.32)  (2.01)  (2.43) 
ChairmanBoard  -0.0021  0.0000  -0.0030  -0.0012 
  (-0.52)  (-0.02)  (-2.87)  (-2.92) 
Director  -0.0039  -0.0006  -0.0031  -0.0013 
  (-1.72)  (-0.71)  (-5.32)  (-4.86) 
MultipleInsiders  -0.0180  0.0001  -0.0011  0.0014 
  (-10.42)  (0.18)  (-2.49)  (7.51) 
SOX  0.0000  -0.0064  0.0005  -0.0007 
   (-0.01)  (-3.01)  (0.37)  (-1.07) 
Observations 147,357 136,404 325,645 307,905 147,357 136,404 325,645 307,905 
Adjusted R² 0.017 0.055 0.005 0.070 0.012 0.030 0.002 0.040 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry dum-
mies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table 5.12: Abnormal outsider returns and stealth trading 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with abnormal outsider returns CAR(1,20) as dependent variable. 
The event window starts (t=1) the next trading day after the disclosure date (t=0) of the first transaction of a 
series of stealth trades or the disclosure date of a non-stealth trade. See Table 5.1 for a definition of all variables. 
For each independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the p-value of the two-
sided t-test for zero slope. In all OLS regressions, t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. 
  Purchases Sales Purchases Sales 
 OLS OLS (Winsorized 1%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Stealth 0.0141 0.0011 -0.0075 0.0012 0.0127 0.0006 -0.0074 0.0006 
 (14.61) (1.06) (-14.34) (2.15) (14.92) (0.58) (-15.95) (1.16) 
LogMarketCap  -0.0047  -0.0045  -0.0039  -0.0034 
  (-14.13)  (-21.70)  (-13.12)  (-19.68)
StakeDecile  0.0030  -0.0027  0.0031  -0.0024 
  (13.26)  (-21.51)  (15.18)  (-20.89)
Turnover  0.0592  -0.0747  0.0525  -0.0622 
  (2.01)  (-10.31)  (2.05)  (-8.71) 
Volatility  0.0241  -0.0375  0.0182  -0.0388 
  (8.87)  (-17.79)  (8.67)  (-26.26)
CEO  0.0097  -0.0040  0.0090  -0.0034 
  (5.09)  (-3.65)  (5.45)  (-3.52) 
Officer  0.0131  -0.0038  0.0129  -0.0036 
  (9.29)  (-4.78)  (10.20)  (-5.03) 
ChairmanBoard  0.0021  0.0056  0.0026  0.0048 
  (0.86)  (4.56)  (1.21)  (4.40) 
Director  0.0072  -0.0012  0.0066  -0.0010 
  (5.26)  (-1.49)  (5.36)  (-1.41) 
MultipleInsiders  0.0099  -0.0108  0.0098  -0.0099 
  (10.08)  (-19.33)  (11.05)  (-19.88)
SOX  0.0371  0.0143  0.0328  0.0121 
  (10.28)  (6.60)  (10.46)  (6.16) 
Observations 147,357 136,404 325,645 307,905 147,357 136,404 325,645 307,905
Adjusted R² 0.002 0.036 0.001 0.029 0.002 0.037 0.001 0.033 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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10 Figures 
Figure 5.1: Average volume of insider transactions 
Panel A: Single stealth trades vs. non-stealth trades 
The figure displays the development of the average volume (in thousand $) of single stealth trades and non-
stealth transactions over the sample period. The dashed vertical line marks the quarter when the Sarbanes-Oxley 
act came into force. 
 
 
Panel B: Aggregated stealth trades vs. non-stealth trades 
The figure displays the development of the average volume (in thousand $) of non-stealth transactions and ag-
gregated stealth trading sequences over the sample period. The dashed vertical line marks the quarter when the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act came into force. 
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Figure 5.2: Average stake traded by insiders 
Panel A: Single stealth vs. non-stealth trades 
The figure displays the development of the average stake (= #shares traded / total #shares outstanding) traded in 
single stealth and non-stealth transactions over the sample period. The dashed vertical line marks the quarter 
when the Sarbanes-Oxley act came into force. 
 
 
Panel B: Aggregated stealth vs. non-stealth trades 
The figure displays the development of the average stake (= #shares traded / total #shares outstanding) of non-
stealth transactions and aggregated stealth trading sequences over the sample period. The dashed vertical line 
marks the quarter when the Sarbanes-Oxley act came into force. 
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Figure 5.3: Proportion of stealth trades of all insider transactions 
Panel A: Number of trades 
The figure displays the development of the proportion of stealth trades of all insider transactions over the sample 
period. The dashed vertical line marks the quarter when the Sarbanes-Oxley act came into force. 
 
 
Panel B: Volume and Stake 
The figure displays the development of the total volume (in U.S. $) of stealth trades relative to the total volume 
of all insider transactions (StealthVolume) and total stakes traded (% of shares outstanding) in stealth trades 
relative to the total stakes traded in all insider transactions (StealthStake) over the sample period. The dashed 
vertical line marks the quarter when the Sarbanes-Oxley act came into force. 
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Figure 5.4: Average time span of a stealth trading sequence 
The figure displays the development of the average time span between the first and the last trade in stealth trad-
ing sequence over the sample period. The dashed vertical line marks the quarter when the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
came into force. 
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Figure 5.5: Average time span between two consecutive trades in a 
stealth trading sequence 
The figure displays the development of the average number of days between the single trades in a stealth trading 




Figure 5.6: Average number of transactions in a stealth trading sequence 
The figure displays the development of the average number of transactions in a stealth trading sequence over the 
sample period. The dashed vertical line marks the quarter when the Sarbanes-Oxley act came into force. 
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Figure 5.7: Average reporting delay of insider transactions 
The figure displays the development of the average number of days between the trading and the reporting date 
for non-stealth and stealth transactions over the sample period. The dashed vertical line marks the quarter when 
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